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1 Introduction: Decentralisation as a Pathway out 
of Poverty and Confl ict? 
Gordon Crawford and Christof Hartmann
Decentralisation entails the transfer of power, responsibilities and finance from 
central government to sub-national levels of government at provincial and/or lo-
cal levels. Its current popularity, especially in the developing world, is unparal-
leled, with 80 per cent of all developing and transition countries undertaking 
some form of decentralisation over the past two decades (ICHRP 2005: 11). In 
Africa south of the Sahara , the focus of this book, there are few countries that 
have not implemented decentralisation reforms. 
Th is is remarkable, as Africa has a long history of formally centralised rule 
which dates back to colonial times, and in some instances much beyond. Independ-
ence constitutions did provide, at least in the former British colonies, for a fully 
established system of local government with elected councils. Th ese had respon-
sibilities for the delivery of services such as education , health, roads, water supply 
and agricultural extension, as well as a level of resources. Although attempts at 
state centralisation in independent Africa might not have been as successful as in-
tended, the imperative of nation-building, the realities of single-party or military 
rule and the necessities of centralised planning led to the marginalisation or out-
right suppression of these elected local and district councils and their competen-
cies throughout the late 1960s and 1970s. In their support for modernisation and 
Keynesianism at that time, the donor community equally pressed for the establish-
ment of strong central state institutions. Local government did continue to exist 
in many places, but with little power and resources, and thus local authorities lost 
both their role in the political and development process and also their legitimacy 
with local populations. Few authoritarian regimes were willing to cede any control 
over resources to other state institutions, with the notable exception of Nigeria ’s 
military regime which initiated a substantial decentralisation programme in 1976.
Against this background, at first sight, there appears nowadays to be a remark-
able consensus on the desirability of decentralisation, with support coming from 
international development agencies (the ‘donors’) and civil society organisations 
 Gordon Crawford and Christof Hartmann
alike, as well as – at least officially – from central governments who are charged 
with its implementation. Potential advantages of decentralisation are seen in both 
democratic and developmental terms. Government is brought closer to the people, 
in theory allowing greater influence on local public affairs, with local government 
perceived as more responsive to local needs, inclusive of the majority poor. Yet it 
is not at all clear that the anticipated benefits are being realised. Many studies to 
date, some of which are discussed below, have highlighted that decentralisation 
is complex, multi-faceted and faces many challenges, and has variable outcomes. 
The aim of this book is to contribute to this literature, with a particular emphasis 
on the outcomes of decentralisation in Africa on the two themes of poverty re-
duction and the management of violent conflict . 
This initial chapter introduces the book. It proceeds in five sections. First, 
key terms are defined. Second, the motives, claims and issues concerning decen-
tralisation are outlined. Third and fourth, the recent literature and debates on 
decentralisation and poverty reduction and on decentralisation and conflict man-
agement are discussed in turn. Finally, the structure of, and contributions to, this 
book are outlined.
1. Defi nitions of Key Concepts 
1.1. Decentralisation 
Although decentralisation is very prevalent, its form and extent varies greatly 
across countries. Difficulties in understanding and comparing decentralisation 
policies have been intensified by a multitude of definitions used by practitioners 
and scholars. One main controversy since the early 1980s has involved the ques-
tion of whether the concept of decentralisation should be restricted to the verti-
cal process of shifting competencies and resources from the central state level to 
territorially defined sub-national levels of government, or whether the concept 
should also include the horizontal process of decentralising competencies and 
resources at a given level of government through processes such as delegation 
and privatisation . It was Rondinelli et al.’s (1983) influential book that first pro-
posed a comprehensive typology encompassing both the horizontal and vertical 
dimensions of decentralisation. Subsequently Rondinelli came under strong at-
tack (Slater, 1989) both for the analytical weakness of such a broad categorisation 
and the political agenda behind it, i.e. seeing administrative-political devolution 
in its instrumental role for economic liberalisation and for downsizing the role 
of the state in the development process. Many developing countries eventually 
introduced a mix of delegation, privatisation and deconcentration , while leaving 
out the politically most relevant sub-type of devolution. 
A Pathway out of Poverty and Conflict?
Although the new emphasis on local governance in both industrialised and 
developing societies since the 1990s makes the analysis of non-state actors in poli-
tics and developmental processes and their coordination with public agents and 
institutions a priority, there are good reasons to adopt here a concept of vertical 
decentralisation, and to include its political, administrative and fiscal elements. 
While still allowing a range of conceptual differences, it makes empirical analysis 
and cross-national comparison possible by focussing on the decision space and 
discretionary power of sub-national levels of government. 
In defining decentralisation from this perspective, it is common to outline 
three different forms that emphasise one or other of these elements, as exempli-
fied by Manor (1999: 5):
Devolution (or democratic decentralisation), i.e. transfer of power and resourc-
es to sub-national authorities that are both (relatively) independent of central 
government and democratically elected.
Deconcentration (or administrative decentralisation), i.e. the transfer of au-
thority to sub-national branches of the central state, often to line ministry of-
ficials based in local areas. 
Fiscal decentralisation, i.e. authority over budgets ceded to deconcentrated of-
ficials and/or unelected appointees or to elected politicians. 
One minor controversy concerns whether fiscal decentralisation is actually a 
third main type of decentralisation. Ribot (2002: iii) argues that it is a cross-
cutting element of both deconcentration and devolution , rather than a separate 
category, an analysis which is accepted here. Thus two main forms of decentrali-
sation can be distinguished – devolution and deconcentration – although it is 
recognised that this distinction is often blurred in practice, as highlighted in some 
of the chapters here. While decentralisation’s popularity has been evident from 
the early 1980s (Conyers 1983), it has itself undergone a shift in emphasis from 
deconcentration in the 1980s to devolution in the 1990s. Whereas deconcentra-
tion (and privatisation ) was closely related to structural adjustment programmes 
and attempts to break up the power of the centralised state, influenced by prevail-
ing neo-liberalism, a shift towards democratic decentralisation was linked with 
the general democratisation trends from the early 1990s onwards, especially in 
Africa (Olowu and Wunsch, 2004: 38), and a related change in donor emphasis 
toward participatory governance. 
Claims and expectations of decentralisation usually assume a devolved form 
and some have even proposed to disregard deconcentration as a form of decen-
tralisation (Mawhood, 1993). In this book, we are concerned primarily with devo-
lution (or democratic decentralisation) and its impact on poverty reduction and 
conflict management , with authors also drawing attention to the various limita-
tions and obstacles to genuine devolution. 
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1.2. Poverty and poverty reduction 
Since the turn of the millennium, it has become very common to take a multidi-
mensional approach to poverty . This is evident from the work of two influential 
sources, the World Bank and the Development Assistance Committee (DAC ) of 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) . In its 
Attacking Poverty report, the World Bank (2001: 15-19) defines poverty as multi-
ple human deprivation, inclusive of economic deprivation as well as social and po-
litical dimensions. The traditional economic dimension entails low income levels 
and an inability to meet basic household consumption needs. The social dimen-
sion focuses on health and education levels, measured by such indicators as infant 
and under-five mortality rates, life expectancy, and primary school enrolment 
rates, as well as vulnerability over time to income or health poverty and other 
risks such as violence and crime. The political dimension of poverty entails what 
the World Bank terms ‘voicelessness and powerlessness’, measured by a combina-
tion of participatory methods and indicators such as the extent of civil and politi-
cal liberties. Similarly the OECD DAC (2001) defines the multidimensionality 
of poverty as including economic, human, political, socio-cultural and protective 
dimensions. For the World Bank (2001: 7-8), a poverty reduction strategy entails 
three policy responses to the multidimensional nature of poverty, described as 
‘promoting opportunity, facilitating empowerment and enhancing security’. ‘Pro-
moting opportunity’ encompasses both economic and social deprivation and in-
volves the expansion of opportunities for poor people to increase incomes and to 
access basic services. ‘Facilitating empowerment’ addresses the political dimension 
and focuses both on strengthening the participation of poor people in political 
processes and on state institutions becoming more responsive and accountable to 
the poor. ‘Enhancing security’ pertains to measures aimed at reducing overall vul-
nerability, with a particular emphasis on health- and climate-related risks. 
In exploring the relationship between decentralisation and poverty reduction , 
this book will take a multidimensional approach to poverty and examine various 
and interrelated aspects of poverty and poverty reduction. In particular it will fo-
cus on whether the anticipated positive linkages have been realised or not, as well 
as considering the adverse impact of various constraints and challenges.
1.3. Confl ict and confl ict management 
The concept of conflict is at least as contested and multidimensional as poverty . 
Conflicts are ubiquitous in many dimensions of daily life. Some theories locate 
their sources in the nature of the protagonists (anthropological theories), or in 
relations between conflict parties (behavioural sociology and social psychology). 
A Pathway out of Poverty and Conflict?
We follow here the structural approach of Galtung who sees conflicts emerging 
from contradictions in the structure of society. They then become manifest in 
conflicting attitudes and behaviour (Galtung, 1996). According to this ‘conflict 
triangle ’, once conflicts are formed they undergo various processes of transfor-
mation, but all three dimensions (structural contradiction, behaviour, attitudes) 
remain equally important and have to be taken into account in any attempt to 
solve or transform a conflict. 
In development policy debates, there is a strong tendency to identify structural 
factors such as unequal distribution of socio-economic resources or bad govern-
ance as key causes of conflicts. These factors are important, though they should 
not be overestimated in relation to factors which trigger the outbreak or escala-
tion of conflicts on a more short-term basis. The latter include, for instance, a 
change of regime, reform measures impacting negatively on individual sections of 
the population, politically-motivated assassinations (or assassination attempts) 
and economic crises of a cyclical nature (Ropers, 2002).
If there is little agreement about the causes of confl ict , there is even less con-
sensus about the possibility of ending confl icts. Much policy-oriented analysis and 
political discourse within Africa suggests that confl icts are inherently negative and 
can be resolved by modifying confl ictive behaviour and attitudes and removing the 
structural contradictions at the root of the confl ict. Much of the scholarly debate is 
more sceptical for both empirical and theoretical reasons. Empirically we observe 
many protracted social confl icts over scarce resources where attempts at removing 
structural contradictions have constantly failed. A major strand in the theoretical 
debate has also defended the idea that confl ict itself is not only an unavoidable ele-
ment of social interaction but also a ‘positive’ element of development:
‘Confl ict is an intrinsic and inevitable aspect of social change. It is an ex-
pression of the heterogeneity of interests, values and beliefs that arise as 
new formations generated by social change come up against inherited con-
straints.’ (Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 1999)
These conflicts may lead to political crisis and destructive escalations of violence 
affecting whole societies primarily during phases of socio-economic and political 
transformation. The problem is then not the conflicts per se, but the way in which 
they are managed and resolved (Rupesinghe, 1998).
The traditional idea of conflict resolution which assumes the overcoming of 
the original incompatibility of interests has proven to be ambitious especially in 
conflicts over identity and values, while conflicts over material resources are more 
amenable to a solution by reframing of interests or compromises. It is in this con-
text that the idea of conflict management has become prominent. It acknowledges 
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the structural contradictions in a social context as given for the time being, and 
restricts itself to modifying conflictive behaviour and attitudes. Although con-
flict management is often used in the restricted sense of limiting, mitigating or 
containing violent conflict, we will use it here as a concept that covers the various 
ways of positive conflict handling (Harris and Reilly, 1998). 
2. Decentralisation : Motives, Claims and Issues
2.1. Motives
Although the forms and degrees of decentralisation vary greatly, not only is decen-
tralisation very widespread geographically, but there appears to be a remarkable 
consensus on its desirability amongst diverse actors. It is a consensus that seems 
to encompass both the political left and right. The neo-liberal right supports 
decentralisation because it entails a further shrinking of the powers of the cen-
tralised state. The political left also supports decentralisation because it is associ-
ated with an agenda of democratic deepening, with some progressive civil society 
organisations seeing decentralisation as providing greater opportunities for influ-
encing decision-making processes at the local level. Advocacy of decentralisation 
comes from various sources, inclusive of donor agencies and local pro-democracy 
movements (Devas and Delay, 2006: 678; Thede, 2008: 3) and ostensibly from 
central governments themselves. Yet, it is clear that this apparent consensus con-
ceals a variety of interests and motives (Thede, 2008: 3). Goals have also evolved 
and altered somewhat over the past quarter of a century. As mentioned above, in 
the 1980s, decentralisation in Africa and elsewhere was closely associated with 
structural adjustment programmes and a neo-liberal reform agenda (Campbell, 
2001), with decentralisation reforms largely a response to the perceived failures 
of the centralised state (Wunsch and Olowu, 1990), notably in Africa. The belief 
was that decentralisation would lead to greater economic efficiency in the alloca-
tion of goods and services. Thus an economic motivation prevailed, one closely 
connected to the neo-liberal mood of this period, with decentralisation portrayed 
as leading to improved service delivery at local level through deconcentration and 
privatisation and the mobilisation of local resources. 
The 1990s saw two related developments: the rise of democratisation move-
ments in Africa and the addition of  ‘good governance’ to the reform agenda of the 
‘donors’. Both gave not only a further stimulus to decentralisation in general, but 
to democratic decentralisation in particular (Olowu and Wunsch, 2004: 38-39). 
The World Bank (1997), the United Nations Development Programme [UNDP] 
(1997) and the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD (1997) all iden-
tified decentralisation as a key element of good governance. For UNDP , for in-
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stance, ‘decentralisation and support to local governance’ was one of five focal 
areas for governance programming (UNDP , 1997). Improvements in governance 
were perceived as stemming from democratic local government in which local 
citizens could exert greater influence on public decision-making . Such an agenda 
struck a common chord with many civil society organisations who were inter-
ested in deepening democracy and in addressing the limits of national-level de-
mocratisation, which often remained dominated by an elite political class ( Thede, 
2008: 5). Despite this democratic turn, the decentralisation agenda in the 1990s 
continued to have a liberal underpinning, especially for those bilateral and multi-
lateral agencies whose primary concern remained to limit the power and author-
ity of the central state. Recently, more overt democratic goals appear to have been 
expressed by international agencies, with decentralisation favoured as a means of 
‘empowerment ’ and increasing the ‘voice’ of the poor and marginalised. But the 
use of such language can be deceptive at times, perhaps aimed at maintaining an 
outward show of sharing objectives with non-governmental actors. 
It is worth reiterating that poverty reduction and confl ict management did not 
feature initially as signifi cant motives for decentralisation. More common ration-
ales entailed greater effi  ciency in the allocation of economic resources through a 
redefi nition of powers and responsibilities between central and local governments , 
and a better match between government programmes, local preferences and local 
conditions (Burki et al., 1999; Cohen and Peterson, 1999; Litvak et al., 1998).
2.2. Claims
As is somewhat apparent from the motives, proponents make great claims for 
decentralisation, with interrelated developmental and democratic benefits an-
ticipated. Decentralisation is perceived as bringing government closer to the 
people, leading to greater political participation at the local level, with citizens 
more able to make claims on local government and to subject it to greater scru-
tiny. In turn, it is anticipated that local government will be more knowledgeable 
about and more responsive to the needs of local populations, inclusive of the 
majority poor. Crook (2003: 77) notes that this is ‘an assumption questioned by 
few’, while Smoke (2003: 11) remarks that decentralisation is ‘commonly treated 
as an unambiguously desirable phenomenon’. Yet these claims often appear to 
be driven more by belief than by experience or empirical evidence. Three other 
expectations are commonly stated: increased equity and efficiency and decreased 
corruption . One consequence of the perceived ‘informational advantage’ of local 
government can be a more equitable distribution of public resources within their 
jurisdiction (Smoke, 2003: 9) and a better match of available resources with local 
demand. Similarly, it is thought that the closer proximity of local government to 
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taxpayers and beneficiaries will increase transparency in the use of local resources 
and strengthen downward accountability mechanisms, resulting in a decrease in 
corrupt practices (Devas and Delay, 2006: 691). There is also the expectation that 
decentralisation contributes to overall regime consolidation and increases the 
overall quality of the democratic process by guaranteeing accountability, foster-
ing civic competence and social capital, or strengthening political parties and civil 
society (Vengroff, 1993; Rothchild, 1996; Smith, 1996; Stoker, 1996).
Claims of a positive role for decentralisation in mitigating social and political 
conflict are less openly stated. Following violent conflicts , political decentralisa-
tion is seen as a compromise strategy to maintain the integration of secessionist 
groups within the state, while at the same time allowing for a meaningful degree 
of autonomy over local resources and decision-making (Diamond, 1999: 129). In 
a similar way, the expectation of poverty reduction through decentralisation has 
been added more recently, corresponding with ‘poverty reduction’ becoming the 
stated overarching goal of most donor agencies. In two influential reports (World 
Bank , 2004; UNDP , 2004), decentralisation was seen as crucial to achieving pov-
erty reduction and the Millennium Development Goals . 
Yet does decentralisation deliver such positive outcomes? This book intends to 
subject these two specific claims, poverty reduction and conflict management , to 
empirical investigation through a series of country case studies.
2.3. Issues 
Many writers also acknowledge that democratic decentralisation is a complex and 
multifaceted process (Smoke, 2003: 13), with prospects for realisation of the an-
ticipated benefits adversely affected by a number of implementation issues and 
constraints. Nine potential issues are outlined here, identified mainly by analysts 
writing about the African context, with the later issues becoming more political 
in nature. While these are general constraints that impact adversely on the overall 
prospects for successful implementation of decentralisation reforms, it is evident 
that they are likely to have a detrimental effect on the potential of decentralisa-
tion to contribute to poverty reduction and conflict management .
First, there may be shortfalls in the legal framework (Olowu and Wunsch, 
2004: 23). The strongest form of legal backing for decentralisation is through its 
inclusion in the national constitution , consolidated by specific local government 
law(s), but weaker legal frameworks entail decentralisation merely through cen-
tral government policy or by decree (Thede, 2008: 9).
Second, a clear division of responsibilities between local and central govern-
ment is essential, but the absence of such clarity can equate to a lack of local 
government autonomy (Agranoff, 2004) and discretionary powers. Addition-
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ally, it can imply that a relatively high degree of central government control is 
maintained over local service provision, especially through deconcentrated sector 
ministries, indicating that the lack of a clear division of responsibilities may be 
by design rather than by default. Confusion over roles and responsibilities can 
also be intensified by the multiplicity of government agencies involved, inclusive 
of various central government departments (ministries of finance, local govern-
ment , home affairs and sectoral departments) and different levels of sub-national 
government , as well as international donor agencies (Smoke, 2003: 13).
Third, in a context of general state weakness , a lack of local government capac-
ity is likely, with inadequate financial and human resources (Olowu and Wunsch, 
2004: 22; Steiner, 2007: 177). Regarding financial resources, central government 
financial transfers may not be commensurate with responsibilities, and the reve-
nue raising powers of local government may be limited. In addition, the establish-
ment of new local authorities, especially at district level, has high initial adminis-
trative costs. Regarding human resources, civil servants may be reluctant to move 
to rural areas, especially when it entails transferring from the relative security of 
a centralised career structure to a less certain future under the authority of a local 
government service (Olowu and Wunsch, 2004: 19).
Fourth, new legislative bodies may be relatively weak and ineff ective in decision-
making , with locally elected members unfamiliar with the exercise of their powers 
and grappling with the technicalities of public policies or the formal language re-
quirements. One consequence could be inadequate control over policy implemen-
tation, resulting in executive dominance by the local administration, with power 
eff ectively in the hands of appointed district heads or municipal managers.
Fifth, the anticipated increase in local political participation may be limited in 
practice due to insufficient opportunities being provided to citizens by local of-
ficials, or a lack of information about opportunities being made available (Steiner, 
2007: 179), or a weak organisational set-up of local civil society . In some parts of 
Africa , rural communities may view any new public programme or policy with 
indifference or scepticism, with the promise of participation having to overcome 
a high degree of civic apathy (Diamond, 1999: 144).
Sixth, closely related to the issue of participation is that of accountability . 
There is a tendency to assume that ‘democratic participation will yield strong 
mechanisms of accountability’ ( Johnson, 2003: 8). Yet powers can be decentralised 
‘to actors who are not accountable to their constituents, or who are accountable 
only to themselves or to superior authorities within the structure of government’ 
(Agrawal and Ribot, 1999: 478). The realisation of more accountable government 
through decentralisation is by no means automatic.
Seventh, the political will of national elites to seriously implement devolution 
cannot be taken for granted. National elites might have accepted a decentralisa-
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tion scheme primarily to please donors, while remaining confident that they will 
be able to maintain control over resources. The veto-power of national elites in 
blocking the effective implementation of new legal rules, or in perverting them to 
their own advantage, is a critical constraint to any decentralisation policy (Blair, 
2000).
Eighth, this leads to the related problem of local elite capture . Within the 
local arena there is an existing set-up of powerful players who might be nega-
tively affected by decentralisation, such as traditional authorities or local bosses 
dominating trade and other economic activities (Olivier de Sardan, 1999). These 
local elites may also respond to decentralisation by attempting to capture the 
benefits that it provides, and the problem of such elite capture of decentralised 
resources is a commonly cited one in the literature. It is generally achieved by 
one of two means. First, it may stem from local class and caste structures and the 
ability of high-status groups to dominate local politics and gain control of local 
political institutions. Second, it may also be a function of the ability of central 
government actors to control the transfer of powers and resources into the local 
arena along lines of economic and political alliances, in other words to channel 
resources to their patronage networks in order to consolidate their local politi-
cal base.
Ninth, a final issue concerns the overall lack of local democracy and the exist-
ence of a local democratic deficit. Many institutional arrangements established 
under decentralisation reforms are insufficiently democratic and do not create a 
clear line of accountability from decision-makers to the local population (Ribot, 
2004: 3). Again, the failure to encourage local democratic processes raises ques-
tions concerning the motivation and intent of those central government actors 
that are tasked with the implementation of decentralisation reforms.
In particular the poverty case studies in this volume draw attention to various 
aspects of these implementation issues. For example, Steiner focuses on issues 
of participation , accountability and local government capacity in Uganda , and, 
usefully, she also provides a more detailed discussion of these particular chal-
lenges in her chapter; Chinsinga examines constraints in Malawi pertaining to 
the lack of political commitment shown by national elites as well as the capture of 
limited resources by local elites; Crawford also addresses issues of participation 
and accountability, investigating how the former has not led to the latter in the 
Ghana case; and Van Dijk, while generally more positive about outcomes, points 
to issues of national-level elite resistance to decentralisation and the lack of local 
revenue-raising capacity. Finally, the nine issues outlined above are returned to in 
the conclusion, with the findings from the country case studies summarised in 
relation to each one.
A Pathway out of Poverty and Conflict?
3. Decentralisation and Poverty Reduction:
 A Review of Recent Surveys
The three elements of the World Bank ’s poverty reduction strategy are recalled: 
‘promoting opportunity, facilitating empowerment and enhancing security’ (2001: 
7-8). Decentralisation is highlighted by the Bank as a key policy reform that en-
hances the ‘facilitating empowerment’ dimension, given the potential of decen-
tralisation to both strengthen participation and increase government responsive-
ness to the poor (World Bank, 2001: 106). Subsequently, Steiner (2007), also a 
contributor to this volume, has further elaborated this analysis and indicated how 
decentralisation can contribute to all three elements of the Bank’s poverty reduc-
tion strategy. As regards ‘facilitating empowerment’, she also notes the contribu-
tion of decentralisation through increased participation in public decision-mak-
ing (ibid.: 177). In terms of ‘promoting opportunities’, the transferring of certain 
decision-making powers to local government involves an assumption that local 
authorities have an ‘informational advantage’ with regard to local needs and pref-
erences, increasing the likelihood of greater correspondence between demand and 
supply of local services (ibid.: 177). Finally, the contribution of decentralisation 
to ‘enhancing security’ entails an overlap between the issues of poverty reduction 
and confl ict management . Signifi cantly though, Steiner also notes that these three 
potential channels of poverty reduction constitute an optimal model, one that is 
rarely fully realised. In practice, constraints in implementing democratic decen-
tralisation are frequently encountered, thereby limiting the effects on poverty. 
Yet, although decentralisation advocates have asserted likely pro-poor out-
comes, such claims have generally not been well supported by academic evidence. 
It is only comparatively recently, in fact, that decentralisation research has spe-
cifi cally focused on the linkages with poverty reduction , with a number of studies 
published since the turn of the century, all reviews of secondary literature (Bossuyt 
and Gould, 2000; Crook and Sverrisson, 2001; Von Braun and Grote, 2002; Crook, 
2003; Vedeld, 2003; Jütting et al., 2004, 2005).1 Of these, the most extensive sur-
veys of cases across Africa , Asia and Latin America have been undertaken by Crook 
and Sverrisson (2001) (ten countries and two states in India ) and by Jütting et al. 
(2004) (eighteen countries and three states in India), while the other studies have 
been smaller in scale. Th e studies share a number of similar features, including the 
common fi nding that linkages between decentralisation and poverty reduction are 
generally negative, either in the sense of no clear attribution of poverty reduction 
to decentralisation or, more worryingly, that decentralisation can have a deleteri-
ous eff ect on poverty levels. Th ese studies are reviewed here in four sub-sections: 
the methods used to measure the impact on poverty, their fi ndings, the (pre-)con-
ditions noted for pro-poor outcomes, and the shortcomings of the studies. 
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3.1. Measuring poverty impact
As is commonplace, poverty is defined as a multidimensional concept and meas-
uring the impact of decentralisation on poverty is undertaken along both political 
and economic lines. In three studies, participation and empowerment are taken 
as the key political indicators, while the provision of basic social services is re-
garded as the crucial socio-economic outcome. Jütting et al. (2004, 2005) examine 
political and economic impacts in terms of ‘empowerment’ and ‘access to services’ 
respectively, where empowerment is assessed through considering levels of ‘par-
ticipation’ and of ‘local government capacity’ ( Jütting et al., 2005: 629-30). Von 
Braun and Grote (2002: 73-74) also highlight both political and economic link-
ages with poverty reduction , assessing ‘participation /empowerment ’ and ‘public 
services/pro-poor investment’. Crook and Sverrisson (2001: 5) look for evidence 
of poverty reduction through increased ‘responsiveness and participation’ and 
through improved ‘social and economic outcomes’. They assess the responsiveness 
of local government to the needs of the poor through examining the degree of 
participation , while acknowledging that participation is a ‘somewhat imperfect 
indication of the degree of responsiveness’ (ibid.: 10). Positive social and eco-
nomic outcomes are looked for in four areas: pro-poor growth; increased social 
equity; enhanced human development (health, education , sanitation); decreased 
spatial or inter-regional inequalities (ibid.: 10-11). One important economic indi-
cator that appears to have been omitted from all studies, however, is the level of 
local incomes and whether decentralisation has contributed to poverty reduction 
through creating employment opportunities and enhancing household incomes.
3.2. Impact of decentralisation on poverty reduction : survey fi ndings
The overall common finding is that decentralisation has not had a significant ef-
fect on poverty reduction . Crook and Sverrisson (2001: 52) concluded that:
‘Th e notion that there is a predictable or general link between decentrali-
sation of government and the development of more ‘pro-poor’ policies or 
poverty alleviating outcomes clearly lacks any convincing evidence.’
Jütting et al. (2004: 7) found that ‘an unambiguous link between decentralisation 
and poverty reduction cannot be established’. From his review of literature on 
democratic decentralisation and poverty reduction, Vedeld (2003: 194) concludes 
that there is ‘little convincing evidence that either democracy or decentralisa-
tion… will necessarily produce gains for the poor’. Drawing on three cases in 
Africa , Bossuyt and Gould (2000: 5) state that ‘the link between decentralisation 
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and poverty reduction policies is weak’. Only Von Braun and Grote (2002) deviate 
slightly from this consensus. Having posed the question ‘Does decentralisation 
serve the poor?’, their answer is ‘Yes, but it depends’ (ibid.: 89). However, their 
selected country evidence does not provide many positive examples.
There are few relatively successful cases, with the same ones often cited, most 
notably West Bengal in India (Crook and Sverrisson, 2001; Jütting et al., 2004; 
Vedeld, 2003) and Bolivia ( Jütting et al., 2004; Vedeld, 2003). Of their twelve 
cases, Crook and Sverrisson (2001: 47) note that only West Bengal showed ‘an 
unambiguously positive outcome’, while three others (Karnataka , Colombia and 
Brazil ) showed ‘good results in some aspects’. 
A further six countries, including four from Africa , were all regarded as ‘ex-
amples of the failure of decentralisation to help the poor’ (Crook and Sverrisson 
(2001: 47). Jütting et al. (2004: 14) classify countries by performance into four cat-
egories: positive (three countries); somewhat positive (four); somewhat negative 
(nine); and negative (five). The positive examples are West Bengal , Bolivia and 
the Philippines , while they note that decentralisation in two-thirds of cases has 
had a negative impact on poverty indicators. Vedeld (2003) focuses on relatively 
successful examples (West Bengal and Kerala in India , Bolivia, the Philippines, 
Uganda and Mali ), yet none of these have attained ‘substantial effects on poverty 
reduction ’ (ibid.: 195). It is in Africa that the negative impact of decentralisation 
is most evident (Crook and Sverrisson, 2001; Jütting et al., 2004; Bossuyt and 
Gould, 2000), though Ghana and South Africa are perceived by Jütting et al. 
(2004: 14) as partial exceptions, categorised as ‘somewhat positive’ performers. 
3.3. Conditions for pro-poor decentralisation 
Despite the failure to find an overall positive relationship between decentralisa-
tion and poverty reduction , most studies retain faith in decentralisation and seek 
to identify the conditions that will facilitate pro-poor outcomes.2
Jütting et al. (2005) identify a number of ‘determinants’ related to the design and 
implementation of decentralisation that can enhance its pro-poor nature. Th ese 
are divided into political, administrative and fi scal factors. Political factors entail: 
political commitment to decentralisation by central government and political elit-
es; policy coherence where local authority powers are not undermined by other 
means; and transparent and participatory processes (2005: 638-41). Administra-
tive factors include an investment in local capacity building and a clear division 
of functions between local and central government (2005: 641-42). Fiscal factors 
entail adequate and secure resources, including tax -raising powers (2005: 642-43). 
From this list, political determinants are highlighted as decisive: ‘Real devolution 
of power and resources while establishing accountability systems’ (2005: 644).
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From examples of ‘relatively good practice’, Vedeld (2003: 185-87) assembles a 
list of five pre-conditions for making democratic decentralisation more pro-poor. 
These are: central government commitment; civil society engagement; participa-
tion and accountability ; donor support; and a public discourse on poverty . The 
political dimension is again emphasised. Echoing Jütting et al., central govern-
ment commitment is highlighted as ‘stand[ing] out as an essential precondition’ 
(Vedeld, 2003: 186, emphasis added). 
Crook and Sverrisson (2001) and Crook (2003) take a slightly different tack 
by seeking to explain differing poverty outcomes, both positive and negative. In 
identifying the key variables, however, they simultaneously suggest the necessary 
conditions for greater success. Again, the first and most significant variable per-
tains to central government commitment, though with an added ideological slant 
in the case of West Bengal . Successful poverty reduction here is understood as 
due to the state government’s ‘ideological commitment to anti-poverty policies’ 
(Crook, 2003: 85). In this instance the ruling Left Front government has imple-
mented decentralisation as a means to challenge local elite resistance to mass-
based policies and to mobilise an electoral alliance in favour of such policies. Key 
variables that influenced the degree of poverty reduction elsewhere included: the 
extent to which political participation was effective in establishing accountable 
local government ; the system for allocation of financial and administrative re-
sources; and the length of time that decentralisation has been implemented, with 
ten to fifteen years needed to show results (Crook and Sverrisson, 2001: 4-5). 
3.4. Limitations and shortcomings
Although these studies usefully provide an overall picture based on reviews of a 
signifi cant number of country cases, such surveys also have their shortcomings. 
One limitation is that they are mainly dependent on secondary literature, includ-
ing country studies of decentralisation whose original focus may not have been on 
poverty reduction . Judgements may be rudimentary and the distance from primary 
research also increases when one secondary survey quotes another as the source of 
its evidence – for example, Jütting et al. (2004: Table A-1) often cite Bossuyt and 
Gould (2000) and Von Braun and Grote (2002) as sources for their fi ndings. 
The reliability of judgements is questioned by the case of Ghana , for example, 
with differing assessments made. Jütting et al. (2004: 14) place Ghana in their 
‘somewhat positive’ category, and Von Braun and Grote (2002: 90) state that ‘the 
overall decentralization process has been judged as successful’. In contrast, Crook 
and Sverrisson (2001: 47) regard Ghana as an example ‘of the failure of decen-
tralisation to help the poor’, with the qualification that it was the ‘least bad’ of 
six negative examples. This assessment is based on Crook’s mid-1990s primary 
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research in Ghana, published in Crook and Manor (1998), as well as secondary 
sources. The source of Jütting et al.’s (2004: 36) evaluation is given as Von Braun 
and Grote (2002), while Von Braun and Grote themselves rely exclusively on 
secondary literature. 
In sum, despite limitations, these cross-national surveys based on secondary 
sources provide valuable reviews of the ‘big picture’ regarding decentralisation 
and poverty reduction . They can be complemented, however, by country case 
studies based on primary data, which this book intends to provide.
4. Decentralisation and Confl ict Management:
 A Review of the Debate 
In stark contrast to the theoretical and empirical debate about the relationship 
between decentralisation and poverty reduction , there is no similar body of so-
phisticated approaches and empirical assessment concerning decentralisation’s 
impact on conflict management . There are several reasons for this state of the art. 
While poverty reduction is the first of the UN Millennium Development Goals 
and no African government (with the possible exception of Mauritius ) would 
reject poverty alleviation as one of its main policy objectives, many governments 
deny that there exist any conflicts within their countries or refuse the interna-
tional community’s competence to deal with them. In other words, while poverty 
reduction is a vague but undisputed commitment of most governments, conflict 
management (at least as far domestic conflicts are concerned) is not. Crisis pre-
vention and conflict management is thus more a concern of the donor community 
and international governmental organisations (OECD , 2004). 
Most policy-makers would argue that successful socio-economic development 
and democracy are the best way to prevent crisis and solve violent confl icts . By 
contributing to such aims, decentralisation can also contribute to the management 
of confl icts . Th is way of framing the problem still leaves us with the question of 
whether decentralisation – beyond these indirect eff ects – has a direct impact on 
the dynamics of confl icts. Policy-makers also tend to avoid the thorny question of 
whether decentralisation might also increase the likelihood of violent confl ict .
There has not been any systematic and continuous academic debate on de-
centralisation and conflict management , i.e. both discourses have evolved largely 
separate from each other. We will thus discuss those three strands of literature 
that have to some extent tried to analyse the linkage. First, if federalism is per-
ceived as one type of decentralised government, then it becomes possible to use 
scholarship from this tradition. A second strand of research is concerned with the 
largely indirect effects of decentralisation on various aspects of political stability . 
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Finally, there are some mainly conceptual studies that try to analyse the specific 
impact of decentralisation policies (in unitary states) on various types of con-
flicts, mostly in post-conflict settings.
4.1. Federalism and confl ict management 
There is a long research tradition on the conflict management potential of multi-
ethnic federations. In contrast to decentralisation, federalism presupposes a di-
vision of sovereignty, a constitutionally protected status for the devolved units 
(usually states in their own right with parliaments, governments and a distinct 
political process whose rights can only be revoked by constitutional amend-
ment), a constitutional procedure to solve conflicts between the central and 
the decentralized levels, and an organ at central level where the decentralized 
units have a veto power over national policy decisions affecting their rights. The 
provinces within a decentralized unitary state may, however, have more effective 
power than the member-states of a federation. This is one of the reasons why 
recent research on federalism (Bermeo and Amoretti, 2004) has proposed to 
replace the dichotomy between federalism and unitary states with a more dif-
ferentiated typology of variables such as the degree of fiscal decentralisation or 
electoral systems.
Lake and Rothchild (2002) tried to statistically assess the role of federal insti-
tutions in the transition from war to peace and came to a relatively sober assess-
ment. On the basis of their data they see decentralisation in the short run as a 
valuable tool for peace-making because it serves as a signal of moderation by the 
majority. In the long run it may work as a major incentive for secession and dis-
integration. Ghai (2002) in a qualitative comparison obtained a different result, 
claiming that only ‘true autonomy prevents secession’ (Ghai, 2002: 23). The track 
record of multi-national federations in Africa in managing conflict does certainly 
not allow for much optimism, whether one thinks of Nigeria or Ethiopia . 
What then are the decisive elements that make a federal system stable? McGar-
ry and O’Leary (2002) have identifi ed a number of variables such as consociational 
forms of democratic rule at the central level, a minimum number of three major 
ethnic groups, and a certain level of socio-economic development that allows for 
instruments of fi scal equalisation and distributive fairness. Stepan (2003) has also 
argued that federalism would not be an easy model to adopt as only those federa-
tions who came together on a voluntary basis (by aggregation) have been able to 
manage internal confl ict well, while the ‘holding together’ federations of former 
empires are de facto ‘pseudo-federations’ that were doomed to fail.
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4.2. Indirect eff ects of decentralisation on confl ict and stability 
Schou and Haug (2005) have proposed a typology of conflict mitigating and con-
flict intensifying effects of decentralisation. One positive effect of decentralisa-
tion is the political inclusion of new groups, which is typically the case when 
opposition parties capture sub-national units such as in Mozambique or Mali . 
Decentralisation would thus increase the representative character of the political 
system especially in heterogeneous societies with territorially concentrated mi-
norities (Diamond, 1999: 129). Decentralisation can also foster political stability 
and national unity through granting greater autonomy to conflicting groups, who 
are forced to enter into a formal bargaining process with the government (Roth-
child, 1994: 1). Finally, it can also help the state to establish central government 
authority in areas where state penetration had been weak, thereby increasing the 
legitimacy of public institutions. 
Schou and Haug (2005: 18) also recognise the danger of decentralisation lead-
ing to the intensification of conflicts. This might happen by giving political space 
to forces whose loyalty to the central government is not guaranteed, as was the 
case in Angola , or who are not interested in a peaceful transformation of conflicts . 
Decentralisation may also exacerbate regional differences in socio-economic de-
velopment which might easily lead to a further polarisation along regional lines, 
especially when intergovernmental fiscal transfers include a high percentage of 
direct distributive interventions and exemption rules. One might add that decen-
tralisation might also simply be irrelevant for conflict management , because con-
flicting parties might ignore new authorities and dispensations and continue to 
solve conflicts via established informal rules and power-brokers (Mehler, 2002). 
While it is certainly an important and useful first step to point to the ambiva-
lent role of decentralisation, any assessment of whether these potential effects 
occur depends on a number of critical variables. The specific contexts (both of 
countries but also of micro-social settings) and the prevailing constellation of 
actors certainly matter, but it can be assumed that the design of decentralisation 
itself is also important for conflict dynamics and management (Sisk, 2001).
4.3. Decentralisation policies and confl ict  
Little empirical research has been done to test these assumptions in African con-
texts. Some African governments have apparently used devolution as a conflict 
management tool (Mali , Senegal , South Africa , Sudan , Uganda ), and their ex-
perience has been analysed in various case studies. Seely (2001) has analysed the 
decentralisation policies enacted in Mali since 1992 as a deliberate attempt of the 
new democratic regime to co-opt the Tuareg rebels into the political system. The 
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Ugandan case has attracted much more interest, because decentralisation was de-
signed as a strategy to appease the proponents of federalism (largely concentrated 
in wealthy Buganda ). As the survival of the ruling coalition depended on the 
support of the new constitution in the constituent assembly , some concessions to 
autonomy demands had to be taken (Englebert, 2001; Griffiths and Katalikawe, 
2003). Decentralisation had the additional advantage of being popular with do-
nors. In the process, minorities emerged to demand an ever-stronger fragmenta-
tion of districts, thus denying the bigger ethno-nationalist movements any possi-
bility of using decentralised units as springboards for secession while shifting the 
problem of ethnic conflict to local levels where it was supposedly less threatening 
to state integrity (see Schelnberger, in this volume). 
The focus of these analyses has been, however, largely restricted to an analysis 
of governmental policies whose declared intention consisted in contributing to 
conflict management and political stability . Unintended effects of decentralisa-
tion policies are not analysed (Mehler, 2002). The empirical question of how local 
or national conflicts have actually been influenced by these policies and whether 
the new dispensation indeed helped to better manage ongoing and sometimes 
violent conflicts over land, natural resources and political power have rarely been 
addressed in the African context (with the notable exception of the South Afri-
can case, see Munro, 2001 or Ntsebeza, 2005).
The contributions to this book intend to shed some fresh light on the rela-
tionship between decentralisation and conflict by proceeding with an empirical 
qualitative analysis of single or, in one instance, a small number of cases. These 
aim to help us in better understanding the critical variables that potentially lead 
to decentralisation in the African context having positive or negative effects with 
regard to conflict. 
5. Structure of the Book
This book is structured into two main parts pertaining to the two main questions 
being investigated: the impact of decentralisation on poverty reduction and on 
the prevention and management of violent conflict respectively. Following this in-
troductory chapter, the first part looks at decentralisation and poverty reduction 
with four country case studies in different regions of Africa : Uganda , Malawi , 
Ghana and Tanzania . Subsequently, the second part has three chapters that look 
at issues of decentralisation and conflict management . The first of these three 
chapters itself entails three country studies, those of South Africa , Namibia and 
Mauritius , while the other two chapters look at Uganda and Rwanda respectively. 
A brief introduction to each chapter follows.
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In Chapter 2, Susan Steiner explores ‘Constraints on the Implementation of 
Decentralisation and the Implications for Poverty Reduction’ through the case 
study of Uganda . While it is often argued that decentralisation is effective for the 
reduction of poverty due to inherent opportunities for higher popular participa-
tion , responsiveness in policy-making and increased efficiency in public service 
delivery , this chapter qualifies such arguments and outlines potential challenges 
to the poverty reduction potential of decentralisation. It explains that achieving 
poverty alleviation through decentralisation is by no means automatic and can be 
seriously constrained by an insufficient increase in popular participation , lack of 
downward accountability , inadequate levels of competence as well as low human 
and financial capacity at the local level. The chapter examines the existence of 
these constraints in the case of Uganda . The Ugandan government initiated an 
ambitious decentralisation reform programme in 1992, which provides for the 
devolution of far-reaching responsibilities to local governments. However, several 
shortcomings, such as limited local autonomy, differences between local politi-
cians and civil servants , conflicts between different local government levels, finan-
cial shortages and low information levels, as well as the prevalence of corruption , 
patronage and clientelism , all impede the proper implementation of the reform. 
This in turn puts improvements in participation, accountability and efficiency at 
risk and ultimately jeopardises the expected impact on poverty.
In Chapter 3, Blessings Chinsinga provides a critical appraisal of decentralisa-
tion and poverty reduction in Malawi . While acknowledging that decentralisa-
tion, democratisation and poverty reduction are widely seen as positively related, 
he demonstrates that the empirical track record of the decentralisation reforms 
in Malawi raises some serious doubts about this perception. As yet, democratic 
decentralisation policy reforms have had no discernible impact on poverty reduc-
tion, service delivery and political participation , despite a timeframe of over a 
decade since their introduction. Chinsinga argues, however, that this does not 
discount the potential of decentralisation to promote poverty reduction and po-
litical participation per se, but rather demonstrates that the success is greatly de-
pendent on how decentralisation policy reforms are introduced, articulated and 
implemented. The Malawi case demonstrates that there is an inherent risk that 
the nature, form and scope of spaces that open up as a result of democratic de-
centralisation reforms can be strategically limited, controlled and even closed by 
powerful actors intent on promoting, defending and consolidating vested political 
interests. This in turn undermines the potential of decentralisation as a crucial 
element in reinvigorating state institutional capability as a foundation for an ef-
fective public sector as well as a means of bringing the state closer to the people.
In Chapter 4, Gordon Crawford subjects the conventional wisdom on the 
relationship between decentralisation and poverty reduction to further ques-
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tioning in three ways through the case study of Ghana . First, he questions the 
assumption that ‘democratic participation will yield strong mechanisms of ac-
countability ’, as noted by Johnson (2003: 8). Findings in the Ghana case are that 
increased participation and popular input into local policy-making processes 
has not led to greater popular control of government, highlighting a de-linkage 
between participation and accountability. Second, he questions the ‘ubiquitous 
claim’ that political will is ‘the principal requirement for success’, as highlighted 
by Smoke (2003: 12). Reliance on central government political commitment is 
misplaced or paradoxical, with the Ghana case demonstrating how central gov-
ernments often implement decentralisation in a manner intended to promote 
their own interests. Third, he questions the ‘managerial thrust ’ of much public 
administration literature that assumes that ‘if reforms are technically on target, 
the rest will follow automatically’, as noted in ICHRP (2005: 15). Such literature 
emphasises the importance of decentralisation being implemented ‘by design’ 
and not ‘by default’ ( Jütting et al., 2005: 638-9), yet the Ghana case indicates 
how structural constraints are precisely inherent in the design, with decentrali-
sation as a political exercise not a technical one. The questioning in this chapter 
of these three aspects of conventional wisdom is underpinned by the concept of 
the politics of (de)centralisation . In other words, while central governments may 
implement (or be forced to implement) decentralisation for a variety of reasons, 
they invariably aim to retain (and even consolidate) their power and control over 
resources. 
In Chapter 5, Meine Pieter van Dijk deals with the local government reform 
process in Tanzania by taking a closer look at the grass roots level in the capital 
city and in two districts. Van Dijk argues that decentralisation has contributed 
to local development, primarily due to the flows of goods, services, capital,  ideas 
and people that it has generated. Decentralisation policies provide economic op-
portunities for local governments and entrepreneurs . It provides local people 
with the opportunity to take various initiatives and it makes available money 
for local investments by local government through the generation of local taxes. 
Although too much local tax collection can work as a disincentive for private 
sector development, it does allow local governments to undertake more develop-
ment activities. With regard to the role of decentralisation for poverty alleviation, 
Van Dijk identifies three main instruments: income transfers, developing services 
and infrastructure , and creating employment at the local level. The importance 
of these instruments in the Tanzanian context is reviewed in the empirical part 
of the chapter. The paper ends by summarising the benefits of decentralisation, 
especially for poor people, while acknowledging implementation constraints and 
instances where impact has not been as positive as anticipated, for instance, a lack 
of success in diminishing rural-urban differences.
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The next three chapters deal with the relationship between decentralisation 
and conflict . In Chapter 6, Christof Hartmann analyses the relationship between 
decentralisation and the management of conflict in the heterogeneous multi-ra-
cial societies of Southern Africa . In these countries decentralisation is less con-
cerned with finding a way out of violent conflict but rather with establishing 
durable political institutions that are capable of peacefully regulating the high 
potential for social conflict. Hartmann’s chapter first develops a theoretical state-
ment concerning typical – both positive and negative – effects of decentralisation 
on conflict , and proposes to distinguish between conflicts that oppose different 
actors within a decentralised unit and those where a sub-national government 
clashes with central government . The empirical part of the paper analyses how 
these two types of conflicts have been influenced by decentralisation policies. 
Hartmann argues that the depoliticisation of local government in Namibia and 
South Africa has minimised the potential for centre-local conflicts, but at the 
same time further marginalised groups that do not belong to the ruling coali-
tion. Decentralisation has been more important for local conflicts in so far the 
developmental role attributed to councils has both increased expectations of the 
population and led to conflicts with traditional authorities. 
In Chapter 7, Anna Katharina Schelnberger uses a thick description of a local 
resource conflict in the Ugandan district of Kibaale to question the conventional 
wisdom of the beneficial impact of decentralisation policies on conflict. Resource-
based conflicts between indigenous and migrant populations in the Kibaale area 
were transformed into political and ethnic conflicts through the establishment 
of a new district within the new Local Government Scheme . Schelnberger il-
lustrates how the introduction of new rules affects the interests and expectations 
of various actors. The violent escalation of this conflict was brought to a halt 
only by the direct intervention of the President of the Republic, thus annulling 
both the democratic election of a migrant politician and the political autonomy 
of the decentralised authority. The second part of the chapter develops a theory-
based explanation for what happened in Kibaale. It gives a detailed account of the 
institutional provisions within the Local Government Law , and of the role that 
different sources of conflict (concerning land ownership and use and the control 
of political institutions) had for the capacity of local government to manage the 
conflict. 
Chapter 8 by Peter van Tilburg analyses the role of decentralisation for the po-
litical stability of Rwanda . Following the 1994 genocide there was an urgent need 
not only to rebuild the physical infrastructure but also to develop a new political 
dispensation and to create a deep reconciliation among the conflicting parties and 
populations. Within this overall process of political and social reconstruction, the 
government has also introduced a policy of decentralisation. Van Tilburg assesses 
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both the specific Rwandan model of decentralisation and the likely impact it will 
have both on the cohesion and national integration of the population. The chap-
ter ends with the optimistic perspective that decentralisation and the resulting 
participation of the local population in planning their own future will support 
the drive towards stability in this African country which has become the symbol 
of particularly brutal and inhumane violence. 
Finally, the concluding chapter summarises the country chapters in a com-
parative manner, highlighting both similarities and differences in the impact that 
decentralisation has had, and draws overall conclusions regarding the two main 
research questions: the extent to which decentralisation has contributed to pov-
erty reduction and to the prevention and management of violent conflict in Sub-
Saharan Africa .
 Notes
 Vedeld (: ) states that his literature review was supplemented by ‘limited field 
visits to India, Mali and Uganda’. 
 The work of Crook and Sverrisson () and Crook () is an exception, maintaining 
a more non-committal stance.
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2 Constraints on the Implementation of 
Decentralisation and Implications for Poverty 
Reduction – Th e Case of Uganda 1
Susan Steiner
1. Introduction
In recent years, it has come to be widely accepted that decentralisation can be 
conducive to poverty reduction mainly because local governments are assumed 
to have better information and higher incentives than the central government 
to design and implement policies that respond to local needs and preferences. 
Besides, decentralisation is considered a means to achieve good governance in 
terms of a high level of public participation , accountability of public officials, 
and low corruption , all of which are crucial conditions for poverty alleviation. 
These arguments are very popular among policy-makers in developing coun-
tries, including donor organisations. The World Bank , for example, explains on 
its website that ‘national development and poverty alleviation often hinges on 
improved sub-national growth and service delivery ’, which in turn is supposed 
to be achieved through decentralisation.2 However, the academic backing for an 
impact of decentralisation on poverty is still restricted and at best ambiguous. 
With the present chapter, I intend to bring further light into the relationship 
between decentralisation and poverty by outlining challenges to the poverty re-
duction potential of decentralisation in general and examining constraints on the 
implementation of decentralisation in Uganda .
Although the argument that decentralisation can be effective for the reduc-
tion of poverty due to inherent opportunities for higher popular participation 
and increased efficiency in public service delivery is certainly valid, it must be 
taken into consideration that the link between decentralisation and poverty is 
by no means automatic (Steiner, 2007). Decentralisation is a highly complex re-
form process which requires comprehensive transformation and modification in 
political, administrative and fiscal procedures. The proper implementation of de-
centralisation can thus easily be constrained by several challenges, which can in 
turn diminish the chances to bring about voice and power for the poor as well 
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as responsiveness and efficiency in local decision-making . In this chapter, I first 
elaborate on such challenges in general terms before analysing their scope and 
hence implications for poverty in the case of Uganda .
The decentralisation reform in Uganda was initiated in 1992 and is exceptional 
among developing countries in terms of the scale and scope of the transfer of 
power and responsibilities to the local level. It has been praised as ‘one of the 
most far-reaching local government reform programmes in the developing world’ 
(Francis and James, 2003: 325) and ‘one of the most radical devolution initiatives 
of any country at this time’ (Mitchinson, 2003: 241). By investigating the design 
and implementation of decentralisation in Uganda, I attempt to gain a thorough 
understanding of the theory and practice of the reform in order to derive implica-
tions for its potential impact on poverty . Since it cannot be sufficient to look at 
the formal processes and legal provisions of decentralisation, I put special em-
phasis on the way in which these processes and provisions are put into practice. 
In other words, I do not directly assess the impact of decentralisation on poverty, 
but rather identify constraints on the implementation of decentralisation which 
adversely affect its poverty reduction potential. 
Th e empirical part of this chapter is based on the evidence gathered during 
two fi eld research periods in Uganda , May to July 2004 and May to June 2005, as 
well as a review of secondary literature, various primary sources and an analysis 
of data from the National Service Delivery Survey undertaken by the Ugandan 
government. During my fi eld research, I conducted about thirty expert interviews3 
with representatives from several local governments, the Ministry of Local Gov-
ernment, the Local Government Finance Commission, the Decentralisation Sec-
retariat , the Uganda Local Governments Association , the Inspectorate General of 
Government , the Danish International Development Agency (Danida) , the UK’s 
Department for International Development (DfID) , the World Bank , the United 
Nations Capital Development Fund , the German Development Service , the Cen-
tre for Basic Research and the Economic Policy Research Centre , both at Mak-
erere University, and Cornell University. I did not use a prepared questionnaire 
but adapted the interviews to the respective fi eld of expertise of my interview part-
ners. Th e information I gathered in this way helped me substantially in identifying 
and interpreting the constraints on the implementation of decentralisation. 
Besides, I paid a visit to one sample district (Tororo ) in order to gain insight 
into the functioning of decentralisation that goes beyond the information one 
can obtain from reviewing the literature. In Tororo, I interviewed the Chief Ad-
ministrative Officer, the Vice Chair of the District Council , the Resident District 
Commissioner , and two representatives of the German Development Service who 
worked as advisors to the Tororo district government. I also visited three sub-
counties (Rubongi , Mulandan and Nabuyoga ) and spoke with several sub-county 
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councillors. I deliberately did not visit more than Tororo district because I had 
previously ruled out the option of narrowing the research down to a few selected 
districts in Uganda . Instead, I aimed to carry out a countrywide study, enabling 
me to draw generalised conclusions. The decision to go to Tororo was taken on 
merely practical grounds, as I had previously established contact with representa-
tives of the German Development Service. In principle, I could have visited any 
other of the then fifty-six Ugandan districts. However, due to the prevalence of 
many shortcomings related to decentralisation in this district, Tororo turned out 
to be a very instructive example. While in Uganda, I also obtained the data of the 
2004 National Service Delivery Survey from the Uganda Bureau of Statistics . 
This survey covers more than 17,000 households nationwide who had been ques-
tioned about six service sectors: agricultural extension, education , health, road 
infrastructure , governance, and water and sanitation. I here analyse that part of 
the data that concerns local governance. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. In Section 2, I describe 
several challenges which diminish the chances for decentralisation to bring about 
voice and power for the poor as well as responsiveness and efficiency in local de-
cision-making . In Section 3, I provide an overview of the main features of the de-
centralisation reform in Uganda , including its historical and legal background, as 
well as the political, administrative and fiscal elements of the reform.4 In Section 
4, I analyse the functioning of decentralisation in Uganda and show that there is 
a gap between the design and the implementation of the reform. In Section 5, I 
derive conclusions with respect to the implication of these implementation con-
straints for the potential impact of decentralisation on poverty in Uganda. 
2. Challenges to Achieving Poverty Reduction through 
Decentralisation 
As already mentioned, it cannot be taken for granted that decentralisation re-
forms indeed lead to poverty reduction because of the complexity of such re-
forms. It appears to be more reasonable to assume that decentralisation can con-
tribute to poverty eradication if and only if the reform is far-reaching in scale and 
scope and is implemented as completely as possible. As outlined in what follows, 
an insufficient increase in popular participation , a lack of downward account-
ability plus the related problems of corruption , clientelism and patronage , and an 
inadequate level of competence, coupled with low human and financial capacity 




A first challenge that can jeopardise the poverty alleviation potential of decen-
tralisation is that decentralisation does not automatically bring about increased 
participation of the population in general and the poor in particular. As regards 
electoral forms of participation, i.e. voting and election campaigning, people are 
unlikely to get actively involved if elections are not free and fair, so that their 
votes and dedication do not have a bearing on the election result; or their pre-
ferred candidates do not have a fair chance of being elected into office. Empirical 
evidence has shown that local representatives are often not from among the poor 
but from elite groups (Echeverri-Gent, 1992; Crook and Manor, 1998).5 Although 
this might seem to be a sign of low levels of participation and representation of 
the poor, it must be interpreted with caution. Crook and Manor (1998) explain 
that it is in some countries culturally expected that elite groups participate in 
the development of their home regions through involvement in local councils. 
Councils dominated by poor people would instead be regarded as having little 
consequence or even as failures. Hence, the question is not so much whether 
local representatives belong to elite or poor groups but rather whether they are 
responsive to the needs of the poor. To the extent that different individuals, pos-
sibly from different elite groups, compete for political posts, they can be expected 
to respond to the demands of their respective supporters, if only to secure votes 
in the next elections. I turn to this question in more detail below. Some countries 
intend to guarantee representation of previously disadvantaged groups, such as 
the poor, women, certain religions or ethnicities, through reserved seats in local 
councils. Although this increases the formal representation of such groups, it 
may or may not bring about higher participation in local council affairs. Efforts 
of disadvantaged groups can simply be undermined by powerful entrenched in-
terests, which do not allow them to voice their concerns (Tripp, 2000; Crook and 
Manor, 1998). 
Regarding non-electoral forms of participation , i.e. contacting or lobbying 
local governments , the level of popular involvement depends heavily on the re-
lationship between elected representatives and the electorate. If representatives 
do not succeed in establishing a meaningful role with the local population, it is 
less likely that people will approach the government with their concerns and at-
tend public meetings to discuss local policies. To the extent that people do not 
perceive the local government to be accessible and do not see opportunities to 
influence decision-making , they cannot be expected to be motivated to get ac-
tively involved. However, it must be acknowledged that in countries with a legacy 
of strong centralisation , dictatorship or civil war, people generally need time to 
learn to participate in public decision-making and to demand responsiveness of 
Constraints on the Implementation of Decentralisation
public officials. A critical level of information on local government affairs among 
the population is necessary to ensure meaningful participation . Equally, elected 
representatives must learn to include the electorate in public affairs as well as to 
value and respond to their opinions and priorities. Therefore, time plays a crucial 
role in the implementation of decentralisation. 
The legitimacy of elected representatives is an important factor for partici-
pation and hence the success of decentralisation. It is not sufficient to provide 
opportunities for popular participation; it is necessary to build trust among the 
population that their interests will indeed be represented and translated into 
policy. If the same politicians are re-emerging again and again without enjoying 
wide support among the population, this gives rise to distrust in local government 
structures and indifference towards public affairs, including low participation in 
local elections (Bossuyt and Gould, 2000). Furthermore, if elected representa-
tives do not actively promote an open dialogue with the general population, bar-
riers for the poor to interact remain prohibitive due to social distance. Subse-
quently, local government decisions are less likely to take account of the needs 
of the poor, either because elected representatives are unaware of these needs or 
because they are unwilling to respond to them. It is therefore not enough to en-
courage people’s voices; their voices must also be heard by those in power (Goetz 
and Gaventa, 2001). It could be expected that low representation of the poor 
in local councils will be related to low responsiveness of local decisions to their 
needs but this would be only part of the story. Even where representatives of the 
poor do sit on councils, there is little evidence that local governments have been 
more responsive to the poor and marginalized (Crook and Manor, 1998; Crook, 
2003; Hickey, 2005). 
2.2. Accountability
Closely related with the question of participation and responsiveness is that of 
the accountability of local governments. Local governments are accountable if 
they are (held) responsible for their actions. There are two main lines of account-
ability: civil servants should be accountable to elected representatives; and elected 
representatives should be accountable to the public. If there are mechanisms that 
form a credible threat to both local politicians and civil servants in the sense that 
they are punished for unresponsiveness and misbehaviour, they will have greater 
incentives to act in the population’s interests, encouraging participation and ad-
dressing demands. Hence, accountability promotes participation of the popula-
tion and responsiveness of public officials, but participation is equally a precon-
dition for accountability. Without the engagement of the population, there will 
be no demands to hold officials accountable. To the extent that the proximity be-
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tween citizens and local governments in decentralised systems increases the moni-
toring power of the population, decentralisation off ers opportunities to increase 
the accountability of public offi  cials (World Bank , 2001; Von Braun and Grote, 
2002). Otherwise, accountability is not necessarily aff ected by decentralisation. It 
is typically not decentralisation that determines whether or not local governments 
are accountable but the establishment and enforcement of accountability mech-
anisms, such as competitive elections , auditing and evaluation, public hearings, 
third-party monitoring by a free press, and procedures for recall (Agrawal and 
Ribot, 1999; Blair, 2000; Ribot, 2002). In the words of Crook and Manor (1998: 
303), a ‘public “culture of accountability”’ enhances the readiness of the population 
to complain about the misbehaviour of politicians and civil servants .
In fact, accountability turns out to be one of the most crucial elements for 
successful decentralisation. Agrawal and Ribot (1999: 478) note that ‘if powers 
are decentralized to actors who are not accountable to their constituents, or who 
are accountable only to themselves or to superior authorities within the structure 
of government, then decentralisation is not likely to accomplish its stated aims.’ 
This is so because local government systems that are characterised by relatively 
low levels of accountability provide scope for corruption , patronage , clientelism 
and elite capture , all of which are deleterious to responsive policy-making and 
efficient service delivery . Although these four phenomena are closely related and 
it is sometimes difficult to clearly distinguish between them, they are differently 
conceptualised. Corruption has traditionally been defined as the abuse of pub-
lic office for private gain, though Kaufmann (2005) offers a broader definition, 
namely the privatisation of public policy.6 Whereas the former is supposed to 
place too much emphasis on the responsibility of public office-holders and on 
the alleged illegality of the act, the latter highlights that corruption includes both 
legal and illegal acts and that the responsibility for corruption resides both with 
those who exert undue influence as well as those who are unduly influenced.7 
Patronage and clientelism , as integral elements of neo-patrimonial systems, 
both describe the relationship between patrons and clients (Erdmann and Engel, 
2007). In the local government context, patrons are local politicians and clients 
are the local electorate. Patronage is then defined as the politically motivated dis-
tribution of favours, such as the special treatment of a particular geographic area 
in the provision of public goods and services, to certain groups of people, often of 
the patron’s own kin. Clientelism denotes the exchange or brokerage of specific 
resources and services, such as land or office, to individuals who are not necessar-
ily of the same kin. I make the following distinction between corruption on the 
one hand and patronage and clientelism on the other hand. Whereas the princi-
pal motivation in the latter case is for the one in public office to obtain political 
support, mainly in the form of votes, the major objective in the case of corruption 
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is to gain monetary benefits. Public officials involved in patronage and clientelism 
are therefore exclusively politicians but can be either politicians or civil servants 
in the case of corruption. Local elite capture can coincide with corruption, pa-
tronage or clientelism. It refers to situations in which local elites are in a position 
to influence policy-making for their own benefit, without necessarily being in 
public office themselves (Echeverri-Gent, 1992; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000, 
2006).8 Since elites are privileged in terms of social, economic or political power 
to both get organised and obtain crucial information, it is much easier for them 
than for the poor to have a bearing on local government affairs. 
In the presence of corruption , patronage , and clientelism , decisions are gener-
ally taken on grounds other than efficiency. In contrast to acting for the common 
good, officials tend to follow their self-interests of both political and economic 
kinds. For example, the quality with which services are provided is likely to be 
reduced the more job positions as well as tenders are granted on the basis of 
personal relationships rather than on merit. If local elites manipulate the shaping 
of policies and regulations, or make campaign contributions to their advantage, 
the benefits of public decisions tend to end up with the powerful and not with 
the needy. In the absence of elite capture , however, the poor may well benefit 
from inefficient (and politicised) policy-making . As noted above, it is in the self-
interest of competing patrons to target policies and public spending towards their 
respective clienteles in order to secure political support. To the extent that the 
poor form these clienteles, this essentially translates into a system of selective re-
distribution. Similarly, corrupt officers may not keep monetary gains exclusively 
for themselves, but are likely to use them for the benefit of family members or 
others, who may or may not be poor. However, I want to make it explicit that even 
though the poor may benefit from patronage or corruption to a certain extent, 
this is highly unlikely to lead to broad-based and sustainable poverty reduction . 
2.3. Competence and capacity
The responsiveness of public decision-making and the efficiency of service provi-
sion can additionally be compromised if the expectations and demands on local 
governments are beyond their competence and capacity. Empirical evidence has 
shown that certain actors in the central government tend to refuse to truly trans-
fer power to the local level, as this curtails their own influence in decision-making 
(Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Bossuyt and Gould, 2000; Crook, 2003). Possibly the 
largest opponents to devolution are those officials in line ministries who stand 
to lose much of their rights and discretion to local governments. The control of 
the centre sometimes expresses itself in centrally appointed local officials who 
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are supposedly better able to look after the interests of the state or in national 
priority-setting that has to be followed locally. This severely limits local autono-
my, restricting the ability of local governments to determine funding and service 
delivery as they deem appropriate. Even if local governments are aware of local 
needs and preferences and are willing to respond to them, they simply cannot 
break out of the hierarchical constraints that prevent them from delivering. Be-
sides, it is sometimes claimed that central control over local decision-making is 
necessary due to high levels of corruption in local governments. The alleged as-
sociation between the level of discretion and the level of corruption suggests that 
the more autonomy local governments have, the higher is the incidence of corrupt 
practices. However, this would be too shortsighted as corruption is closely related 
with local accountability . Hence, if local governments were accountable, corrup-
tion could be expected to be lower even if there was a high level of discretion. 
Central government reluctance to grant full autonomy for local policy-making 
to local governments indicates that decentralisation is a highly political proc-
ess. If the central government is not fully committed to decentralisation but em-
barked on the reform by default (in contrast to by design), it is highly likely to 
slow down the process wherever possible and to leave the most crucial aspects 
of public decision-making under central control. As Crook and Manor (1998) 
note, the hidden politics of decentralisation become visible by an examination of 
which rights and responsibilities are not devolved. The commitment of the cen-
tral government strongly influences whether the relation between the centre and 
the local governments is of a supportive and equalised kind. It has been shown 
that decentralisation has proved to be more effective in cases when the centre was 
prepared to ensure implementation of local policies and to challenge local elite 
resistance if necessary without interfering in local autonomy (Crook and Sverris-
son, 2001; Crook, 2003). Besides, coherence between decentralisation and sector 
policies, as well as between government decisions and donor activities is essential 
to promote success of decentralisation and avoid confusion about the division of 
tasks and responsibilities between all relevant stakeholders (Bossuyt and Gould, 
2000; Land and Hauck, 2003). 
In addition, mismatches between the responsibilities of local governments and 
their capacity represent obstacles to responsive policy-making and efficient serv-
ice provision. Capacity is here understood as the ability of local governments to 
perform their assigned functions (Grindle and Hilderbrand, 1995; Grindle, 1996; 
Boesen et al., 2002).9 Capacity is not equated with effectiveness, as a capable local 
government is not automatically well-performing and effective if it does not apply 
its capacity in the interest of the common good (World Bank , 1997). This implies 
that local governments’ capacity is a crucial precondition for making decentralisa-
tion effective for poverty alleviation, but capacity itself does not necessarily lead 
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to reductions in poverty. In order to make local governments capable, adequate 
human capital and sufficient financial resources play an equally important role. 
On the one hand, it is imperative that both politicians and civil servants are 
adequately educated and experienced to fulfil their assigned functions. Untrained 
and unprofessional officials are less likely to understand and correctly assess 
the requirements and consequences of decentralisation in their entirety, hence 
putting the proper implementation of the reform at risk. For example, it is unclear 
whether they can translate local information into responsive service provision and 
whether they can organise the local decision-making process so that citizens have 
equal opportunities to participate. Besides, the level of education among officials 
is closely related to accountability (Crook and Manor, 1998), which is not to say 
that education safeguards from corruption or patronage , but it makes the exist-
ence of and compliance with accountability mechanisms more likely. It must be 
noted that the human capital challenge can be expected to be more pronounced 
in poorer and less developed countries where the level of education is generally 
low. While it may still be possible to attract educated and trained personnel at 
the central government level there, it will be difficult to ensure an adequate level 
of education and experience among politicians and the civil service in every lo-
cal government unit. Yet, this may equally be a problem in countries with higher 
education levels, as potential politicians and civil servants are more attracted to 
the central than to local governments due to better career chances in the first 
(Prud’homme, 1995; Bardhan, 2002). In any case, to the extent that politicians 
and staff are inadequately trained, it will be hard to achieve poverty reduction 
through decentralisation. 
On the other hand, even if local governments are equipped with adequately 
educated personnel but do not possess the financial means to do their duties, it is 
rather unlikely that decentralisation will deliver on the expectations placed on it 
(Prud’homme, 1995; Romeo, 2002). Empirical evidence has shown that expendi-
ture assignment to local governments is sometimes more extensive than revenue 
assignment, either because the costs are underestimated or because the centre 
appropriates to itself the most lucrative sources of public revenue (Crook and 
Manor, 1998; Livingstone and Charlton, 2001; Asante, 2003). However, resource 
deficiencies severely undermine the ability of local governments to fulfil their 
functions and conduct even the most basic activities such as holding meetings or 
recruiting staff. There is a multitude of financing alternatives for local govern-
ments. The design of the fiscal arrangement must of course depend on the social, 
political, and economic context of any particular country, but with regard to pro-
moting transparency and accountability , it may be preferable to strengthen local 
taxation as much as possible (Olowu, 2003).
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3. Decentralisation in Uganda 
3.1. Historical and legal background
Uganda ’s experience with a decentralised system of government traces back to 
colonial times when the British governed by what they called indirect rule.10 The 
British district commissioners reigned over the districts of the country through 
native authorities, who were typically traditional chiefs. They acted as mediators 
between the commissioners and the indigenous population, exercising direct ad-
ministrative control over the people while remaining subject to the advice and 
overrule of the colonial authorities. When the country achieved independence 
in 1962, the native authorities were abolished. The new district commissioners, 
who were invariably Ugandans, were representatives of the central government 
at the district level. The Independence Constitution provided for the devolu-
tion of powers to kingdoms, urban councils and district councils under a quasi-
federal form of government. The elected councils were allowed to enact byelaws 
and dispense services, while the four kingdoms of Buganda , Bunyoro , Ankole 
and Toro and the territory of Busoga enjoyed substantially more autonomy.11 
In 1966, however, this attempt at federalism came to an abrupt end as the then 
Prime Minister Milton Obote suspended the Constitution and centralised all 
executive powers in the presidency. He abolished the kingdoms and even forced 
the Kabaka (King of Buganda) into exile. In order to consolidate these changes, 
the Local Administrations Act was passed in 1967, which divided the country 
into eighteen districts, downgrading them from local governments to local ad-
ministrations and depriving them of any discretionary power. Henceforth, the 
only sub-national institution with (partly formal, partly informal) power was 
the traditional chief.
This highly centralised government system remained in place until the mid-
1980s. Things began to change with the guerrilla war of the National Resist-
ance Movement (NRM ) under the leadership of today’s president Yoweri Kaguta 
Museveni , which lasted from 1981 to 1986. With the aim to overthrow the acting 
government of Milton Obote , who had come to office for a second time in 198012 
by allegedly unfree and unfair elections , the NRM established resistance councils 
in the areas under their control in order to mobilise and politicise the masses. In 
addition to providing support in the fight against Obote, these resistance coun-
cils were of strategic importance as they were meant to be an instrument to in-
stall and consolidate democracy. The NRM had the vision to establish a new 
and revolutionary concept of democracy – one that is presented as participatory, 
grass-roots based and popular, rather than representative, elitist and parliamen-
tary – and councils at the local level were considered to be the most appropriate 
way to achieve such a type of democracy. 
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When the NRM seized power in 1986, one of the first endeavours of the new 
government was to set up resistance councils throughout the entire country. A 
Local Government Commission was appointed to investigate the prevailing sys-
tem of local administration and, as the case may be, to propose reforms. As noted 
in the final report of this commission, although the terms of reference ‘did not 
specify that the reforms recommended take any particular direction, it is clear 
that expressed public opinion did expect the Commission to steer its recommen-
dations in the direction of one single overall objective: decentralisation’ (Repub-
lic of Uganda , 1987: 6). The Commission indeed recommended maintaining the 
resistance councils and assigning them with a number of watchdog, deliberative, 
legislative, executive, dispute settling and security functions. In Mamdani’s (1995, 
1996) view, this represented a major step towards dismantling ‘decentralised des-
potism’ in rural areas, where traditional chiefs had been exercising substantial 
power without any checks and balances. Yet the Commission did not advocate 
full-blooded devolution , which would have included the transfer of all execu-
tive functions to the local level, because it feared this could have disintegrative 
implications for such an ethnically and economically heterogeneous country like 
Uganda .
The Resistance Councils and Committees Statute of 1987 legalised the resist-
ance council system, creating a five-tier pyramidal structure with councils and 
committees at the village (RC1), parish (RC2), sub-county (RC3), county (RC4) 
and district (RC5) levels.13 The Statute aimed at securing and ensuring popular 
participation in decision-making , mobilising the masses for local economic de-
velopment, fostering empowerment of the population in the political sphere, and 
eliminating dual structures at the local level (Lubanga, 1996). But despite these 
ambitions, it turned out to be very difficult to implement the provisions of the 
Statute (Republic of Uganda , 1990). A major reason was seen as the resistance 
of central ministries to devolve powers to the local level: ‘Recalcitrant ministries 
balk at the prospect of dispersal of resources to the field – ostensibly due to lack 
of infrastructure amenities and a supportive legal framework. But what really 
appears to be most at stake is the implicit loss of control of massive financial 
and material resources’ (Republic of Uganda, 1990: 37). Subsequently, an intense 
debate about the future of the local government system was set off among per-
manent secretaries, local government leaders, decentralisation experts and other 
stakeholders. As a result and in the form of a memorandum, it was proposed to 
the cabinet in 1991 to adopt a far-reaching reform of decentralisation. The govern-
ment was prepared to implement this, and, in October 1992, a presidential policy 
statement officially launched the current decentralisation reform. 
Since then, the implementation and institutionalisation of decentralisation 
has gained momentum. It was first enshrined in the Local Government (Resist-
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ance Councils) Statute of 1993 and then in the Constitution of 1995. Since the 
constitution made provisions on principles, structures and finances of local gov-
ernments that went much further than the 1993 Statute, it became necessary to 
repeal the Statute and replace it by another legal document. The resultant Local 
Governments Act of 1997 paved the way for full implementation of the decen-
tralisation reform as envisioned by the government, and determines the political, 
administrative and fiscal aspects of decentralisation in Uganda today. 
3.2. Political decentralisation
The five-tier pyramidal structure established in 1987 still forms the foundation 
of the current local government system, but resistance councils were renamed as 
local councils with the 1995 Constitution. These councils form the political organ 
at the local level. They are headed by the council chairperson who is elected lo-
cally and is answerable to the respective council that he/she chairs. The district 
council (LC5) is the highest local government level, with the city council (LC5) as 
the urban equivalent.14 The sub-county (LC3), municipality (LC4), municipal di-
vision (LC3), town (LC3) and city division (LC3) councils are classified as lower 
local governments ; and the county (LC4), parish (LC2), ward (LC2) and village 











Figure 1: The fi ve-tier system of local governments and administrative units in Uganda 
Source: Author’s illustration.
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planning, legislative and executive powers, with the right to formulate, approve 
and execute their own budgets and development plans. The district develop-
ment plan is supposed to incorporate the plans of lower local governments, and 
these in turn are expected to integrate the plans of administrative units (except 
the county) in their jurisdictions. Besides having limited autonomy in planning, 
the councils of administrative units are mainly responsible for the resolution of 
problems or disputes at their respective levels, the monitoring of service delivery , 
the encouragement of self-help projects, and assistance in the maintenance of 
law, order and security. In both local governments and administrative units, the 
council chairperson, the vice chairperson, and a specified number of additional 
councillors form the executive committee, which is the executive and functional 
arm of the council. It initiates policies and submits them to the council for ap-
proval, monitors the implementation of council programmes, and reports to the 
council.
In higher and lower local governments , councillor s represent electoral areas 
or specific interest groups and are elected every four years.15 Those councillors 
representing electoral areas (one per electoral area) and women (one-third of all 
councillors) are elected by universal adult suffrage through a secret ballot, while 
those representing the youth and persons with disabilities (two for each interest 
group) are elected by respective electoral colleges through a secret ballot. In lower 
local governments, there are two additional councillors who represent elderly 
persons. In administrative units except in the villages, the council is constituted 
by all members of the executive committees of the respective lower level. The vil-
lage council, in contrast, is composed of all persons of eighteen years and above 
residing in the village.16
3.3. Administrative decentralisation
The administration in local governments and administrative units is clearly ac-
countable to its respective councils. The administration in local governments is 
headed by the chief administrative officer in districts, the town clerk in cities, 
municipalities and towns, and the chief in sub-counties. These people are the 
main accounting officers in their jurisdiction. They chair the technical planning 
committee, which is the organism that coordinates and integrates sectoral plans 
of lower local governments for presentation to the district/city council, conduct 
monitoring and supervision visits, discuss progress of programme implementa-
tion, and compile annual reports. The committee is made up by the heads of 
sectoral departments in the local government, which in turn are in charge of the 
technical work in such sectors as education and sports, works and technical serv-
ices, production, health, management support services, finance and planning, and 
 Susan Steiner
community-based services. Administrative units do not have well-established 
administrative structures. The chief in counties and parishes/wards is the only 
administrative officer at these levels who is responsible for administrative coor-
dination and support of sub-counties and for the collection of and accounting 
for local revenue, respectively. Villages do not have any permanent staff but are 
supported administratively and technically by parish and sub-county staff if nec-
essary.
In addition to these administrative structures, there are several statutory bod-
ies at the local level. These are the District Service Commission , the Local Gov-
ernment Tender Board , the Local Government Public Accounts Committee , and 
the District Land Board , all of which are appointed by the district council on the 
recommendation of the district executive committee and are thus accountable to 
the district council as well. The District Service Commission is responsible for 
the hiring and firing of all administrative staff and civil servants (such as teach-
ers, health workers, etc.) as well as human resource development within its area 
of jurisdiction. The Local Government Tender Board awards tenders for the local 
supply of goods and services. The Local Government Public Accounts Committee 
is in charge of auditing and reporting to the district council and the Ministry of 
Local Government. The District Land Board deals with any matters connected to 
land in the district, particularly the allocation of land which is not owned by any 
person or authority. A number of central government institutions are supposed 
to support local governments and administrative units in the fulfilment of their 
mandated functions, including the Ministry of Local Government, the Ministry 
of Public Service, the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, 
and the different line ministries. The line ministries are in charge of securing the 
local implementation of nationally set policies and local governments’ adherence 
to performance standards. At the district level, the resident district commissioner 
acts as a direct link between the central government and the district. He/she is 
appointed by the President of Uganda and is principally responsible for supervis-
ing the local implementation of those functions that are not decentralised, such 
as defence and security.
With regard to the assignment of service delivery responsibilities to different 
levels of government, the Local Governments Act is very comprehensive and pre-
cise in determining which levels of government are in charge of which functions 
and services. In line with the principle of subsidiarity, it is established that local 
governments and administrative units are responsible for those functions and 
services which the respective higher levels are less able and appropriate to fulfil. 
In general, local governments and administrative units are thus responsible for all 
functions and services that are not assigned to the centre. In very broad terms, 
central functions comprise of the provision of national public goods, such as de-
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fence, security and foreign relations, and the elaboration of national guidelines 
for sectoral policy-making , while local authorities deliver local public goods and 
services. The responsibility for a large number of service delivery sectors was 
devolved to the local level. Specifically, the Local Governments Act differenti-
ates between: 1) functions and services for which districts are responsible (for 
example, education services except for tertiary education, basic health services, 
water services, road services except for trunk roads between districts); 2) func-
tions and services for which cities, municipalities or towns are responsible (for 
example, street lighting, ambulance services, fire brigade services); 3) functions 
and services to be devolved by the district to lower local government levels (for 
example, provision of nursery and primary education, provision of agricultural 
ancillary field services, provision and control of soil erosion); 4) functions and 
services to remain at city or municipal level and not to be transferred to lower 
levels (staffing and payment of staff, mortuary and cemeteries, construction and 
maintenance of major drains); and 5) functions and services to be devolved by the 
city or municipalities to lower levels (for example, health education and visiting, 
immunisation, road sweeping). 
3.4. Fiscal decentralisation
In order to empower local governments and administrative units to fulfil their 
responsibilities, they are entitled to collect or receive local taxes and fees, and to 
receive a number of intergovernmental grants.17 With regard to taxes and fees, 
district and urban local governments are allowed to impose property tax , several 
forms of non-tax revenue (market dues, trading licences, parking fees, education 
contributions, etc.), and, until fiscal year 2004/05,18 graduated personal tax. The 
collection of this own local revenue is generally accomplished by sub-counties 
on behalf of district councils in rural areas and by divisions on behalf of city 
or municipal councils in urban areas.19 According to the law, own local revenue 
proceeds are retained locally and shared between all levels of local government 
and administrative units but not with the centre. With regard to intergovern-
mental transfers, unconditional, conditional and equalisation grants are chan-
nelled to district and urban councils who then distribute them downwards. 
Until 1999/00, these grants exclusively entailed the recurrent budget, while the 
development budget was still centralised.20 Starting with the Local Government 
Development Programme funded by the World Bank and implemented by the 
Ministry of Local Government, development funds have since been devolved to 
the local level.
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Figure 2: Own local revenue, 1997/98-2002/03 (million Ush)
Source: Author’s illustration based on data from Local Government Finance Commission.
It is very diffi  cult to obtain consistent data on Ugandan local fi nance in gen-
eral, and it is impossible to obtain such data for periods prior to the mid-1990s. 
Th ere had not been a coordinated and standardised way of data collection in local 
governments until the Local Government Financial and Accounting Regulations 
were passed in 1998. Since then, data availability has improved but remains, at least 
partly, fragmentary and erroneous. Local fi nance data must therefore be treated 
with great caution. Th is is particularly true in the case of data for own local rev-
enue, as many local governments do not report own revenue in a disaggregated 
way, but instead report total revenue under ‘other’ sources. Numbers for the diff er-
ent revenue types are therefore likely to be under-reported and numbers for other 
sources are likely to be over-reported. Th is is illustrated in Figure 2, which shows 
own local revenue for the years 1997/98 to 2002/03.21,22 Due to the high declara-
tion for other revenue, especially in recent years, the fi gure should be regarded as 
no more than a vague indication. What it shows clearly, however, is that graduated 
personal tax had been an important source of own local revenue, which makes 
the abolition of this tax in 2005 a highly critical decision as is discussed below. 
Figure 3 illustrates the evolution of intergovernmental transfers between 1997/98 
and 2003/04.23 In absolute terms, transfers have substantially increased over time, 
and conditional grants more so than unconditional and equalisation grants. Th e 
share of conditional grants in total grants amounted to 76 per cent in 1997/98 and 
increased to 80 per cent in 2003/04, while the share of unconditional grants de-
creased from about 24 per cent to about 20 per cent. Equalisation grants had not 
been distributed until 1999/00 when ten districts received the grant for the fi rst 
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Figure 3: Intergovernmental transfers, 1997/98-2003/04 (million Ush) 
Source: Author’s illustration based on data from Steff ensen et al. (2004: Annex 4.8) for 
1997/98-1999/00 and from Local Government Finance Commission for 2000/01-2003/04.
The system of intergovernmental transfers as it evolved since the initiation of 
the decentralisation reform turned out to produce some major obstacles. Most 
importantly, the number of conditional grants increased so much that the man-
agement of these became an administrative burden for both the centre and local 
governments . In 2004, there were thirty-seven grant schemes (twenty-six sectoral 
and eleven non-sectoral); all having different conditions and reporting require-
ments attached and each requiring separate bank accounts. As a result, local gov-
ernments had to submit numerous reports to the centre in each quarter (Stef-
fensen et al., 2004), which used a substantial part of the limited available human 
resources. In consequence, cabinet passed the Fiscal Decentralisation Strategy in 
June 2002, which was introduced in fifteen pilot local governments in 2003/04 
and countrywide in 2004/05. It entails two systems of intergovernmental trans-
fers, the recurrent transfer system and the development transfer system, through 
which the unconditional, conditional and equalisation grants are now channelled. 
This significantly reduces the administrative burden compared to the previous 
transfer system. Besides, the Fiscal Decentralisation Strategy provides for a great-
er flexibility in the use of grants. With increasing capacity of local governments , 
grants are planned to have decreasing conditional and increasing unconditional 
elements.
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4. Constraints on the Implementation of Decentralisation 
in Uganda 
From the presentation in the previous section, it becomes clear that decentrali-
sation in Uganda was designed as a highly ambitious and far-reaching reform 
with transfer of extensive power and responsibilities to the local level. Political 
commitment to decentralisation and local democracy paved the way for an exem-
plary form of devolution , at least on paper. If decentralisation was implemented 
and functioned as it is provided for by law, it should offer much potential for an 
impact on poverty through popular participation , responsive policy-making , and 
efficient service provision. However, despite the exceptional reform efforts, a gulf 
remains between principles and practice. A number of serious constraints on the 
proper implementation of the decentralisation reform can be identified, all of 
which correspond to the challenges that were introduced above, i.e. low popular 
participation, low levels of accountability , and low competence and capacity at the 
local level. I elaborate on these constraints as follows.
4.1. Limited autonomy in decision-making 
Despite the de jure devolution of decision-making responsibilities, line minis-
tries have de facto remained with substantial power over local policy-making , 
which expresses itself in two ways. First, line ministries determine national ob-
jectives and priorities, especially within the national Poverty Eradication Action 
Plan . The overall objective of this plan is to reduce the poverty headcount to 
10 per cent by the year 2017, and sector-wide approaches operationalise actions 
to achieve this. Since the implementation of many sectoral policies, especially 
poverty-relevant service delivery functions, lie within the competence of local 
governments, these have to adhere to the provisions made by line ministries in 
order to fulfil the national objectives even if they would set local priorities dif-
ferently. Second, and very much related to this, the operations of local authori-
ties depend almost entirely on funds obtained through sector budgets, which 
are transferred as conditional grants to the local level. The attached conditions 
are defined by the line ministries, partly in collaboration with donor organisa-
tions, and spell out budgetary allocations, performance targets, and technical 
specifications. As can be seen from Figures 2 and 3, about 90 per cent of lo-
cally available resources are intergovernmental transfers, and about 80 per cent 
of these transfers are conditional and thus predetermined for a particular use. 
Reallocations between sectors according to local priorities are ruled out even 
though this is likely to be changed under the recently initiated Fiscal Decen-
tralisation Strategy .
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Reasons for this reliance on conditional grants appear to be manifold. The 
introduction of the Poverty Action Fund in 1998/99, which is a protected part 
of the public budget mainly used for so-called poverty priority areas (primary 
education , primary health care, rural road rehabilitation and maintenance, ag-
ricultural extension, and rural water and sanitation) and channelled through 
local governments , resulted in an extensive conditioning of intergovernmental 
grants to ensure that these grants are spent on the intended purposes (Republic 
of Uganda , 2002). Besides, the use of conditional grants has often been deemed 
necessary by central authorities because of presumed weak financial management 
and accountability mechanisms at the local level, as well as concerns about local 
capacity and willingness to make decisions in line with national priorities (Stef-
fensen et al., 2004). The perspective in some line ministries is that decentralisa-
tion has fragmented and confused efforts towards coherent pro-poor service de-
livery (Hickey, 2003). However, empirical evidence has shown that local decisions 
made under discretionary funding match national objectives to a great extent 
(Onyach-Olaa, 2003). As one interviewee stated, local misuse and contradictory 
decision-making are no more than the official reasons to justify the high share of 
conditional grants; the real reason is that line ministries hang on to power.24
Whereas resistance to the transfer of autonomy to the local government level 
is natural and generally to be expected in the course of decentralisation reforms, it 
need not represent a major obstacle if there was a spearheading institution push-
ing the reform through and relating it to other policies and reform programmes. 
The lack of such an institution is one of the most important constraints on the 
implementation of decentralisation in Uganda according to one of my interview-
ees.25 Land and Hauck (2003: 15) tend to agree when they write: ‘It is unclear 
who is now responsible for championing the process.’ At the initial stage of the 
decentralisation reform, an advocating institution was established in the form of 
the Decentralisation Secretariat . This secretariat was created in 1992 under the 
head of the Ministry of Local Government to facilitate the implementation of 
decentralisation and it was delegated a wide range of responsibilities (Villadsen, 
1996). It provided ‘highly competent critical technical guidance’ in the first years 
of the reform (Steffensen et al., 2004: 26) but was shut in July 2004, as it was 
assumed that sufficient capacity within the Ministry of Local Government had 
been built (MoLG, 2004). Already in the mid-1990s, Villadsen (1996) noted that 
to resolve the difficulties in line ministries regarding their roles and functions in 
a decentralised system would be a great challenge and should be addressed by the 
Decentralisation Secretariat. However, in the light of its decreasing influence, 
the Secretariat has not been able to do so. Almost a decade later, Steffensen et 
al. (2004) still note that line ministries have to be brought on board with regard 
to their responsibilities vis-à-vis local governments. Sector regulation and prac-
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tice are often inconsistent with and potentially undermining decentralised service 
delivery , partly because sector legislation predates the Local Governments Act 
(Land and Hauck, 2003; MoLG, 2004; Steffensen et al., 2004). It has therefore 
been proposed to re-define the role of the Ministry of Local Government as a 
crosscutting ministry, thereby enabling it to spearhead the decentralisation proc-
ess (MoLG, 2004).
4.2. Confl ict between politicians and civil servants 
A second constraint on the implementation of decentralisation is the fact that 
the relationship between the political and administrative wings of local govern-
ments has not been without differences. In the past, administrators have report-
edly blamed the councillor s for interfering in their operations, while politicians 
have in turn accused them for not adhering to their guidance (Steffensen et al., 
2004). This can principally be attributed to confusion about the respective roles 
and functions of councillors and administrators, aggravated by a shortage of edu-
cated and experienced manpower. Local politicians as well as civil servants are 
often inadequately trained for their responsibilities, which is not surprising given 
the relatively low level of education in Uganda . With regard to administrative and 
service provision staff  at the local level, such as accountants, planners, engineers, 
teachers and health workers, there is a general lack of educated personnel in the 
country, and remote areas face particular diffi  culties to recruit and retain person-
nel.26 With regard to politicians, a problem consists in the fact that councillors are 
elected and not recruited based on their educational qualifi cations (except for the 
district council chairperson who must fulfi l the minimum qualifi cation of advanced 
level standard or its equivalent), which sometimes results in councillors having 
completed fewer school years than administrators or service provision staff . 
This provides scope for conflict between civil servants , particularly admin-
istrators, and councillors since the first are supposed to be accountable to the 
latter. The problem can be further intensified in higher local governments where 
some of the councillors are employed full-time and are paid emoluments27, which 
according to local conditions may be higher than the wages of administrators 
(Foster and Mijumbi, 2002; Francis and James, 2003).28 One interviewee pointed 
out that conflicts between the administration and the council can inhibit the 
proper functioning of local councils or administrations, resulting in delays and 
inconsistencies in the planning and budgeting processes as well as poor service 
delivery .29 In fact, due to a clash between the council chairperson and the chief 
administrative officer in Tororo district, council meetings were rather dedicated 
to arguments about the distribution of power than to the core council business.30 
Steffensen et al. (2004) note that constant guidance and training on the respec-
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tive roles of and relationship between politicians and administrators in such in-
cidences by the Ministry of Local Government have improved the situation. In 
order to tackle issues of low human capacity and inadequate staff levels at the 
local level, a restructuring of local governments is under way, which aims at better 
co-aligning the devolution of functions and responsibilities with staffing struc-
tures (MoPS, 2003).
4.3. Confl ict between diff erent local levels
Human capacity constraints are generally more pronounced at lower than at 
higher local levels. Very often, this makes higher levels hesitant to transfer re-
sources downwards, as they do not trust in the ability of lower levels to use their 
resources efficiently and to account for the funds they receive (Francis and James, 
2003). Districts and higher urban councils, which coordinate intergovernmental 
grants, do not necessarily share these with lower government levels as provided 
for by law. And sub-counties, which are supposed to transfer a particular share 
of own local revenue to the village and parish levels, do not always do so either 
(LGFC, 2000). This in turn jeopardises an efficient service delivery , even though 
the mistrust in lower local governments is not necessarily justified. One inter-
viewee noted that there might be a trade-off between capacity and accountability . 
While sub-counties and villages might face bigger capacity constraints than dis-
tricts, they might be more accountable because of their proximity to citizens.31 
In fact, households turn out to be more satisfied with the performance of lo-
cal governments or administrative units the closer these are to the population, 
as found by Saito (2003) and MFPED (2000). Data from the National Service 
Delivery Survey corroborates this, with 61 per cent of households rating the per-
formance of village councils as good and 26 per cent as fair, while only 38 per cent 
think that sub-county councils perform well and 23 per cent that they perform 
fairly.32 Closely related with this is the fact that distance presents an access prob-
lem for only 4 per cent of the respondents in the case of village councils but for 25 
per cent in the case of sub-county councils.33 This implies that the proximity of 
lower levels is an advantage that should not be disregarded, as it has the potential 
to enhance levels of participation and accountability .
An additional difficult dimension of the relationship between different local 
levels is the issue of integrating lower-level development plans into higher-level 
development plans. It appears that if lower-level plans reach higher local govern-
ments , they are rarely incorporated (Francis and James, 2003). Th is can be for sev-
eral reasons. First, as above, mistrust in the capacity of lower government levels 
and hence disrespect for identified priorities and elaborated plans can be a cause. 
Second, ignorance of procedures among the officials in charge can represent the 
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source of the problem, as noted by an interviewee.34 Many officials simply do not 
understand the rules of the game, and nobody at the local level is informed about 
what is going on, who has which plans, and whether plans have been written at 
all. And third, delays in the submission of plans from lower levels naturally leads 
to a considerably reduced probability of their consideration.
I observed such a situation in Tororo district. I visited three sub-counties at 
the beginning of July 2004, and none of them had submitted their plan to the 
district even though the new fiscal year had already started. I was told that plan-
ning had started late because of a lack of resources for transport to villages, the 
organisation of meetings, paper, etc. The district development plan in turn had 
already been drafted, which makes it very clear that lower-level plans had not 
been integrated. In the sub-counties, the picture with regard to the incorporation 
of village plans was mixed. In one sub-county, village plans were supposed to be 
ready but could not be found when I wished to see them. In another, the council 
headquarters were abandoned and nobody could be found to provide me with 
information about village plans. In the last sub-county, I came across a very posi-
tive example. The council chairman was present and showed me orderly village 
plans (including priorities and respective units of responsibility) for all thirty-
seven villages in the sub-county. He told me that he himself together with other 
sub-county leaders had gone to all these villages and organised the elaboration 
of village level plans. I am afraid that this positive example is an exception rather 
than the rule. 
4.4. Financial shortages
Approximately 30 per cent of the total Ugandan government budget is today 
transferred to local governments as intergovernmental grants and about 27 per 
cent of total public expenditures are spent at the local level.35 These proportions 
are relatively high but they must be seen in the light of expenditure assignments. 
Since most service delivery functions have been decentralised, local level financial 
requirements are high. Yet, fiscal decentralisation was pursued without a system-
atic costing of decentralised services in the initial stage of the process, and devolv-
ing new functions was done without adequate compensation of the costs of these 
(LGFC, 2000). Even though transfers have increased incrementally, this has hap-
pened without proper consideration of the costs of local functions, and local gov-
ernments have always complained about the inadequacy of their finances. 
In an attempt to investigate the relevance of this complaint, the Local Govern-
ment Finance Commission conducted a study and found that local governments 
had an annual recurrent expenditure need of Ush 228 billion (approx. US$150 mil-
lion, or 167 million) in 2000/01, exceeding the conditional grants they received, 
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most of it in general administration, health and agriculture (LGFC, 2000). It was 
suggested that two-thirds of this amount could be covered by unconditional and 
equalisation grants as well as by a substantial increase of locally collected revenue, 
but a third still remained uncovered. The results of this study were passed to 
the central government for consideration and the recurrent transfers have since 
increased. But a recent report reveals that funds are still not commensurate with 
service delivery requirements, which is reflected by the long list of unfunded pri-
orities in local governments and funding gaps in sector strategic investment plans 
(MoLG, 2004). 
The principal problem with regard to local finance is that collection of local 
taxes and fees is extremely low, about one-third to one-half below the potential 
(LGFC, 2000). Reasons for this are manifold and include the politicisation of 
local taxes, wide reluctance among the population to pay tax due to arbitrary, 
regressive and sometimes forceful collection practices, lack of awareness of tax-
payers about the connection between services and taxes, collusion between tax 
collectors and taxpayers, and lack of administrative capacity at the local level (Liv-
ingstone and Charlton, 1998; LGFC, 2000; MFPED, 2000; Ellis and Bahiigwa, 
2003; Francis and James, 2003; Bahiigwa et al., 2004; Kasimbazi, 2004). I believe 
that the high level of intergovernmental transfers represents an additional disin-
centive for collection of own local revenue, as also pointed out by the  Republic of 
Uganda (2002) and Land and Hauck (2003).36 
In consequence, locally-collected revenue does not allow for many produc-
tive investments and is instead just sufficient to cover councillors’ emoluments 
and allowances. The same is incidentally true for unconditional grants, which 
are supposed to pay for wage and non-wage expenditures of administrative staff; 
but the transfers to some local governments are even lower than the wage bill 
(Francis and James, 2003). This has two important implications. First, since con-
ditional grants are insufficient to provide the required funds and proceeds from 
other sources are no more than marginal, the problem remains that part of the 
functions and duties of local governments are unfunded. And second, local gov-
ernments do not dispose of much autonomy and discretion with regard to their 
expenditure assignments for exactly the same reason, i.e. that conditional grants 
account for the major share of local revenue. 
It must be emphasised at this point that the problem of low local tax collection 
is far from being resolved. Instead of improving local governments’ capacity to 
collect taxes and fees, the central government recently abolished graduated per-
sonal tax, which was an important local tax in nominal terms and an innovative 
form of direct taxation in a predominantly rural setting. Proceeds from graduated 
personal tax had steadily decreased over the last years, which was mainly due to 
political interference. The tax had repeatedly been used for campaign objectives, 
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for example in the 2001 presidential elections , leading to a widespread refusal 
to pay the tax and a significant drop in revenue collection. Yet from the local fi-
nance point of view, the abolition of graduated personal tax was an incorrect and 
counterproductive decision. On the one hand, it will further decrease local gov-
ernments’ ability to cover expenditure needs, as well as curbing their financial au-
tonomy in the short run because it makes them even more dependent on transfers 
from the centre. On the other hand, and maybe more importantly, it obstructs 
the opportunity to increase local accountability , as citizens will lose the feeling 
that they contribute to the common good with their taxes and can thus expect 
services in accordance with their needs. It would have been much more advisable 
to reform the prevailing, admittedly partly harmful, local tax system and improve 
the administration and collection thereof. 
There is certainly no obvious solution to how local tax systems should be 
reformed; but it appears that this question has not received sufficient attention 
from the central government . Most strikingly, the fact that graduated personal 
tax was abolished in the midst of the debate about the removal of presidential 
term limits and just ahead of the 2006 presidential elections suggests that the 
motivation to do so was more political than fiscal. Due to the unpopularity of 
the tax, it could be assumed that the majority of the people would more than 
welcome this decision and show gratitude at the poll stations. It was, however, 
not given sufficient consideration that abolishing graduated personal tax would 
result in a resource gap for local governments of an estimated Ush 80 billion,37 
which, without introducing a viable alternative, would ‘cause a serious crisis to 
the local government system’ (MoLG, 2004: 13). At the time of my field research 
in May 2005 when the budget for 2005/06 was to be adopted, the National 
Budget Framework Paper did not contain a position to compensate local gov-
ernments for losses resulting from the abolition of graduated personal tax. The 
2006/07 Background to the Budget at least recognises that local governments 
should be compensated for the loss of revenue from graduated personal tax and 
lists this as one of the ‘activities that will take first call on any additional re-
sources’ (MFPED, 2006: 32).
4.5. Election behaviour and low information levels
A crucial aspect of the decentralisation-poverty nexus is the intended increase 
in popular participation in public decision-making , i.e. the relationship between 
local governments or administrative units and the local population. With regard 
to electoral forms of participation, local elections have taken place in 1989, 1992, 
1998, 2002 and 2006 since the NRM came to power. Onyach-Olaa (2003) notes 
that a high turnover of councillors at local elections can be seen as a sign of ac-
Constraints on the Implementation of Decentralisation
countability because those candidates who did not perform well are punished 
and voted out of office. Occasionally, local council elections appear to be won 
on the basis of criteria other than candidates’ capability or merit. In particular, 
wealth appears to play an important role. Muhumuza (2003) reports that the 
most affluent candidates often receive most votes because they can distribute 
monetary or in-kind benefits to the constituency in the run-up to the elections. 
Titeca (2005) confirms this, noting that councillors invest a lot of money during 
electoral campaigns, which in their eyes legitimises them in maximising per-
sonal benefits derived from state resources once in office as a way to recover the 
investment. Related to this, several of my interviewees referred to the phenom-
enon of councillor s’ constant attendance of workshops and meetings, where al-
lowances and meals distributed provide the main incentive to attend rather than 
the topic discussed.38 Yet the wealth factor seems to be of higher relevance in 
elections of higher local governments than lower local governments. Councillors 
tend to be more elite, wealthy and highly educated at the district level, but are 
generally characterised by a certain status in the community (e.g. long residency 
in the locality, maturity, marriage and good behaviour) at lower levels (Saito, 
2003). Beside wealth, ethnic and religious background partly influences election 
behaviour. For example, an advisor to the Tororo district government told me 
that unless the district council has Catholic, Protestant, and Muslim members, 
there is large potential for conflict due to mistrust between the religions.39 And 
lastly, it happens that community elders influence the outcome of elections by 
way of advising the community on whom to vote for.40 Nevertheless, whatever 
people may have based their election decision on, it is fair enough to say that 
they have had and have used the opportunity to raise their voice and elect their 
representatives.
As far as non-electoral forms of participation are concerned, however, the 
situation looks more discouraging. An interviewee stated that there is hardly any 
consultation between local governments and administrative units on the one side 
and citizens on the other side when work plans are prepared and budgets for-
mulated.41 The Uganda Participatory Poverty Assessment (MFPED, 2002) came 
to the same conclusion. Meetings of local governments are generally open to the 
public and citizens can solicit access to the minutes of these meetings. However, 
in few instances have citizens indeed attended meetings or requested to see the 
minutes (Steffensen et al., 2004). Reasons for this are many and include high op-
portunity costs of attending meetings in the form of foregone income, an overload 
of meetings,42 the discussed matters being too technical,43 the limited resources 
at stake, and the perception that local decisions are the prerogative of elected 
representatives (Francis and James, 2003). But more often than not the ignorance 
of the population plays the major role. People have not fully understood what 
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decentralisation is about and what their rights and duties are. An interviewee 
described this as follows: ‘It was an extreme shift from the government deciding 
what is best for the people to the people telling the government what is best for 
them.’44 Since it was too radical, it did not work. He quoted an experience made 
during research in a very remote area. When he introduced himself as conducting 
a survey on behalf of the government, the interviewees told him that they had 
long waited for him (‘the government’) to come to their village. Hence, as long as 
there are people who are not sufficiently informed about the meaning and impli-
cations of (local) government and decentralisation, the level of popular participa-
tion will remain severely constrained.
4.6. Corruption, patronage and clientelism 
The fact that the principles of decentralisation are not yet fully comprehended 
by either local politicians, local administrators or local citizens entails the risk 
of ‘the process of dezentralisation degenerat[ing] into a scramble for local influ-
ence and local power’ (MoLG, 2004: 4). Francis and James (2003: 336) note that 
under the conditions on the ground, ‘those with vested interests are capable of 
turning the institutions and opportunities created through dezentralization to 
their own advantage’. Essentially, this implies that there is wide scope for cor-
ruption , patronage , clientelism , and elite capture . But caution must prevail here. 
Knowledge about the incidence of these practices is restricted by their sensi-
tive nature, and general conclusions should not be drawn from single cases. It is 
sometimes believed that decentralisation in Uganda has led to a mere dispersion 
of corruption, ‘redefining the character of corrupt relationships from those con-
trolled by the centre to those controlled by district-level officials’ (Watt et al., 
1999: 48). However, contentions that corruption is higher at the local level may 
be influenced by perceptions, since local corruption may simply be more visible 
(Martinez-Vazquez et al., 2004). In addition, while decentralisation may have 
increased the number of people with access to public resources, it may also have 
decreased the amounts used for private gain. It thus remains hard, if not impos-
sible, to tell whether there is more or less corruption under the decentralised 
system in Uganda . 
Quantitative evidence on the incidence of corruption is very hard to find but 
the Second National Integrity Survey analysed by Deininger and Mpuga (2005) 
and the National Service Delivery Survey (NSDS) provide some insights into 
the (perceived) corruption situation at the local level. The Second National In-
tegrity Survey was conducted in 2002 among both private and public sector rep-
resentatives in order to assess the incidence of corruption in different government 
institutions and foster the empirical basis for policies and programmes aimed at 
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strengthening accountability and improving public service provision. The data 
illustrate that the incidence of perceived corruption varies widely between the 
considered institutions, ranging from extremely low levels in the Central Bank (3 
per cent) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (4 per cent) to medium levels in local 
councils (between 21 and 32 per cent) and to very high levels in District Tender 
Boards (58 per cent) and the traffic police (70 per cent). Despite the obvious 
weaknesses of corruption perception indicators, this finding reveals that house-
holds are exposed to corruption both at the national and local level. How exten-
sive this corruption really is remains an open issue.
The NSDS questioned households about whether they had to make any pay-
ment if they had a case or issue that required intervention by local councils in 
the last two years and what the purpose of this payment was. Slightly more than 
half of the respondents reportedly made a payment before their case or issue 
was handled. In the majority of incidents, this money was a regular case fee. In 
about 15 per cent of incidents, however, the payment was either an outright bribe 
or a ‘token of thanks’. Beside households, service providers were asked about the 
incidence of misuse of funds at the local level. They stated that misuse was a 
larger problem at the sub-county level than at village and parish levels, with 5 
per cent reporting misuse in villages, 5 per cent in parishes, and 15 per cent in 
sub-counties, and that higher amounts of money were misappropriated at the 
sub-county level. When requested about who was implicated in cases of misuse, 
an interesting finding emerged. The executive committee was involved in 56 per 
cent of village cases, in 39 per cent of parish cases but in only 7 per cent of sub-
county cases. In contrast, the respective accounting officer (chief ) was by far the 
most implicated person at sub-county level (56 per cent). At village and parish 
level, this officer was implicated in only 12 per cent and 22 per cent of the cases 
respectively.
There are different reasons for politicians and civil servants to engage in cor-
rupt practices. Low wage levels and arrears in payment provide strong incentives. 
An interviewee noted that when the decentralisation reform was adopted, many 
local people regarded the new structures as a way to benefit from public resources 
and simply imitated the corruption they had previously observed at the central 
level.45 Weak auditing and reporting capacity as well as a lack of reliable account-
ability mechanisms prepare the ground, as it remains difficult to monitor the use 
of funds. Another interviewee said, however, that in some cases it is the mere loss 
of documents that leads to (unjustified) suspicions of corruption.46 This again 
confirms that one must be careful when making statements about the incidence 
of corruption. In addition, since transfers from the centre to the local level are 
often made with delay, resources are spent in a hurry because accountability re-
quirements necessitate prompt reporting, and hence money is partly used for 
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ends other than the intended ones.47 And lastly, lack of information among citi-
zens keeps them from demanding accountability from local officials. 
About 70 per cent of households stated in the NSDS that they did not know 
how to report minor extortion as well as minor and major embezzlement by lo-
cal councils at the village, parish, and sub-county level. This suggests that the 
majority of corruption cases go unreported; a fact that was also pointed out by 
Deininger and Okidi (2003). However, about two-thirds of the respondents said 
they would report extortion or embezzlement if they encountered it. Yet the 
question remains how would they do this without the necessary information on 
procedures. Among those who would not make a report, about two-thirds stated 
fear of retribution as the reason and the remaining one third said that reporting 
would be ineffective. In fact, the surveyed service providers asserted that this lat-
ter concern was indeed of relevance. In more than 50 per cent of the cases of mis-
use of funds at village and parish level, no action was taken. At the village level, 12 
per cent of those accused of corruption were interdicted or suspended, 15 per cent 
were dismissed and 17 per cent were reprimanded. The corresponding figures at 
parish level were 13 per cent, 7 per cent, and 26 per cent. At sub-county level, no 
action was taken in only 23 per cent of the cases, while 33 per cent of suspected 
wrongdoers were interdicted or suspended, 4 per cent dismissed, and 40 per cent 
reprimanded or recovered. 
Coming back to the issue of information, some people appear to be completely 
unaware of the responsibility and the source of finance for local projects. As an 
interviewee told me, when a road is built, it is often unclear to the people whether 
it is financed by the central government directly, by intergovernmental transfers, 
by local taxes, or by donor funds.48 Such ignorance among citizens creates vast 
room for patronage politics. Titeca (2005) describes a highly interesting example 
from Kasese district. Local people do not perceive services or projects as serv-
ices rendered to the community by an independent agency, be it central govern-
ment, local government or NGO , but as services brought to the community by 
political patrons. Both parliamentarians and local councillors create exactly this 
perception: without their support and lobbying, services would not have been 
delivered. This in turn builds up their legitimacy and power base. Attaining le-
gitimacy through monetary or project benefits seems to play an important role 
in general. Councillors lobby hard to receive and channel money to their home 
sub-counties.49 
Besides, there are irregularities in local tenders and recruitment of civil serv-
ants (MFPED, 2002; Francis and James, 2003), which must be considered to be a 
mixture of corruption and clientelism . While tenders are supposed to be granted 
by the District Tender Boards on the basis of a points system taking into account 
such objective criteria as price, experience and record of tax payments, a letter of 
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recommendation from a councillor seems to be an equally important prerequisite. 
Successful tenderers are often friends or relatives of the politicians, or proxy com-
panies operating on their own behalf. Irregularities in recruitment procedures 
occur, as many local governments appoint staff as ‘sons and daughters of the soil’ 
(MoLG, 2004: 5). As Murembe et al. (2005) note, recruitment at the district 
level is rather a matter of know-who than of know-how. Councillors are said to 
exert pressure on the District Service Commissions to favour local applicants for 
administrative positions over candidates from other parts of the country since 
the first are likely to be more malleable and easily enmeshed in local structures of 
patronage (Francis and James, 2003).
That increasing people’s access to information can be effective for increasing 
local accountability has best been illustrated by Reinikka and Svensson (2004, 
2005). After finding in an initial study that schools received only 22 per cent on 
average of intended transfers for non-wage expenditures in 1995 and that the bulk 
of the funds was captured by local officials and used for patronage politics,50 the 
Ugandan government embarked on an information campaign of publishing all 
intergovernmental transfers in local newspapers and at local notice boards. A 
follow-up study revealed that by 2001 local capture had been strikingly reduced 
and schools now received more than 80 per cent of the same grant. But informa-
tion alone cannot cure the lack of accountability. First, the source of information 
is important. Azfar et al. (2001) found that citizens obtain most information on 
local issues from local leaders, which implies that information transfer can easily 
become subject to manipulation and censure. And second, in addition to informa-
tion, clear and credible procedures for sanctioning are required. 
The lack of detailed sanctioning procedures turns out to be a great challenge 
in terms of increasing accountability in Uganda . While the legal provisions in the 
Local Governments Act are very detailed on local governments’ functions and on 
the inspecting, monitoring and coordinating role of the MoLG, they are rather 
vague on the consequences for improper, unlawful or inefficient behaviour of lo-
cal councils. The Act determines that if an offence by a local council has been 
disclosed, this is to be reported to ‘the relevant authority for appropriate action’. 
As an interviewee told me, it takes a long time before the Ministry of Local Gov-
ernment or the line ministries report to the Ministry of Finance, Planning and 
Economic Development and the Presidential Office and again a long time before 
these react.51 In place of the rather imprecise provisions in the law, it should be en-
sured that local councils lose their autonomy if they violate their mandate, and it 
is only given back if they undertake certain measures of improvement. He quoted 
an example of three Chief Accounting Officers who were sued for corruption and 
ended up with compensation, which to make matters worse had to be paid from 
the local budget that was already very low. 
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5. Implications for Poverty Reduction
In the previous section, I identified several constraints on the implementation 
of decentralisation in Uganda , which give reason for concern about whether the 
poverty -reducing potential of decentralisation has been realised in this country. 
First, local governments do not have full competence and autonomy in local de-
cision-making . Although the responsibility for the majority of publicly provided 
services was transferred downwards, the central government , and especially the 
line ministries, still exert considerable influence. Not only does the central gov-
ernment set national priorities and determine sectoral guidelines, which have to 
be adhered to by local governments even if they set their priorities differently, 
but also most of the financial resources available to local governments are condi-
tional grants from the centre. Local governments are constrained in the flexible 
allocation of these funds and basically only administer them. Hence, despite the 
fundamental assumption in the decentralisation debate about the informational 
advantage of local governments over the central government with regard to local 
needs and preferences, the centre ultimately decides how much money is trans-
ferred and used at the local level and for which purposes. If poverty is reduced 
as a result of these resources being generally channelled towards poverty priority 
areas, it is not the decision-making at the local level but central policy-making 
that is behind it.
Second, it appears that the intended increase in popular participation has only 
been achieved to a limited extent, particularly as far as non-electoral forms of 
participation are concerned. Local officials generally do not provide sufficient 
space for citizens to get involved in decision-making , and citizens often prove to 
be ignorant about the opportunities offered by decentralisation. It must be seen 
in the light of Ugandan history that no participatory culture has yet developed. 
The long phase of radical centralisation from 1966 until 1992, the experience of 
brutal dictatorship and deprivation over many years, as well as strict hierarchical 
social and political relations, has resulted in people’s apathy towards and cynicism 
about public affairs. Given these preconditions, it is not surprising that people 
have not been immediately eager and able to participate in politics to influence 
the way they are governed. In order to allow for a participatory political culture 
to evolve, time is a necessary factor.
Third, the level of capacity in the form of human and financial resources is by 
and large restricted in local governments as well as administrative units. The ef-
fective fulfilment of assigned functions is often constrained by inadequate levels 
of staffing and financial resources but also by insufficiently trained and experi-
enced politicians and civil servants . Local officials frequently do not fully un-
derstand the instructions and procedures related to decentralisation, which has 
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given scope for mistrust between politicians and civil servants as well as between 
different local government levels. Hence, unrealistic planning and budgeting, po-
litical quarrels about roles and functions, and denial of the rules of the game 
inhibit the smooth functioning of decentralisation. However, given the initial sit-
uation of an extremely centralised government system and the fast growth in re-
sponsibilities, functions and funds that now have to be handled at the local level, 
this is not particularly surprising. In contrast, it would have been astonishing if 
decentralisation were put into practice without any difficulties. Nonetheless, the 
highly sophisticated reform basically overstretches the implementation capacity 
on the ground, which makes local governments unlikely to implement the reform 
properly even if they were motivated to do so. 
And fourth, there are indications that the level of local accountability is yet to 
be improved, especially with respect to the accountability of local councillors to-
wards the population. Due to a lack of information on the roles of councillor s as 
well as relevant accountability mechanisms, many people do not hold councillors 
responsible for their actions. Low levels of accountability, however, provide scope 
for patronage , clientelism , and corruption , which is deleterious to responsiveness 
and efficiency. In fact, irregularities appear to be very prevalent in local tendering 
and recruitment processes with clear consequences for the delivery of services. 
On the basis of these considerations, it seems that decentralisation in Uganda 
is not performing perfectly in the way it was designed. A restricted level of popu-
lar participation , insufficient accountability of local officials to the population, as 
well as limited competence and capacity in local governments and administrative 
units, indicate that the reform’s potential for poverty reduction is not (yet) fully 
tapped due to the reasons outlined in the second section of this chapter. Having 
said that, I would like to make a cautionary statement with regard to how this 
should be interpreted. As noted before, decentralisation is a complex and medium 
to long-term reform process, which cannot yield a significant effect on poverty in 
the short run. Expecting immediate results is unrealistic and conditions can still 
improve over time. In the case of Uganda , it should be clear that it is not decen-
tralisation in itself that is disappointing or deficient, but the implementation of 
the same. The picture may thus be very different in five to ten years time. 
 Notes
 The present chapter is part of the result of a two-year research project funded by the 
Fritz-Thyssen-Stiftung. 
 See http://www.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization (last accessed  February 
).
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 When I refer to any of these interviews below, I do not quote the interviewees by name. 
I merely indicate their institutional affiliation together with the place and the date of the 
interview.
 Decentralisation in Uganda has been well documented by many authors. For further in-
formation, the interested reader should consult Villadsen and Lubanga (), Nsibambi 
(), Obwona et al. (), Saito (), and Steffensen et al. (). 
 Elite can refer to different dimensions, such as social elite, political elite or economic elite. 
Besides, there can be a distinction between the traditional elite (traditional leaders and 
chiefs) and the modern elite (for example, teachers and entrepreneurs). I purposely do not 
specify which elite is meant, as this depends strongly on the country context. 
 There is a controversial debate about whether corruption is lower or higher under decen-
tralisation than under centralisation. Even though the literature on the relationship be-
tween decentralisation and corruption is limited, Fjeldstad () and Martinez-Vazquez 
et al. () provide helpful reviews. They find that the existing studies, both theoretical 
and empirical, point in different directions and do not allow for clear-cut conclusions on 
the impact of decentralisation on corruption.
 On its website, Transparency International differentiates between ‘according to rule’ cor-
ruption and ‘against the rule’ corruption. Facilitation payments, where a bribe is paid to 
receive preferential treatment for something that the bribe receiver is required to do by 
law, constitute the former. The latter, on the other hand, is a bribe paid to obtain ser-
vices the bribe receiver is prohibited from providing. See http://www.transparency.org/
news_room/faq/corruption_faq (last accessed  February ).
 Bardhan and Mookherjee () acknowledge that elite capture is not principally a prob-
lem of local governments but that it affl  icts the centre just as much as the local level. Th ey 
point out that it is impossible to determine a priori whether it is worse centrally or locally. 
 Most of the literature on the capacity of governments is concerned with capacity build-
ing, and again most of it focuses on the central government. One of the few academic 
publications dealing with local government capacity is Gargan () who understands 
capacity as the ability of a local government to do what it wants to do. He claims that local 
governments are no more than as good as they have to be because capacity results from 
the interplay of community expectations, community resources, and community prob-
lems. This definition might have worked for his purpose, which consisted in making the 
argument that capacity building in the form of imparting management practices is not 
always adequate; but it is not very helpful here. Particularly in the light of potentially 
high corruption, letting local governments do what they want to do would neither be a 
satisfactory definition in theory nor an appropriate policy goal in practice. Other writers 
on local government capacity do not provide definitions (Honadle ; Wallis and Dol-
lery ; Matsui ). I therefore base my definition of capacity on the literature that 
concentrates on the central government. Wallis and Dollery () do the same. 
 If not indicated otherwise, the information provided in this section stems from Sathya-
murthy (), Republic of Uganda (), and Kisakye (). 
 The kingdom of Buganda clearly had most power over its own affairs. Since colonial times, 
it had enjoyed a special standing vis-à-vis the rest of the country. Independence brought 
Buganda a federal status, while the rest of the country was either semi-federal or uni-
tary (Oloka-Onyango ; Watt et al. ; Kanyeihamba ). When Milton Obote 
abolished all kingdoms in , the Baganda leadership considered his action unlawful, 
unconstitutional and anti-Buganda. Up to today, the Baganda have repeatedly called for 
the restoration of a federal government system (‘Federo’). Though being subject to debate, 
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this has so far been opposed by the government and Uganda has remained a unitary coun-
try. Yet, in an unexpected move Museveni restored Uganda’s monarchies in , albeit 
without giving them a formal political role. On  July of the same year, Prince Ronald 
Muwenda Mutebi was appointed the thirty-sixth Kabaka.
 Obote’s first presidential term was from  to  and the second from  to .
 The number of districts in Uganda has increased over time, as several districts were split 
into smaller entities. While there were thirty-three districts in , there are eighty dis-
tricts today. Considering the current total population of about  million, this indicates 
an average district size of . inhabitants. 
 Only the capital of Kampala has a city government. 
 Except for the last local election, which took place in , local councillors were voted for 
on grounds of individual merit, not political party affiliation. It remains unclear whether 
and how the recent return to multiparty politics will affect the electoral behaviour in fu-
ture local elections. 
 Before the Local Governments Act was passed, local elections took place in the form of 
indirect elections. The whole village community constituted the council at the village level 
and elected the members of the village committee. The council at all higher levels was 
formed by committee members of the next lower level, and committees were elected from 
among the councillors (Kisakye ). Hence, the district council was then constituted of 
the county-level committee members under its jurisdiction. This system did not allow for 
much representation of the electorate. ‘The higher one went up the [resistance council] 
pyramid, the more watered down was the democratic content of the system’ (Mamdani 
: ). 
 Beside locally-collected revenue and intergovernmental grants, local governments are en-
titled to borrow from national sources. However, most local governments do not make use 
of this right (Obwona et al. ). They may also receive donations from donors, NGOs 
and civil society-based organisations. But even though donor funds constitute a consider-
able share of the resources spent at the local level, these are typically channelled to the 
central government, which then transfers it as intergovernmental grants downwards. 
 The fiscal year in Uganda starts on  July.
 This holds for all types of locally-collected revenue except for market dues, which are col-
lected by private firms.
 The development budget is the Ugandan term for the budget that entails investment ex-
penditure.
 Data for own local revenue refer to collections at district level and do not include collec-
tions by urban authorities due to missing data.
 The monthly average exchange rate at the beginning of this period (i.e. in July ) was 
Ush , per US, and at the end of the period (i.e. in June ) Ush , per US. 
The Ush has appreciated thereafter and stood at Ush , per US in June . Today 
(i.e. on January , ), it stands at Ush , per US. 
 Data on transfers refers to approved budget, not budget release. 
 Interview with a former official of the Decentralisation Secretariat, Kampala,  May 
. The same official offered a further interesting explanation: the central government 
deliberately keeps the unconditional grant as low as possible because of the nature of the 
allocation formula for this grant. The Seventh Schedule of the Constitution determines 
that the amount of the unconditional grant for a particular local government should be 
equal to the amount paid in the previous year adjusted for changes in the price and wage 
levels and changes in the budgeted cost of running added or subtracted services. In his 
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opinion, the central government does not increase this amount to more than is required 
because it is not possible to reduce the amount of this transfer ever again. 
 Interview with a decentralisation advisor to the Ministry of Local Government, Kampala, 
 May .
 For a detailed report on challenges in human resource deployment in the social sectors, 
see Price Waterhouse Coopers (). 
 These are the chairperson, the vice chairperson, the speaker, the deputy speaker and 
secretaries. The remaining councillors receive sitting allowances when there is a council 
meeting.
 Problems related to low educational levels of councillors are so prevalent that key stake-
holders strongly endorse suggestions to introduce minimum qualifications for more coun-
cillors than only the district council chairperson (MoLG ). 
 Interview with an official of the Ministry of Local Government, Kampala,  May .
 Interview with a decentralisation advisor to the Tororo district government, Tororo,  July 
.
 Interview with a decentralisation advisor to the Ministry of Local Government, Kampala, 
 May . 
 Unfortunately, the survey only covered the village, parish and sub-county levels so that I 
am not able to present equivalent findings for the district level.
 In another study, Tidemand () observes that in his two sample villages more than 
three quarters of people know the names of the village council chairperson but only one 
fifth knows the name of the district council chairperson.
 Interview with a researcher of the Economic Policy Research Centre, Kampala,  May 
.
 These percentages were calculated on the basis of data from various years of the Back-
ground to the Budget. 
 This is equivalent to the high level of aid inflows being a disincentive to tax collection at 
the national level. Museveni’s statement on  May , that he personally wants to over-
see operations of the Uganda Revenue Authority in order to stop tax leakages and evasion, 
confirms this because it followed an announcement of the United Kingdom to withhold 
 million in aid (due to Uganda’s failure to make progress in establishing a fair basis for 
multipartyism).
 Speech of the Chairperson of the Budget Committee of the Parliament of Uganda at the 
Public Expenditure Review,  May , Speke Resort Munyonyo, Kampala.
 Interviews with the Chief Administrative Officer of Nakasongola district, Kampala,  
May ; a researcher of the Centre for Basic Research, Kampala,  May ; and a 
decentralisation advisor to the Tororo district government, Tororo,  July .
 Interview with a decentralisation advisor to the Tororo district government, Tororo,  July 
.
 Interview with a researcher of the Centre for Basic Research, Kampala,  May .
 Interview with the same researcher.
 Talk at Public Expenditure Review with the Chief Administrative Officer of one district, 
Kampala, May , .
 Interview with a researcher of the Centre for Basic Research, Kampala,  May .
 Interview with the same researcher.
 Interview with an official of the Ministry of Local Government, Kampala,  June .
 Interview with a decentralisation advisor to the Tororo district government, Tororo,  July 
.
Constraints on the Implementation of Decentralisation
 Interview with a representative of the Inspectorate General of Government, Kampala,  
May . 
 Interview with an official of the Local Government Finance Commission, Kampala,  
May .
 Interview with the Vice Chair of the District Council, Tororo,  July .
 The possibility that the transfers were captured at the central level was ruled out by 
Reinikka and Svensson (). 
 Interview with a decentralisation advisor to the Ministry of Local Government, Kampala, 
 May . 
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3 Decentralisation and Poverty Reduction in 
Malawi – A Critical Appraisal
Blessings Chinsinga
1. Setting the Context
Democratic decentralisation is seen as the most topical state reform that can open 
up spaces for wider and deeper participation at the local level. It encourages more 
people to get involved in the politics that affect them, making government more 
accountable through citizen oversight and control through elections . Thus, in 
theory, the devolution of governance to the lowest possible unit paves the way to 
fully entrench and consolidate democratic values, principles and practices. This 
in turn improves responsiveness to local needs in the delivery of public services 
and hence contributes to the attainment of the trinity of good governance, devel-
opment and poverty reduction . The reforms leading to decentralisation are thus 
seen as providing a robust structural arrangement through which the grassroots 
can participate in the fight against poverty at a very close range, since the ultimate 
objective is to institutionalise their participation in the policy processes. In short, 
decentralisation heralds a permissive and enabling atmosphere for communities 
to effectively realize their full potential for dignified and fulfilling lives, as it is 
not only an institutionalised but also a legally underpinned form of participatory 
development (cf. Chikulo, 1998; Chinsinga, 2005a; Olowu, 2006).
Democratic decentralisation reforms in Malawi were introduced in the wake 
of the democratic reforms which saw the ousting of the Malawi Congress Party 
(MCP ) , a one party-led regime which governed the country for three decades, and 
the ascendancy of the United Democratic Front (UDF) at the helm of govern-
ment. From probably being the most repressive regime in all of southern Africa , 
Malawi reinstated multiparty democracy in May 1994 following both relentless 
donor and domestic pressures. This not only marked a disjuncture from the of-
ficial rhetoric of institutionalised denial of crippling poverty , but also stimulated 
unequivocally critical policy debates pertaining to poverty for the first time since 
independence in July 1964 (Anderson, 1994; GoM, 1995). Unlike the MCP re-
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gime, which denied the existence of poverty or viewed it from a grossly minimal-
ist perspective, the UDF government quickly acknowledged the widespread exist-
ence of poverty, its magnitude and depth. During the MCP era, the question of 
poverty did not arise at all as long as Malawians had food, clothes on their backs 
and lived in houses which did not leak when it was raining.
The collapse of the autocratic one party state machinery was sealed with the 
adoption of a liberal democratic constitution in 1995 which, among other things, 
guarantees a full range of civil, cultural, social, political and economic rights, de-
mocracy, good governance and the rule of law . This constitution further recognises 
a viable local government system as an integral building block of a functional and 
potentially vibrant democracy. Appropriate instruments, notably the new Local 
Government Act 1998 and the 1998 decentralisation policy, were promulgated in 
a bid to concretise the fundamental ideals embodied in the liberal democratic 
constitution. The ultimate objective of these legal instruments is to build up local 
capacity and grassroots institutions and adequately institutionalised arenas of 
participation . The poverty agenda further gained irreversible momentum because 
the UDF government identified poverty reduction both as a policy and strategy 
that would guide all development activities in the short, medium and long-term. 
In fact, poverty reduction was widely orchestrated as ‘[the] government’s first 
priority and centrepiece of [its] overall social and economic programme’ (NEC, 
1998: 3). Several poverty reduction programmes have since been launched and 
implemented. These have, among many others, included the Poverty Alleviation 
Programme (PAP) inaugurated in 1994 under which the Malawi Social Acti on 
Fund (MASAF) has been the main intervention. This was followed by the Vision 
2020 in 1998; the Malawi Poverty Reduction Strategy (MPRS) in 2001; the One 
Village One Product (OVOP) in 2003; and the Malawi Growth and Develop-
ment Strategy (MGDS) in 2006. All these poverty reduction initiatives variously 
champion decentralisation as a two-pronged strategy for poverty reduction and 
democratic consolidation. 
Th ere is little doubt that the reforms ushered in by the UDF government raised 
high hopes and expectations among the people at all levels of society, especially 
given that Malawi ’s socio-economic profi le is characterised by marked polarisa-
tion between the rich and the poor. Th e key question, then, is have the democratic 
decentralisation policy reforms, spanning slightly over a decade now, created an 
enabling atmosphere for sustainable poverty reduction and grassroots participa-
tion in political and policy processes? Th e track record of the reforms to date is not 
very encouraging as it increasingly becomes evident that the central government 
commitment to poverty reduction through decentralisation policy reforms has 
progressively waned and essentially remained at the level of rhetoric. Th e reforms 
have been plagued by inconsistent and ad hoc implementation motivated largely 
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by strategic political considerations. Th ere has been a dramatic shift among stake-
holders from genuine concerns with the plight of the poor to promoting, defend-
ing and consolidating their own vested interests. Th e poverty reduction discourse 
is presently less characterised by benevolence, and increasingly with opportunistic 
overtones, than when it was introduced slightly over a decade ago. 
This chapter therefore argues that the decentralisation policy reforms in Ma-
lawi are very unlikely to catalyse sustainable poverty reduction efforts because 
they are yet to be implemented in such a way that ensures that the underlying 
objectives of the reforms are realised. There are several reasons that account for 
the apparent lack of decisive progress in the implementation of the decentrali-
sation policy reforms more than a decade after they were formally introduced. 
These constraints include the following: 1) lack of commitment by national level 
politicians to implement decentralisation reforms motivated by sheer strategic 
political considerations, fearing that doing so would greatly undermine their 
often precarious hold on power; 2) the legislative framework for decentralisa-
tion policy reforms is insufficiently clear regarding the division of labour and 
functions between the Assembly (political organ) and the Secretariat (executive 
organ) which has in turn undermined the capacity of these institutions to col-
laborate efficiently and effectively in carrying out of their respective mandates as 
key integral parts of the evolving decentralised bodies; 3) the failure to establish 
and institutionalise sub-district participatory structures to serve as mechanisms 
for representation, participation and accountability , as in most cases they have 
existed only on paper; 4) pervasive tension and conflict among key political actors 
at the local levels, namely councillors, chiefs and Members of Parliament (MPs), 
eclipsing the prospects of the poor and marginalised sections of the population 
of transforming the opening up of spaces of participation under the auspices of 
decentralisation policy reforms into channels of power and influence; 5) the re-
sistance of the decentralised line ministries to operate within the framework of 
District Assemblies (DAs ) as this would, in their view, mean a significant loss of 
power, status and authority; and finally 6) the mismatch between the range of 
responsibilities DAs are mandated to provide and their precarious, and in most 
cases, virtually non-existent independent financial capacity. In short, DAs have 
up to now not been able to play a key role as a development actor and make a sig-
nificant contribution to democratisation and poverty reduction because various 
organs of local government have not had the capacity to carry out their new tasks 
as envisaged within the framework of the decentralisation policy reforms.
There is therefore a huge risk that the implementation of the democratic de-
centralisation policy reforms are likely to degenerate into merely an invited space 
for the grassroots, one that is entirely a prerogative of the state (cf. Cornwall and 
Gaventa, 2001). This is inevitable since the state is often in control of the reform 
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processes and would therefore dictate the course, taking into account its own vest-
ed political interests. In this case, the nature, form and scope of spaces emerging 
as a result of the democratic decentralisation reforms can be strategically limited, 
controlled and even closed altogether, as a critical reading of the Malawian case 
seem to suggest. Th e point is that while democratic decentralisation is presented 
as a legally underpinned form of grassroots participation , this in itself is not a 
guarantee against the probable closure of democratic spaces of participation. 
This chapter is divided into six main sections. The next section sets the con-
text for the rest of the chapter by putting the status of poverty and the decen-
tralisation policy reforms in Malawi into perspective, principally as the basis for 
assessing the implementation and impact of the decentralisation policy reforms. 
The third section assesses the country’s experience with the decentralisation 
policy reforms, emphasising how the reforms have fared vis-à-vis the poverty re-
duction efforts. The fourth section analyses how the relationships between key 
stakeholders in the local government system as well as the weak financial bases 
impeded the performance of local governments during the period in which they 
were fully constituted. The fifth section examines the status of service delivery , 
participation and downward accountability in the DAs within the framework of 
the decentralisation policy reforms. The sixth section assesses the prospects of 
decentralisation, local governance and poverty reduction in the country against 
the backdrop of the experiences to date. The final section offers some concluding 
remarks and reflections.
2. Decentralisation and Poverty in Perspective
2.1. Poverty in Malawi : A quick overview
The notion of poverty is a fairly recent addition to the repertoire of policy vocab-
ulary in Malawi . Until the early 1990s, the existence of poverty was not officially 
recognised. In fact, any attempt to invoke the notion of poverty in the develop-
ment discourse was not only considered as a taboo but also as being unpatriotic 
(cf. Kalemba, 1997; Chinsinga, 2002). 
The initial attempt to profile the status of poverty in the country was the 1993 
Government of Malawi /United Nations (GoM/UN ) situation analysis under 
the auspices of UNICEF . The incidence of rural and urban poverty was esti-
mated at 60 per cent and 65 per cent respectively. A poverty line was computed 
at US$40 per capita per annum. The high levels of poverty were attributed to 
low agricultural production, low non-farm income, low education , poor health, 
rapid population growth and weak institutional structures. The most vulnerable 
categories of people included smallholder farmers with less than one hectare of 
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land, estate tenants, the urban poor, female headed households, casual labourers 
and children.
Many studies have been carried out since the pioneering situation analysis in 
1993. The studies have varied in scope and focus but their conclusion is the same. 
Poverty in Malawi is widespread, deep and severe. The 1998 and the 2005 Inte-
grated Household Surveys (IHS) , however, stand out as comprehensive studies 
at the national level that have reassessed the extent of poverty in the country 
since the publication of GoM/UN situation analysis in 1993. The 1998 IHS es-
timated the overall incidence of poverty at 65.3 per cent. According to the 2005 
IHS , 52 per cent of Malawians eke out their livelihoods below the poverty line. 
The proportion of the ultra-poor has remained the same at 22 per cent. Put dif-
ferently, the 2005 IHS suggests that about 6.7 million Malawians live in poverty 
and as many as 2.7 million cannot afford to meet even the daily recommended 
food requirements1 (GoM/World Bank , 2006; Devereux et al., 2006). The Gini 
coefficient (an inequality index)2 is estimated at 0.38, which reflects profound in-
equities in the access to assets, services and opportunities across the population. 
The conclusion of a comparative analysis of the 1998 IHS and the 2005 IHS is 
that there has been little or no progress at reducing poverty and inequality (cf. 
Devereux et al., 2006; Chinsinga, 2006). The apparent decline in the incidence 
of poverty in the 2005 IHS from 65.3 per cent in 1998 to 52 per cent is largely at-
tributed to the differences in the methods used in the two surveys by the National 
Statistical Office (NSO, 2005) .
These studies clearly indicate that Malawi remains one of the poorest coun-
tries in the world despite undergoing significant economic and political reforms. 
There is as yet no tangible progress despite the proliferation of poverty reduction 
programmes since the turn of the 1990s. Malawi is one of the poorest countries 
in the world whether judged by GNP per capita, the UNDP ’s Human Devel-
opment Index or its Human Poverty Index (cf. Jenkins and Tsoka, 2003). The 
country’s track record with regard to the Human Development Index is quite 
damning. Malawi has dropped from position 138 out of 178 countries in 1990 to 
position 166 out of 178 countries in 2006. This underlies a steady decline in health 
care delivery, education , economic growth and general living standards.
2.2. Decentralisation in Malawi : A quick profi le
The official adoption of the constitution in 1995 providing for decentralisation 
was not Malawi ’s first attempt at decentralisation but rather a culmination of a 
series of efforts which began with colonial administrators as early as the turn of 
the last century. However, the reform efforts that eventually resulted in the inau-
guration in November 2000 of the current system of local government , namely 
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District Assemblies (DAs ) , can be seen as a continuous stream of transformative 
action that can be traced to the second half of the 1990s. Malawi became inde-
pendent in 1964 with a vibrant local government system, but one which changed 
dramatically following the 1966 cabinet crisis (cf. Baker, 1975; Kaunda, 1992). The 
statutory powers of the local councils were substantially circumscribed and pro-
gressively neutralised by the establishment of District Development Committees 
(DDCs ) to anchor rural development initiatives in 1967.3 Local councils were, 
however, not abolished and this therefore meant that from 1967 onwards Malawi 
maintained parallel and unavoidably rival institutions for the delivery of grass-
roots development.
The need for reforms to the DDCs which ultimately laid the foundation for 
DAs was first echoed in the 1987-96 statement of development policies (GoM, 
1987). The major criticisms of DDCs were that: 1) they were hardly serious fo-
rums; 2) they met irregularly; and 3) they merely produced a series of wish lists 
for development projects. These could only be implemented if they were in line 
with the priorities of the central ministries. The drive for renewed momentum 
in rural development culminated in the District Focus Policy Initiative in 1993, 
modelled on Kenya ’s experience. The substantial appeal of the Kenyan experi-
ence was aptly captured by Barkan and Chege (1989: 432), who characterised it 
as ‘offering much for those who wish to learn more about the prospects for, and 
limits to, decentralisation in Africa ’. The aim of the District Focus Policy Ini-
tiative was to empower districts to plan and implement district-specific projects 
that would otherwise be under the jurisdiction of the central government; to 
make districts into focal points for planning and implementing district specific 
projects, transforming them into major forces and instruments for the design of 
rural development (GoM 1996). This policy initiative was launched in six dis-
tricts, designated as Local Impact Areas (LIAs), in order to ‘pilot participative, 
transparent, accountable and cohesive structures for planning, implementing and 
monitoring activities at district level’ (UNCDF, 1994: 8). These districts were 
Mulanje , Thyolo and Mangochi in the south, Mchinji and Dedza in the centre, 
and Nkhata Bay in the north.
Much as the District Focus Policy Initiative had in many ways revitalised and 
reinvigorated the DDCs , it was argued that its major weakness was that it did not 
entail any measure of devolution . District level activities remained squarely under 
the superintendence of the central government machinery. Furthermore, institu-
tions established under the auspices of the district focus policy initiative were not 
anchored by any legal or legislative mandate, and emphasised development much 
more than governance and representation (Chinsinga, 2005a; Oluwu, 2006). In 
addition, DDCs controlled no funds and had no authority to enforce decisions 
except through coercion, since departmental members remained responsible to 
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their ministries; the behaviour of civil servants at committee meetings (by with-
holding essential information) alienated most people, who had begun to feel that 
they were merely being used by the civil servants to legitimise decisions already 
made by themselves; and they were subject to excessive political direction, to the 
detriment of their development objectives (Chiweza, 1998; Mbeye, 1998).
Th ese lessons inspired eff orts to promulgate a new decentralisation policy 
framework especially in the wake of the momentous transition to democracy in 
May 1994. Th ese lessons were further complemented by study tours to countries 
such as Uganda , Ghana and Germany , and later followed by broad-based consulta-
tions with public and private stakeholders, political and traditional leaders and civil 
society . Th e outcome was the 1996 draft national decentralisation policy (GoM/
UNDP , 1996), eff ectively adopted in October 1998. Th is paved the way for the en-
actment of the Local Government Act in December 1998, which came into eff ect 
in March 1999. Th e distinctive feature of the 1998 decentralisation policy is that it 
provides for devolution . Building on the constraints of, and lessons learnt from, the 
previous decentralisation initiatives, the ultimate objective of the policy is to insti-
tutionalise real decision-making powers and authority in local jurisdictions with 
clear geographical boundaries, legal status and personnel of their own, to the extent 
that a great bulk of their activities will be substantially outside the direct control of 
the central government. Th e local government will therefore no longer be a public 
body exercising delegated powers but rather a deliberative assembly with legislative 
and executive powers recognised by and embedded in the constitution .
These reform efforts culminated in the inauguration of DAs in November 
2000. There are currently forty local governments in the country. The 1998 Lo-
cal Government Act distinguishes four different types of Assemblies. These are: 
District Assemblies, one in each of the country’s twenty-eight administrative dis-
tricts; City Assemblies in the cities of Lilongwe , Blantyre and Mzuzu ; the Mu-
nicipal Assembly of Zomba; and Town Assemblies in the townships of Balaka , 
Dedza , Kasungu , Liwonde , Lucheza , Mangochi and Salima . The focus of this 
chapter is, however, on the DAs which are the dominant form of local govern-
ment in the country geared at promoting local governance, development and pov-
erty reduction . The number of the DAs has increased from twenty-four in 1994 
to twenty-eight to date. Of the additional four DAs , one has been created in the 
north and the rest in the south, considered a stronghold of the United Demo-
cratic Front (UDF) , the ruling party until February 2005.4
DAs , broadly defined as decentralised political and administrative authorities 
with elected representatives of the people, are primarily entrusted with the tasks 
of democratising state power and advancing participatory democracy and collec-
tive decision-making at the grassroots, and have been created by merging local 
councils and DDCs . The merger was imperative because it resolved an outstand-
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ing institutional anomaly that erroneously constrained the potential efficacy of 
each planning and administrative apparatus. The councils were legally constitut-
ed and yet perpetually resource constrained; the DDCs were richly endowed with 
resources, yet without legal or corporate status (Kaunda, 1992; GoM/UNDP , 
1998). The overall mandate of the DAs is to consolidate and promote local gov-
ernment as a source of democratic and autonomous decision-making at the dis-
trict and local levels. DAs have been constituted under the auspices of decentrali-
sation policy reforms whose objectives include the following:
• To create a democratic environment and institutions at the local level which 
will facilitate the participation of the grassroots in decision-making and there-
fore consolidate the democratisation process;
• To eliminate duplication of institutions responsible for governance and rural 
development at district and local levels, with the aim of making the public 
service more efficient and cost effective;
• To promote accountability and good governance at local level; and 
• To mobilise the masses for socio-economic development at the local level in 
order to help government reduce poverty (GoM, 1998).
The mandates of the DAs as prescribed by the 1998 Local Government Act in-
clude the following:
• To make policy and decisions on local governance and development for the 
local government area;
• To consolidate and promote local democratic institutions and participation ;
• To promote infrastructural and economic development through the formula-
tion, approval and execution of district development plans;
• To maintain peace and security in the local government area in conjunction 
with the Malawi Police Service;
• To make by-laws for good governance of the local government area;
• To appoint, develop, promote and discipline its staff;
• To cooperate with other DAs in order to learn from their experiences and 
exchange ideas; and 
• To perform other functions including the registration of births and deaths and 
participate in the delivery of essential local services.
DAs have two organisational structures: political and administrative. The po-
litical structure is headed by a chairperson chosen from among councillors dur-
ing their first meeting, and the administrative structure of DAs is headed by a 
District Commissioner appointed by the central government through the Lo-
cal Authority Service Commission of Malawi (LASCOM) . The administrative 
structure is popularly referred to as the Secretariat and the political structure 
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is known as the Assembly. All senior members of the Secretariat at the level of 
Director and above are appointed through LASCOM5. The Secretariat is thus an 
organ of execution, while the Assembly is an organ of debate6. DAs are thus inte-
grated decentralised authorities combining the strengths of deconcentrated line 
ministries and departments with the autonomy and revenue powers and func-
tions of devolved democratic local government. All government ministries and 
departments represented at the district level constitute the Secretariat, at least as 
projected in the statutes. 
The legislative intent is that all line ministries as outlined in the sector devolu-
tion plans should be under the supervision of the DAs , but the practice is differ-
ent on the ground because of the sluggish, ad hoc and disjointed nature of the re-
forms. The line ministries are fiercely resisting getting integrated into the district 
level structures under the control of District Commissioners for fear of losing 
their status, authority and prestige. While the District Commissioner has been 
designated as the controlling officer, almost all line ministries, notably Health, 
Agriculture and Education, are still reporting directly to, and remain accountable 
to their parent ministry headquarters. Membership of the Assembly is made up 
of: 1) one elected member from each ward within the local government area; 2) 
Traditional Authorities (TAs) and Sub-Traditional Authorities (STAs) from the 
local government area as non-voting members; 3) Members of Parliament from 
constituencies that fall within the local government area as non-voting members; 
and 4) five persons as non-voting members to be appointed by the elected mem-
bers to cater for the interests of such special interest groups as the Assembly may 
determine from time to time.
Th e institutional matrix of the DAs is follows. Below the DAs are Area Devel-
opment Committees (ADCs) and at the bottom end of the hierarchy are Village 
Development Committees (VDCs) . Th is institutional matrix is designed as a con-
duit for grassroots involvement in the political and development policy processes. 
It serves as a channel for articulation, discussion and consolidation of the aspira-
tions, hopes and demands of the grassroots for appropriate action. Th e sub-dis-
trict participatory structures thus function as structured mechanisms of political 
participation and representation from the local to district levels and even beyond.
The ADCs are representative bodies of all VDCs created at the level of tradi-
tional authority (TA). The ADCs are led by traditional chiefs and their member-
ship incorporates one female and one male member elected from each VDC , MPs, 
ward councillors, chairpersons of political parties, representatives of religious 
groups, youth and women groups, the business community and frontline staff 
in health, education , agriculture and community development. The functions of 
ADCs are: 1) to raise funds and mobilise community resources for projects; and 
2) to review and integrate projects from VDCs before submission to DAs . 
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The VDCs represent a group of villages usually corresponding to the jurisdic-
tion of Group Village Headman (GVH) . These are an intermediary between tra-
ditional authorities and village headmen and their main role is to facilitate vari-
ous forms of administrative transactions for the TAs over their respective areas of 
jurisdiction. The functions of VDCs are: 1) to conduct meetings for identification 
of community needs and initiation of self-help projects; 2) to mobilise funds and 
resources; and 3) to coordinate with ADCs . The membership of VDCs include 
the GVH as chair, with the vice chairperson, secretary, treasurer, vice treasurer 
and ten members all elected from the villages within the VDC . The office bearers 
are ordinary community members elected through community meetings overseen 
by officials from ADCs.
The DAs were formally constituted following the local government elections 
in November 2000. At the time the councillors were taking their positions, the 
Local Government Act prescribed a three-year long term of office but this was 
amended to extend it to five years7. The motivation for this amendment was that 
holding local government elections every three years would be a substantial fi-
nancial burden on the part of government. It would thus not be fiscally sustain-
able (cf. Hussein, 2003). By virtue of this amendment, the tenure of councillors 
elected in the November 2000 local government elections expired in 2005. New 
elections are yet to be held. The DAs are currently operating without councillors 
since November 2005.
Elections were scheduled for May 2007. The expenses toward the holding of 
the elections had been provided for in the 2006/2007 budget largely at the in-
sistence of the opposition block in Parliament, but the preparatory processes for 
the elections continued to be way behind schedule and indications in the Febru-
ary 2007 sitting of Parliament were that the elections would be postponed. The 
government tabled a proposal to divert resources meant for elections to alterna-
tive uses in the mid-year budget review.8 The government’s justification was that 
the elections could not be held because of a number of outstanding issues that 
needed resolving, as indicated below. Elections are unlikely before 2009.
3. Decentralisation and Poverty Reduction: A Rapid Stocktaking
3.1. Constituting DAs and the local governance framework
It is quite difficult to undertake an accurate assessment of the impact of the de-
centralisation policy reforms on poverty reduction mainly because of the manner 
in which the reforms have been implemented (cf. Chiweza, 1998 and Chinsinga, 
2005a). Much as local government was duly provided for in the 1995 constitution 
as the bedrock of local governance, the efforts to translate this constitutional 
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commitment into practice have been largely rhetorical. The reforms have been 
implemented in a highly inconsistent, ad hoc and disjointed fashion. The initial 
local elections were delayed for six years and it is now three years since the tenure 
of councillors expired and prospects for local elections in the near future look 
bleak; it took almost four years to finalise the enabling legislative framework for 
local government, yet there are still many outstanding issues to be settled; exces-
sive delays in the devolution of functions to DAs as this only began in June 2005, 
despite the DAs being formally constituted in November 2000; the disbursement 
of central government grants to DAs to carry out devolved functions has been 
haphazard; and most line ministries have fiercely resisted letting their staff oper-
ate within the framework of DAs .
The local elections were supposed to have been held immediately after the 
multiparty general elections in May 1994 but were perpetually postponed until 
November 2000. The delays in institutionalising the DAs were officially attribut-
ed to lack of funding. It is, however, difficult to believe that the very same donors 
who had pressed for democratisation were not forthcoming to ensure the comple-
tion of the process.9 This meant that six years after the transition to democracy 
was concluded, a framework had not been established within which to effectively 
transform local governance with a new focus on improving the standard of liv-
ing and the quality of life of the disadvantaged sections of the communities. It 
was therefore not until November 2000 that the DAs could realistically begin 
to deliver on their developmental mandates and ensure that poor households in 
their respective jurisdictions have access to social services. Yet even when this 
happened, it took almost five years for central line ministries to devolve their 
functions to DAs . 
Besides, the notion of poverty is neither defined in the decentralisation policy 
nor in the Local Government Act . This is a critical oversight because the way in 
which poverty is defined and perceived frames the poor in such a way as to condi-
tion the possibilities for their participation and the nature of attempts to alleviate 
their condition (cf. Brock, et al., 2001; Craig and Porter, 2003). Both the MPRS 
and the MGDS have not addressed this particular constraint either. Th is is the 
case because both interventions are basically products of technical,  money-metric 
gap-filling approaches to poverty reduction which gloss over issues of power and 
control; yet it is widely acknowledged that the fight against poverty is about de-
feating structures that generate it. This is to say that these development frame-
works are guided entirely by income measures in their orientations towards pov-
erty, including the proposed strategies to deal with it. The major cause of poverty 
in the country is the unequal distribution of land, widely appreciated as the ma-
jor productive asset especially for poor households, yet both the MPRS and the 
MGDS are silent on how to deal with this issue, save for recognising that it is 
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a critical factor of production. The point is that the land distribution patterns 
alone embody various forms of exploitative structural relationships, for exam-
ple, sharecropping that are key in perpetuating the poverty unless the problem 
is tackled and addressed accordingly. The exclusive focus on how much income 
people have to earn in order to eke their livelihoods above the poverty line is not 
thus adequate.
The DAs functioned on an interim basis until their mandate expired in 2005. 
They are no longer interim since the District Commissioners were designated 
as controlling officers toward the end of 2005. DAs were interim because during 
this time the sector devolution plans, that is, functions of the line ministries to 
be transferred away from the centre to the DAs , had not yet been worked out. 
The interim administrative structures were made up of the offices of the Dis-
trict Commissioner , the Director of Administration and the Director of Plan-
ning and Development. Their mandate was to oversee the implementation of the 
decentralisation policy reforms in earnest so as to institutionalise participatory 
democracy and development anchored by a well coordinated and decentralised 
planning framework. The understanding was that the administrative structures 
and positions would remain an interim measure ‘until such a time the [DAs ] are 
in a position to design their own administrative structures and the DAs are in 
a position to take over full responsibility for the appointment of staff ’ (GoM, 
2000: 15-16). The legal framework of course provides for a fairly standard insti-
tutional blueprint for DAs , but nonetheless accords them freedom to create ad-
ditional administrative structures that may best respond to the specific needs and 
circumstances of each DA.
The key to the DA structures graduating from an interim status was the com-
pletion of sector devolution plans. Sector devolution plans are elaborate schemes 
of the tasks, functions and responsibilities that line ministries retain at the centre 
and those that are devolved to the DAs , including the guidelines of how the DAs 
should manage them. Thus sector devolution plans are meant to guide the shar-
ing of responsibilities, power and authority between the centre and the periph-
ery within the framework of decentralisation policy reforms. These would be a 
vital input in the DAs ’ efforts to design their own administrative structures that 
would make them responsive to context-specific circumstances. This would allow 
them to identify cheaper and more appropriate ways of providing public services, 
apart from getting a better fit for locally diverse preferences (cf. Bardhan, 1996; 
Nijenhuis, 2003). The devolution of responsibilities, power and authority to the 
DAs should have been effectively concluded by June 30, 2002. This deadline was 
shifted to July 31, 2003 and further postponed to January 1, 2004. The exercise was 
finally concluded after the expiry of the tenure of DAs in 2005. The sectors and 
the functions that have been devolved are as stipulated in Table 1 below:
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Table 1: Functions Devolved to District Assemblies
Ministry/Department Functions Devolved
Education, Science and Technology Nurseries and Kindergartens, Primary 
Schools and Distance Education Centres
Health and Population Health Centres, Dispensaries, Maternity 
Clinics, Health Posts, Control of 
Communicable Diseases, Health Education 
and Environmental Sanitation
Transport and Public Works District, Township and Estate Roads, Street 
Naming, Issuing of Road Permits, Issuing 
of Drivers’ Licences and Provision of 
Maintenance of Offi  ce Buildings
Lands, Survey and Physical Planning Land Valuation, Land Surveys, 
Administration, Lease Agreements, Physical 
Planning
Agriculture and Irrigation Livestock Extension, Control of Livestock 
Diseases, Land Husbandry, Crop Husbandry, 
Food and Nutrition and Small Dams
Water Development Boreholes and Wells, Piped Water Projects 
and Distribution of Water
Gender, Youth and Community Services Women in Development, Community 
Development, Street Children and Orphans, 
Youth Aff airs, Cultural Aff airs, District 
Information Services, Probation and Welfare
Natural Resources and Environmental Aff airs Environmental Reclamation and Education, 
Botanical Gardens, Zoos and Parks, 
Licencing and Inspection of Fishing Gear, 
Fisheries Extension, Establishment of 
Woodlots, Forestry Extension and Forestry 
Management
Commerce and Industry Licencing and inspection of Small and 
Medium Sized Businesses
Finance District Treasuries
Home Aff airs and Internal Security Community Policing
Source: Guidelines for Sector Devolution Plans (GoM, 2000: 21)
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The functions that have been devolved are in principle meant to be exclusive 
tasks, functions and responsibilities of DAs , but this is not necessarily the case in 
practice mainly because of the unclear direction of the decentralisation policy re-
forms in terms of key implementation steps and strategies. The functional review 
that was carried out to rationalise the structures of the DAs in order to prepare 
them for the execution of the devolved functions has been approved by Cabinet, 
but is yet to be implemented because of the substantial financial outlay required 
to do so. It is, however, expected that the new structures for DAs will become ef-
fective from the beginning of the next financial year (i.e. 2008/2009).
The excessive delay in the institutionalisation of the decentralisation policy 
reforms is attributed to the legislative impasse, since the adoption of the decen-
tralisation policy and the Local Government Act necessitated the review of those 
laws that are incompatible with the attendant system of local governance. The 
review of these laws was imperative because the provisions of the decentralisation 
policy and the Local Government Act that are at variance with the supportive 
legislative framework cannot be acted upon unless they are harmonised with each 
other (Mwadiwa et al., 2003; Chinsinga, 2005b). For instance, the decentralisa-
tion policy assigns the responsibility to DAs over land falling under their territo-
rial jurisdictions, yet there are several sector institutions and agencies that legally 
have the same responsibility. 
Mandated by the 1970 Town and Country Act, the Ministry of Lands and 
Physical Planning has jurisdiction over the very same land that the decentralisa-
tion policy bestows to DAs . The jurisdiction over this land is further complicated 
by the 2002 land policy which gives chiefs power over it, especially in terms of 
settling disputes backed up by the 1967 Land Act which accords exclusive juris-
diction over disputes relating to customary land to traditional authorities. Thus 
very little has been done to date. A total of twenty-eight Acts were identified 
in order to harmonize the supportive legislative framework for decentralisation. 
Of all these Acts, implementable recommendations were proposed for seventeen 
Acts, but as yet have not been tabled before parliament for ratification. 
A critical reading of the situation points to strategic political considerations 
and calculations, however. Malawi emerged out of the May 1994 general elections 
as a heavily fragmented polity along regional fault lines. One-partyism persisted 
but largely on a regional basis. The United Democratic Front (UDF ) emerged as 
the dominant party in the south, the Malawi Congress Party (MCP ) in the cen-
tre and the Alliance for Democracy (AFORD ) in the north. If the local govern-
ment elections were to be held immediately after the general elections, MCP and 
AFORD would have most probably secured outright control of DAs in the centre 
and north respectively. Such an outcome would have meant UDF being in control 
of only those DAs in the southern region. This would have greatly magnified 
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the minority status of the UDF as the ruling party and undermined the regime’s 
implementation capacity in the local communities.
When the local government elections were finally held in November 2000, 
due to donor pressure and the electoral outcome of the second general elections 
held in June 1999, the UDF emerged triumphant. It made substantial inroads in 
the centre and secured at least a seat in the north. Out of 848 local government 
seats, the UDF secured 611 representing 70.7 per cent of the total votes; AFORD 
got 122 seats representing 14.1 per cent of the votes; MCP managed only seventy-
eight seats representing 9.3 per cent and independent candidates were successful 
in thirty wards representing 3.3 per cent of the votes. Up to as many as 128 UDF 
candidates were retained unopposed. The average voter turnout for the local gov-
ernment elections was as low as 14 per cent at the national level (cf. Hussein, 
2003; Sikwese, 2003). 
Nevertheless, UDF ’s dominance of local government did not positively affect 
the tempo of the implementation of the decentralisation policy reforms. The 
reforms almost completely stalled afterwards. The Cabinet Committee on de-
centralisation simply did not meet to make decisions on key issues vital to the 
implementation process. Several assessments generally indicate that the politi-
cians, particularly on the governing side, do not welcome decentralisation in its 
original form but see it rather as a means of improving administrative capac-
ity, and not through allowing large scale devolution of power (cf. Dzimadzi and 
Chinsinga, 2003). Their main fear is that in its current form, the decentralisation 
policy reforms would open up avenues for the opposition to get increased access 
to decision-making power and authority. It is therefore not surprising that oppor-
tunities to recentralise have been swiftly seized. For instance, the original version 
of the Local Government Act empowered DAs to recruit their own staff, but this 
has been amended to have the appointment of senior staff centrally controlled. 
Government also proposed that the President should be mandated to appoint 
chairpersons of DAs , but this was dropped because of strong resistance from op-
position parties and civil society . In fact, the Cabinet Committee on Decentralisa-
tion quickly convened whenever initiatives geared at recentralisation were tabled 
for ratification (cf. Mwadiwa et al., 2003).
The implementation of the decentralisation policy reforms has not proceeded 
as intended so as to deliver on the pro-poor intentions that were championed 
at the launch of the reforms. The main challenge as demonstrated above is that 
there have been numerous obstacles that have negatively affected the pace of the 
reforms. For instance, local elections were delayed; sector devolution plans re-
mained unfinalised for almost the entire tenure of DAs ; and there are several 
outstanding legislative issues yet to be sorted out. These obstacles have thus gen-
erally inhibited DAs to fully assume their constitutional mandate as a grassroots 
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development agency. This makes it very difficult to meaningfully assess the im-
pact of DAs on poverty reduction during the 2000-2005 period.
4. Local Government in Action 2000-2005
The functioning of DAs was greatly affected by two main factors. First, the key 
stakeholders within the DAs were engaged in serious power struggles in a bid 
to assert themselves as dominant forces in emerging administrative and govern-
ance frameworks. The reforms had fallen prey to elite capture . The motivation 
of the stakeholders was to appropriate most of the power and steer the benefits 
to themselves or at least maintain the existing distribution patterns. Second, the 
DAs operated without adequate and reliable funds. They were characterised by 
very weak and fragile financial bases to enable them to address the development 
backlogs and promote secure rural livelihoods (cf. Chiweza, 2005; Olowu, 2006). 
The combined effect of these constraints is that the DAs have not effectively 
functioned as spaces meant to amplify the voices of the marginalised and disad-
vantaged sections of the population through enhanced political participation and 
improved delivery of social services, as this section discusses.
4.1. Power struggles among DA stakeholders
The power struggles among the key stakeholders have taken several dimensions, 
but the following have been particularly important. Ward councillors have been 
up against MPs; councillors have crossed swords with chiefs; and the relationship 
between the Secretariats and Assemblies have been hardly harmonious.
 ward councillors versus mps
The main cause of the conflictual relationship between the MPs and council-
lors is that the former perceive councillors as a threat to their candidacy in the 
subsequent general elections . Chiweza (2005) describes the relationship between 
the MPs and councillors as very tense with the potential of suffocating the insti-
tutional framework that was taking shape for the decentralisation policy reforms 
altogether. 
MPs have not been supportive of the efforts to institutionalise the decentral-
ised planning framework at the grassroots. They often frustrated and dominated 
the deliberations of the DAs even though they are members simply in an ex-officio 
capacity. In doing this, the MPs wanted ‘to engage councillors in a boss-servant 
relationship so as to dictate rather than discuss issues’ (Chinsinga, 2005a: 235). 
This was meant to undercut their potential to mobilize and build a power base 
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with which to challenge them. It is for this reason that the MPs never granted the 
request of councillors for a modest monthly salary of MK3000 (about US$25). 
The position of councillor does not attract any form of remuneration except for 
sitting allowances. The councillors’ request for a salary could only be granted 
through a bill deliberated and ratified by parliament. Thus MPs do not fully sup-
port the decentralisation policy reform efforts for strategic political considera-
tions and gains.
 councillors versus chiefs
The problematic relationship between councillors and chiefs arises mainly be-
cause the chiefs want to constitute primary structures of local government in ru-
ral areas. They are strongly opposed to the introduction of alternative structures 
of leadership that appear to challenge the hegemony of their power, prestige, in-
fluence and authority (cf. Chiweza, 2005; Chinsinga, 2006). Two major sources 
of conflict between chiefs and councillors include the imperatives of tradition and 
the DA legislative framework.
Traditionally, chiefs are vested with the guardianship of the land under their 
respective areas of jurisdiction. For this reason, chiefs contend that all people 
– whether councillors, MPs or even the president – are their subjects, in which 
case they have to provide the primary institutions of leadership at local level. By 
invoking tradition, chiefs have greatly undermined the capacity of councillors to 
carry out their developmental mandates because they cannot do anything with-
out first being sanctioned by the chiefs. For instance, a councillor in Thyolo DA 
recalled having mobilised his constituents for a borehole project. They formed 
a committee, identified a site and made all requisite preparations for the launch 
of the project. But when the contractor finally came, the village head directed 
him to drill the borehole in front of his house. The village head formed his own 
committee replacing the one that had been facilitated by the councillor. His argu-
ment was that he saw no need for councillors since he has been able to govern his 
subjects without them for a long period of time and nobody has the right to make 
decisions over his land (Chinsinga, 2006).
The legislative framework for DAs fans the embers of conflict between coun-
cillors and chiefs because the latter are non-voting officials. This makes chiefs 
feel that councillors have stripped them of their once expansive domain of power, 
influence and authority (cf. Chinsinga and Dzimadzi, 2001). They regard the re-
constitution of the position of councillor following the November 2000 local 
elections as an unnecessary intrusion into village politics that has thrown stable 
local power hierarchies into a state of disequilibrium. In contrast, councillors 
challenge chiefs as illegitimate leaders, arguing that they would have been given 
voting powers on DAs if they were genuine and credible leaders. 
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The struggle between chiefs and councillors is intensified by widespread self-
seeking tendencies among national level politicians. Given the fragmented nature 
of the polity resulting from the May 1994 democratic polls, politicians across the 
political divide have strategically turned to chiefs in order to entrench and consol-
idate their legitimacy. Strategies by the ruling parties have included: 1) reinstating 
chiefs that were deposed during the one party era; 2) appointment of new chiefs; 
3) promoting chiefs to higher ranks; 4) building houses and offices for chiefs; 5) 
and putting all chiefs on the government’s payroll. In stark contrast, councillors 
are not entitled to these privileges, greatly diminishing their importance in the 
eyes of the public, further solidified by the apparent lack of any positive impact 
on the part of DAs to deliver on their poverty reduction and development man-
dates.
 secretariats versus assemblies
The nature of the relationship between Secretariats (bureaucrats) and Assem-
blies (elected representatives) is very critical to the potential success of decen-
tralisation policy reforms both in terms of governance and development. The 
quality of outputs from local government would be improved substantially if the 
bureaucrats were genuinely accountable to the elected representatives as it would 
mean ‘inputs being transmitted from participating citizens through elected coun-
cillors to bureaucrats executing policy’ (Crook and Manor, 1998: 43). 
The relationship between bureaucrats and councillors has not been satisfacto-
ry, however. The relationship between bureaucrats and councillors has essentially 
been characterised by suspicion and distrust. The main reason for this was that in 
most DAs bureaucrats and councillors never met to thrash out common strategic 
visions before the mandate of DAs expired in 2005. In a study by Dzimadzi and 
Chinsinga (2003), councillors across the country observed they were not fully 
familiar with members of the Secretariat, as illustrated by one of the councillors 
interviewed in Mulanje DA. He observed that ‘I know only three people in [the 
Secretariat], Mr. Namoyo , the DC and Mr. Mazengera . I know Mr. Mazengera 
because he is the one who gives us allowances.’ It is therefore doubtful that they 
had any clear idea of what their roles were and how they are supposed to work 
and cooperate with each other within the framework of decentralisation policy 
reforms. 
The main sources of conflict between Secretariats and Assemblies included: 
1) lack of remuneration for the position of councillor ; 2) Secretariats monopo-
lising control of DA activities despite Assemblies being policy-making bodies; 
3) poor communication with councillors; and 4) regionalism, tribalism and 
nepotism10 (Chiweza, 2005; Chinsinga, 2005b). The frustrations of councillors 
resulting from the efforts of bureaucrats to marginalise them in the activities 
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of DAs fomented these tendencies of regionalism, tribalism and nepotism. This 
was strongly expressed through the activities of the Appointment and Discipli-
nary Committees (ADCs ), responsible for the recruitment of junior staff in the 
DAs . A ‘sons of the soil syndrome’ marred the ADCs as councillors favoured lo-
cal candidates, mostly their relations and friends, over those from other parts 
of the country. The argument of the councillors was that these problems would 
have been less acute if the DAs were run and managed by people who came from 
within their respective jurisdictions. This needs, however, to be situated in the 
context of the broader political realities obtaining in the country. The country 
emerged out of the May 1994 elections a heavily fragmented polity along regional 
fault lines, whose dynamics are affecting the implementation of decentralisation 
policy reforms as described above. Parties have regional strongholds in which 
they would like to dictate and set the agenda in the political, economic, social and 
even cultural spheres.
4.2. Weak fi nancial bases
The decentralisation policy mandates the government to allocate 5 per cent of its 
annual net revenue to DAs to enable them fulfil their obligations toward bring-
ing about sustainable livelihoods and poverty reduction . Within the 2000-2005 
period, government failed by far to remit 5 per cent of its net annual revenue to 
DAs . It is estimated that the government only managed to provide about 2 per 
cent of the total net revenue that it is mandated to disburse to DAs , though the 
trends are reportedly improving since the 2005/2006 fiscal year. For the last two 
years, the central government grants to DAs have risen to about 3 per cent of 
the total expected income (GoM, 2005a). The financial situation of DAs is fur-
ther worsened by the laxity in the enforcement of the legal framework. The third 
schedule of the Local Government Act empowers DAs to collect and use a series 
of locally generated revenues such as property rates, ground rent fees and licenses, 
commercial undertakings and service charges (Mwadiwa, et al., 2003). Yet most 
ministries are still holding on to the collection of locally-generated revenues. 
The Ministry of Commerce and Industry is a widely cited example, on record as 
having instructed DAs not to collect licence fees from small business, though it 
does not provide any services to the entrepreneurs . Therefore ministries are still 
collecting these revenues themselves through their establishments at the district 
level, with funds thereby raised not finding their way into the District Develop-
ment Fund .
The major source for DAs is the central government’s monthly grants. The 
2000 Shroeder report estimated that DA fiscal shortfalls before transfers from 
the central government stood at 80-100 per cent of the cost of providing the de-
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Figure 1: Monthly Grants to DAs for the 2002/03 Fiscal Year
Source: Chinsinga (2005b: 163)
volved services. These grants are clearly inadequate, irregular and unpredictable. 
The experiences of Ntchisi and Thyolo DAs are illustrative in this regard. Both 
DAs experienced substantial cuts in the monthly grants in the 2002/2003 fiscal 
year and raised queries with the central government. Ntchisi DA was told that 
the DA was paying for the costs incurred when its chairperson was part of a 
delegation that went to Uganda on an official visit, whereas Thyolo was appar-
ently repaying a loan that a former Deputy Minister of Finance from the district 
took out on its behalf to finance the construction of one of the markets in his 
constituency (Chinsinga, 2005b). The most critical point, however, is that there 
is often lack of information provided to the DAs about the reasons for delays in 
releasing funds and little indication of when funds are likely to become available. 
The monthly government’s disbursement for the 2002/2003 fiscal year in some 
selected districts attests to the irregular and unpredictable resource flow patterns 
to the DAs as presented in Figure 1 below.
This figure shows that none of the DAs received the monthly grants from cen-
tral government on a predictable basis, making it extremely difficult for the DAs 
to meaningfully plan their activities. Even though Thyolo and Mchinji enjoyed 
consistently higher monthly disbursements in the 2002/03 fiscal year, they like 






















































Thyolo Mwanza Mchinji Ntchisi Rumphi Nkhatabay
Decentralisation and Poverty Reduction in Malawi
on a monthly basis. The month of September was the worst-case scenario as the 
DAs received no transfers at all from central government . This therefore meant 
that DAs did not have resources even for the day-to-day operational activities 
since most of them lack capacity to generate significant amounts of their own 
income. The weak DA financial bases have had three key consequences: 1) DAs 
cannot implement development projects unless they have alternative sources of 
funding either from NGO s or donors; 2) they are unable to convene at least quar-
terly as stipulated in the statutes; and 3) they are often unable to pay out salaries, 
especially for employees they recruit on their own.
5. Social Service Delivery, Participation and Downward 
Accountability
The implementation of decentralisation policy reforms has had little discern-
ible impact on service delivery . The failure of the DAs to positively impact on 
the livelihoods of the people across the country is underlined by the progres-
sive worsening of the poverty conditions marked by Malawi ’s dramatic slump in 
the HDI ladder since the inauguration of the Human Development Report in 
1990. Similarly, comparative analysis of the 1998 IHS and the 2005 IHS points 
to a complete lack of progress in the fight against poverty. The decentralisation 
policy stipulates that DAs should allocate at least 25 per cent of their monthly 
grants to development projects and social service delivery interventions through 
the District Development Funds (DDF) . This was not possible at all because the 
monthly grants from the central government had been consistently inadequate, 
irregular and unpredictable as demonstrated in Figure 1 above. The grants are in 
most cases not even adequate to suffice for the day-to-day operational activities 
of the Secretariats (Chiweza, 2005; Chinsinga, 2005b). Nevertheless, various 
forms of development projects are taking place in districts, but they are not 
financed by resources channelled to DAs as stipulated in the decentralisation 
policy. The majority of these projects have been financed by the Malawi So-
cial Action Fund (MASAF) , a World Bank funded initiative designed largely 
to cushion the adverse effects of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) 
through rapid financing of programmes targeted at the poor. The other players 
have been the European Union’s (EU) micro projects programme and various 
local and international NGOs, often working without a direct relationship with 
the DAs . Direct DA funding for projects is impossible because of the failure of 
government to fully remit 5 per cent of its annual net income to DAs , as stipu-
lated in the decentralisation policy, and the near absence of capacity of DAs to 
generate income of their own.
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It is a huge paradox that DAs have been unable to register any positive im-
pact on social service delivery in their respective areas of jurisdiction. Since the 
advent of democratisation over a decade ago, several poverty reduction initia-
tives have been implemented, all consistently championing decentralisation as 
the overriding implementation strategy. Thus the development of these grand 
poverty reduction initiatives should have been guided by and benefited from lo-
cal level input, for instance, the District Development Plans (DDPs) . The reality, 
however, is that none of these initiatives have seriously taken into account local 
level input, despite up to 85 per cent of the people in Malawi living in rural areas 
(cf. Jenkins and Tsoka, 2003).
The contradiction is that while such poverty reduction initiatives purport to 
bring poverty reduction closer to local priorities and circumstances, they are fun-
damentally macro in their orientation and inception (cf. Ellis et al., 2002). Thus, 
without getting down to hear the voices of the people from below, the intricate 
factors that would be particularly helpful in addressing the real barriers that ru-
ral citizens confront in their efforts to construct pathways out of poverty can-
not be fully discerned. Besides, resources meant for the implementation of these 
initiatives were widely abused for private political gains by the then ruling party, 
the United Democratic Front (UDF ), with most initiatives launched either im-
mediately before or after general elections . The poverty reduction interventions 
were therefore largely used by the UDF as instruments for consolidating a rural 
patronage machine rather than as instruments for genuine poverty reduction (cf. 
Chinsinga, 2002, 2005b). The disbursement of the resources from these initia-
tives was not so much based on sound and viable bureaucratic principles as on the 
vagaries of political expedience.
The decentralisation policy reforms have not helped to promote meaningful 
political participation at the local levels either. The vertical framework of partici-
patory structures constituting the District Assembly (DA), the Area Develop-
ment Committee (ADC) and the Village Development Committee (VDC ) was 
intended to give opportunities to the grassroots to articulate and define their 
problems and to take part in the decisions to find sustainable ways to meet their 
needs and improve the quality of their livelihoods. The participatory structures 
were meant to create room for different opinions where previously there were 
limited opportunities for public involvement, enabling people to occupy spaces 
that were previously denied to them. 
Th e major constraint has been that these participatory structures have been dor-
mant in most areas since they were constituted. In most areas the participatory 
structures exist only on paper as they have virtually collapsed. Th e main reason for 
this is that they were constituted without being trained and briefed on their roles 
(terms of reference) which is attributed to the perennial fi nancial problems facing 
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DAs . Only in a few cases have the VDCs and ADCs been trained, for instance if it 
were imminent that they would be involved in the implementation of development 
projects, but without any form of follow-up support (cf. Chinsinga and Dzimadzi, 
2003). Th us the sub-district participatory structures are hardly functioning. 
The collapse of these structures has further been cemented by the tendencies 
of NGOs and other development partners to create parallel structures to ADCs 
and VDCs, often well-resourced and therefore very attractive to the grassroots, 
but without any linkages to the decentralised planning framework. Many people 
have little awareness about these structures and they have rarely functioned as 
vehicles for sensitising, educating and informing the grassroots about the decen-
tralisation policy reforms. The widespread lack of knowledge about the partici-
patory structures was, for instance, exposed in Chinsinga and Dzimadzi (2001) 
and Chinsinga (2005b). In the focus group discussions (FGDs) , the responses 
of the grassroots were quite revealing about the status of their knowledge of the 
participatory structures:
• ‘Assembly imene timayidziwa ife ndiyakusukulu,’ which means ‘Th e Assembly 
that we know takes place in schools’ (Chinsinga and Dzimadzi, 2001).
•  ‘Kodi Assembly mukunenayi ndiyokhutsadzana nditchalitchi kapena chipem-
bedzo?,’ which means ‘Does the Assembly you are talking about have some-
thing to do with the church or religion?’ (Chinsinga, 2005b).
• ‘Tikapita kuboma timangoona a talemba kuti District Assembly koma kuti 
tidziwe amapanga chani ayi,’ which means ‘Whenever we visit the district 
headquarters we see the label – District Assembly – but we have no idea of 
what they do’ (Chinsinga, 2005b).
• ‘Ife Assembly sitikuidziwa koma nanga tikuchita dala,’ which means ‘We do 
not know what the Assembly is, but it is as if we are deliberately feigning 
ignorance’ (Chinsinga and Dzimadzi, 2001).
There is very limited knowledge about ADCs and VDCs even though these are 
supposed to be very close to the people (cf. Hussein, 2003; Chiweza, 2005). The 
widespread lack of awareness at the grassroots about the participatory structures 
is further attributed to the great difficulties in meaningfully translating key tech-
nical terms about decentralisation into local languages. These terms either do not 
have direct equivalence in the local languages, or, in desperate attempts to render 
them accessible to the grassroots, they have been translated in a manner that 
greatly distorts their meanings. 
People at the local level are widely aware of the reinstatement of the position 
of councillor , but beyond this they are unable to understand how this position 
fits into the overall picture of the current political and administrative reforms. 
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Moreover, most of the councillors were either dormant or resigned along the way. 
It is estimated that up to 300 out of 848 councillors resigned before the expiry of 
their term of office. They rarely held meetings with their constituents to sensi-
tise, educate and inform them about the decentralisation policy reforms. Most of 
them were disappointed with the terms and conditions for the position of coun-
cillor. Prior to the local elections , it was indicated that the position of councillor 
would attract a decent salary, state of the art motorbikes, educational advances 
and a range of allowances. This turned out to be false and therefore a source of 
frustration especially for those councillors who had given up fairly decent jobs in 
anticipation of a better life. The legislative requirement is that whoever aspires 
for a public office has first to resign if they are working in the public sector. The 
expectation of most aspirants, especially those who had given up jobs for council-
lorship, was that they could make a livelihood out of being a councillor, as is the 
case with Members of Parliament.
With such limited engagement by the grassroots with the participatory struc-
tures, the reforms have not fostered any form of downward accountability . On the 
contrary, a conducive atmosphere for elite capture has been created. In addition, 
it is argued that it is very diffi  cult to achieve downward accountability in Malawi 
because the majority of the people at the local level do not pay any tax . Payment of 
tax is considered vital because it engages local people with the state, giving them a 
basis on which to legitimately expect the provision of social services (cf. Kutengule, 
2000; Ellis et al., 2002). Th is would, however, be disastrous because DAs would be 
forced to raise revenue from an impoverished local population. Multiple commod-
ity and enterprise taxes levied at village level suppress cash generation at the very 
point where it can make the most diff erence to the livelihoods of the poor.
6. Prospects for Decentralisation , Local Governance
and Poverty Reduction
Decentralisation remains a highly uncertain agenda in Malawi to register strategic 
impact on local governance and poverty reduction because of the apparent lack of 
political commitment. Th e major development since the expiry of the tenure of 
DAs in 2005 has been the presidential declaration that District Commissioners 
are now controlling offi  cers for sectors whose functions have been devolved. Th is 
meant that the District Commissioners would be held accountable and responsible 
for the use of public funds through the Public Accounts Committee of Parliament. 
It was argued that ‘this policy shift [would] transfer more public resources closer 
to Malawians than in the previous system under which government ministries and 
departments spend public funds largely at the national level’ (GoM, 2005b: 12).
Decentralisation and Poverty Reduction in Malawi
There has not been any meaningful progress toward holding local government 
elections to have the DAs reconstituted. The elections were scheduled for May 
2005 but were postponed almost indefinitely, justified on the basis of the devas-
tating hunger that affected the country during the 2005/06 fiscal year.11 However, 
the main reason for the government’s stance is the current political texture of 
the country. President Mutharika resigned from the UDF that sponsored him 
into power in February 2005. He proceeded to form his own party, namely the 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP ), which until very recently did not have any 
significant parliamentary representation in Parliament. When stakeholders pres-
sured the government to hold local elections, the indication was that they would 
be held in 2009.12 In fact, the Minister of Local Government pointed out that 
government was not in a hurry to hold local elections because councillors are not 
important.13 He argued that the government was making significant strides in 
rural development working closely with chiefs and MPs. Several District Com-
missioners strongly support the Minister’s position. However, the real motiva-
tion for postponing local elections is that the government is fearful of not doing 
well. Compared to the other established parties, the DPP does not have vibrant 
grassroots structures across the country. The failure to gain control of DAs would 
thus dramatically magnify the government’s minority status both at the national 
and local levels.
Pressure from donors, civil society and opposition parties has been mounting 
for the government to hold local elections (cf. Chiweza 2005; Chinsinga, 2006). 
Th e opposition block in Parliament eff ectively lobbied for the holding of the local 
government elections within the 2006/07 fi scal year. Th ey pushed for a budget-
ary provision for the local government elections as a condition for adopting the 
2006/07 budget. Parliament endorsed that the local government elections should 
be held by the end of the 2006/07 fi scal year. However, the preparations for the 
elections were subverted in a number of other ways. Th e Malawi Electoral C om-
mission (MEC ) could not start the preparations for the polls in earnest because 
the quorum for it to make binding decisions could not be met. Th e contracts of fi ve 
of the eight commissioners had expired. Th e President took some time to appoint 
the commissioners, and when the new appointees were fi nally selected, opposi-
tion parties objected to their appropriateness.14 Th e opposition argued that not 
only did the President not consult them as prescribed by law but also that the ap-
pointed individuals are well known sympathizers of the DPP.15 Th e parties sought 
a High Court injunction restraining the new commissioners from assuming offi  ce 
pending judicial review, and subsequently the High Court nullifi ed the president’s 
appointment of the MEC commissioners as it was in accordance with the law. 
Following the court’s ruling, the president has appointed a new team of com-
missioners, yet still including the six whose appointment was nullified by the 
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High Court. Opposition parties have once again obtained an injunction arguing 
that the president did not follow the right consultation procedure in the selec-
tion of the new commissioners.16 This meant that very little was done to prepare 
for the local elections scheduled for May 2007, causing thier postponement. This 
bears semblance to the fate of the first local elections which were supposed to 
have been held immediately after May 1994 but were perpetually postponed until 
November 2000. The motivation of the governments in both cases borders on 
strategic political considerations, given the concerns that the ruling party, in the 
current case the DDP , will fail to gain clear control of DAs across the country.
The delays in constituting the MEC will have serious knock-on effects on 
the calendar of events leading to the holding of the elections . A fundamental 
requirement to facilitate the holding of local elections is an amendment to the 
Local Government Act concerning the timing of elections. At present, the Lo-
cal Government Act states that local government elections must be held in the 
third week of May in the year following that of general elections to the National 
Assembly. The MEC can only seriously start considering preparations after a leg-
islative amendment has been duly constituted that allows greater flexibility. Yet a 
bill to amend the Local Government Act has not featured at all during the recent 
sittings of parliament, and consequently local government elections were not held 
as scheduled in 2007.17 In the absence of DAs , local governments have reverted to 
the District Development Committee (DDC) system, now described as Consult-
ative Committees, in which chiefs play a dominant role in decision-making proc-
esses as representatives of the people.18 The shortfalls of DDCs as mechanisms of 
fostering local governance and development have already been highlighted. They 
act as serious obstacles to the development of effective democratic local govern-
ance institutions (cf. Mbeye, 1998; Chiweza, 1998; Olowu, 2006).
The delays in reconstituting DAs are creating a propitious environment for 
the continued rivalry between councillors and chiefs. The chiefs shall once again 
emerge de facto as the most influential actors in village or local level politics, as 
happened between 1994 and 2000. There is little doubt that the chiefs exploited 
the virtual impasse in the constitution of DAs to reclaim, reassert and consolidate 
their strategic role in grassroots politics. Likewise, the rivalry between MPs and 
councillors is bound to remain acrimonious. During the 2006/07 budget session, 
MPs endorsed the establishment of Constituency Development Funds (CDFs) 
to the tune of MK 1 million per constituency. Administered by District Com-
missioners at the DA level, MPs are key players in the disbursement of CDFs in 
terms of facilitating the identification of development projects to benefit from 
the fund. This is likely to make councillors redundant as all development projects 
will become the preserve of MPs. This would greatly marginalise DAs as vehicles 
for grassroots participation , empowerment and mobilisation.
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7. Concluding Remarks
Malawi ’s decentralisation policy efforts can be described as deconcentration with 
nominal democratic decentralisation. In fact, it is fair to say that it is extremely 
difficult to make a meaningful assessment of the impact of decentralisation policy 
reforms on local governance and poverty reduction because decentralisation is yet 
to be fully implemented. The reforms have been implemented in an inconsistent, 
ad hoc and disjointed fashion and have not achieved the desired strategic impact 
in terms of deepening participatory democracy and local governance, enhanced 
accountability and transparency, and improved delivery of social services and 
poverty reduction. While the reforms have in theory provided a constitutional 
space within which the poor can organize, compete and otherwise assert them-
selves, the implementation process has been encumbered by strategic political 
interests and calculations, resulting in the political collapse of the DAs , given that 
they are operating without the organ of deliberation since 2005. One main rea-
son for such occurrences is because the reforms have been to a very great extent 
donor-driven. Throughout more than a decade of the reforms, decisive steps are 
only taken in the wake of mounting donor pressure, underlined by threats of aid 
withdrawal. Donors view decentralisation principally as a means of downsizing 
central governments and promoting good governance (cf. Chikulo, 1998; Blair, 
2000; Bierschenk, 2003).
Malawi ’s experience demonstrates one key problem with the design of donor-
driven decentralisation policy reforms. They are more often designed on the basis 
of donors’ ideological arguments than on the analysis of empirical reality of what 
exists on the ground. Consequently donors often prevail in pushing for decen-
tralisation policy reforms, but it is largely the prerogative of the national and 
local politicians of the reforming countries to decide how exactly to put them 
into practice. They often have a clear picture of what interests they are prepared 
to sacrifice or not on the basis of their privileged knowledge of domestic political 
realities. For instance, the root cause of the enduring struggle between councillors 
and chiefs is the lack of clarity regarding the precise roles, functions and powers 
of the various stakeholders in the decentralisation process. It appears, however, 
that precisely carving out the role of traditional leaders within the framework 
of rural governance and development is a politically sensitive issue. The govern-
ment’s relationship with traditional leaders is perhaps deliberately marked by am-
biguity with the intention of preserving its discretion in the determination of the 
status of chiefs for strategic political goals.
The decentralisation policy reforms in Malawi are bogged down in power poli-
tics, which have made it difficult for the reforms to deliver tangibly on governance 
and development as prescribed in the decentralisation policy and Local Govern-
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ment Act . Power politics, broadly understood, prevails both at the bureaucratic 
and political levels. Line ministries are reluctant to devolve the designated func-
tions to the DAs , let alone become integrated into a single government structure 
at the district and lower levels. The intensity of bureaucratic resistance both at 
national and local levels has greatly slowed down the progress of devolving pow-
ers and functions to DAs , as well as restricting capacity development interven-
tions to prepare DAs to fully take on their new mandates. The lack of central 
government political will to decentralise has constrained the process even further. 
There is no doubt that bureaucratic resistance against decentralisation has solidi-
fied since the onset of the decentralisation policy reforms over ten years ago now, 
taking advantage of this lack of political will. 
As demonstrated in this chapter, both the UDF and the DDP governments 
have been very reluctant to constitute democratically elected local governments, 
employing various delaying tactics. The analysis clearly shows that both govern-
ments have had to weigh their own strategic political, economic and social inter-
ests against the possibility of holding local elections which they could lose. DDP 
is a newly formed party, has never experienced any serious electoral test, and, 
compared to other parties, is not yet fully established at the local levels. The fear 
of the parties in government is that failure to do well in the local elections would 
magnify their minority status and may portend bad omens for subsequent general 
elections. The political stakes are very high and the strategy on their part is to 
delay the elections as long as they can feasibly can in order to adequately prepare 
for them and with one aim only: to win them at whatever cost.
The decentralisation policy reforms have as yet had no discernible impact on 
poverty reduction . The country’s poverty indices have in fact somewhat dete-
riorated during the last decade. This was perhaps inevitable because the DAs 
have not been able to fully assume their developmental mandates because of the 
excessive delays in putting in place various aspects of the decentralisation policy 
reforms. The DA structures were for a very long period of time constituted on an 
interim basis; the development of sector devolution plans was excessively delayed 
among other things due to bureaucratic resistance; activities of DAs were con-
strained by the struggle for power, influence and authority among the key stake-
holders; and funding for DAs has been and continues to be irregular, precarious 
and unpredictable even though there are signs that it is improving since 2005.
The recent improvement in resource flows to the DAs is, however, very un-
likely to have any significant effect on poverty reduction and development activi-
ties as long as the political organ of the DAs remains unconstituted. The point 
is that the Secretariats are incurring massive expenditures without any system of 
checks and balances in place. There is absolutely no oversight over their expendi-
ture portfolios in which case poverty reduction and development-orientated pro-
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grammes may not be priorities at all. Decentralisation has the potential to lead 
to political participation and poverty reduction, but such outcomes depend very 
much on how it is implemented. The Malawi case, inter alia, demonstrates that 
there is a very huge risk that the implementation of decentralisation reforms may 
simply degenerate into an invited space for the grassroots, one that is almost en-
tirely the prerogative of the state. This means that decentralisation is unlikely to 
serve as a crucial element in invigorating state institutional capability, either as a 
foundation for an effective public sector or as a means of bringing the state closer 
to the people.
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 Notes
 The definition of poverty used by the IHS is the income poverty or, put differently, the 
head count approach. This is to say that people who do not earn the specified income 
(poverty line) are considered poor whereas the ultra-poor in this case refers to the subset 
of the poor people who live in dire poverty to the extent that they can not even meet the 
daily recommended food requirements by Malawian standards. 
 Gini coefficient, alternatively inequality index, measures the magnitude of unequal in-
come distribution between the richest and poorest quartiles in society. The higher the 
Gini coefficient, the higher the magnitude of inequality in a society. Malawi’s Gini coef-
ficient at . is extremely high. According to GoM/World Bank (), the richest  
per cent of the population has a median per capita income that is eight times higher than 
the median per capita income of the poorest  per cent.
 The DDCs were established in twenty-four districts on the basis of the administrative 
apparatus inherited from the British colonialists at the time of independence. They were 
controlled by central government through the office of the District Commissioner who 
was the direct representative of the Office of the President and Cabinet (OPC) at the 
district level. The number of districts has been increased to twenty-eight since the advent 
of the multiparty dispensation in May .
 The districts vary widely both in terms of physical size as well as population. According 
to the  Population and Housing Census, Likoma is the smallest district in terms of 
size with only , people. The biggest is Lilongwe with as many as ,,  people. 
Likoma is also the smallest in terms of size at only  square kilometres. With , 
people, Mzimba is the biggest district measuring , square kilometres.
 The initial design of the Local Government Act was that the DAs would be entirely re-
sponsible for hiring, disciplining and firing their own staff at all levels. This provision has, 
however, since been amended. The DAs are responsible for hiring, disciplining and firing 
only support staff. The amendment was justified as a means of retaining the national 
character of public administration as localised processes of recruitment would promote 
nepotism, clientelism and regionalism.
 The Assembly is formally entrusted with policy-making responsibility. This is to say that 
councillors are empowered to set the agenda for their respective DAs, of course taking 
into account advice from the Secretariat. The practical reality has been different, however. 
District Commissioners have usurped this responsibility taking advantage of lack of clar-
ity of the statutes and the low levels of education of most councillors. In extreme cases, 
District Commissioners have even ended up chairing the proceedings of DAs.
 See ‘Ward Councillors to Serve for Five Years’, The Nation,  February .
 See ‘Parties, Civil Society against Diversion of Local Polls Money’, The Nation,  Febru-
ary ; and ‘Local Polls Postponed: Funds to be Diverted’, Daily Times,  February 
.
 The government only made an official statement on the local government elections in 
March . But while indicating the availability of funds for the local government 
elections, the government decreed that the elections would be held together with the 
presidential and parliamentary elections in . This required a legislative amendment 
providing for tripartite elections, but was strategically shot down by Parliament. The 
effect of this was to further delay the holding of local government elections (cf. Kaunda, 
).
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 See ‘DCs Frustrating Decentralization’, The Nation,  August .
 See ‘No Funds for Local Polls’, The Nation,  October ; and ‘Proposal to Suspend or 
Extend Councillors’ Term’, Weekend Nation, - February . 
 See ‘Local Government Polls ’, Weekend Nation, - April .
 See ‘Councillors’ Absence Not Felt Chaponda’, The Nation,  May .
 See ‘Commissioners are DPP, Says Opposition’, Malawi News, - December .
 Th e Malawi Electoral Commission Act  () states that the president shall subject to the 
constitution and, in consultation with leaders of the political parties represented in the Na-
tional Assembly, appoint qualifi ed persons to be members of the commission on such terms 
and conditions as the Public Appointments Committee of Parliament shall determine.
 See ‘Court Defers MEC Case over AG Absence’, Daily Times,  January ; ‘Bingu Free 
to Appoint EC Commissioners’, Malawi News,  January- February ; and ‘Bingu 
Picks Same People for MEC’, The Nation,  February .
 See ‘Parties, Civil Society Against Diversion of Local Polls Money’, The Nation,  Feb-
ruary  and ‘Local Polls Postponed: Funds to be Diverted’, Daily Times,  February 
.
 See ‘Malawi Only Country in Commonwealth without Councillors’, The Nation,  No-
vember .
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Through a case study of Ghana , this chapter questions the conventional wisdom 
concerning the relationship between decentralisation and poverty reduction in 
three ways. First, it questions the assumption, as noted by Johnson (2003: 8), that 
‘democratic participation will yield strong mechanisms of accountability ’. Find-
ings in the Ghana case are that increased participation and popular input into lo-
cal policy-making processes has not led to greater popular control of government, 
highlighting a de-linkage between participation and accountability. Second, it 
questions the ‘ubiquitous claim’, as noted by Smoke (2003: 12), that political will is 
‘the principal requirement for success’. The finding here is that reliance on central 
government political commitment is misplaced or paradoxical, with the Ghana 
case demonstrating how central governments often implement decentralisation 
in a manner intended to promote their own interests. Third, it questions the 
‘managerial thrust’ of much public administration literature that assumes that ‘if 
reforms are technically on target, the rest will follow automatically’, as noted by 
ICHRP (2005: 15). Such literature emphasises the importance of decentralisa-
tion being implemented ‘by design’ and not ‘by default’, yet the Ghana case in-
dicates how structural constraints on successful decentralisation are inherent in 
the design, with decentralisation as a political exercise not a technical one. The 
questioning of these three aspects of conventional wisdom is underpinned by the 
concept of the politics of (de)centralisation . In other words, while central govern-
ments may implement (or be forced to implement) decentralisation for a variety 
of reasons, these are invariably aimed at retaining (and even consolidating) their 
own powers and control over resources. 
In the introductory chapter to this volume, Crawford and Hartmann discussed 
recent cross-national reviews that have focused on the specific linkage between 
decentralisation and poverty reduction (Crook and Sverrisson, 2001; Von Braun 
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and Grote, 2002; Crook, 2003; Vedeld, 2003; Jütting et al., 2004, 2005). The 
reviews all examined the impact of decentralisation on poverty along both politi-
cal and economic lines, with participation and empowerment as the key political 
indicators and the provision of basic social services as the main socio-economic 
indicator, as well as including a political component in the multidimensional 
approach to poverty. The consensus to include a political dimension as inte-
gral to the assessment of decentralisation’s impact on poverty levels stems partly 
from the crucial relationship between political ‘processes’ and socio-economic 
‘outputs’ that is envisaged by decentralisation advocates. With a democratic form 
assumed, decentralisation is perceived as bringing government closer to the peo-
ple and is expected to lead to greater political participation at the local level, with 
citizens more able to make claims on local government , including through their 
political representatives. In turn, it is anticipated that local government will be 
more responsive to local populations, inclusive of the majority poor, resulting in 
poverty reduction. Crook (2003: 77) notes that this is ‘an assumption questioned 
by few’.
This contribution applies a case-study approach. Based on fieldwork data 
from two rural districts, it asks whether decentralisation in Ghana has led to 
decreased levels of poverty , and, if not, why not. It retains the dual explora-
tion along both political and socio-economic lines of the cross-national studies, 
though somewhat in reverse. Initially, the socio-economic outputs are examined 
and the impact of decentralisation on local poverty levels assessed. Subsequent-
ly, in attempting to explain why outcomes of decentralisation have not been as 
positive as expected, attention is focused on political processes in terms of levels 
of political participation and of accountability of government. Initial fieldwork 
findings were twofold. First, decentralisation has had, at best, a limited impact 
on reducing rural poverty in Ghana. Second, this is due, at least partly, to a dis-
connection between the political and socio-economic dimensions, itself largely 
a consequence of a de-linkage between participation and accountability within 
the political realm. In the districts examined, decentralisation had indeed led 
to increased local political participation, yet the accountability of local govern-
ment to local people had not been correspondingly strengthened, with various 
shortcomings highlighted in downward accountability mechanisms. Thus, par-
ticipation had not resulted in empowerment , understood as increased popular 
control over government, with local government remaining largely unresponsive 
to citizens’ needs and demands. Therefore, a key conclusion from the empirical 
data was that the linkage between participation and accountability is crucial 
to poverty-related outcomes, with increased participation as ineffective unless 
accompanied by the strengthening of downward accountability mechanisms. 
Yet, many of the shortcomings in accountability mechanisms that are identi-
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fied at local level are themselves symptomatic of wider problems, ones that are 
inherent in the structure and design of decentralisation . These take the form 
of national-level political, administrative and fiscal constraints, ones that are 
largely attributable to the politics of (de)centralisation . In other words, many 
central governments , including that of Ghana, undertake decentralisation as an 
attempt to enhance their own legitimacy, including through fostering the ap-
pearance of being democratic and participatory at local level, while effectively 
retaining central powers.
The chapter proceeds in seven parts. After this introduction, the second part 
outlines the system of decentralisation in Ghana and provides brief profiles of 
the two rural districts in which fieldwork was undertaken. Based on empirical 
data, the third part assesses the socio-economic outputs of decentralisation in 
the two districts and the impact on poverty levels. In accounting for why poverty 
outcomes have been disappointing, the focus shifts to issues of participation and 
accountability in the fourth and fifth parts respectively, highlighting the ‘partici-
pation-accountability gap’. To provide further explanation of this de-linkage, the 
sixth part redirects attention on the national context of decentralisation where 
a number of structural constraints are identified, ones that underpin the local-
level failings. Finally, conclusions are drawn from the case study, ones that depart 
from much conventional analysis and question the likelihood of decentralisation 
having a pro-poor impact. The politics of (de)centralisation suggest that central 
governments undertake decentralisation measures largely to promote their own 
interests. The notion of ‘decentralisation from above’ is paradoxical, with both 
greater popular control over local government and pro-poor outcomes unlikely 
if reliant on political commitment from above rather than on political demands 
from below.
2. Decentralisation in Ghana 
Ghana is a suitable case study for two main reasons. First, decentralisation was 
initiated two decades ago, thereby providing a sufficient timeframe for an impact 
assessment to be made. Second, its legal provisions lay claim to a democratic and 
devolved form of decentralisation in which popular participation is encouraged. 
This section outlines first the main features of Ghana’s system of decentralisa-
tion, and, second, brief profiles of the two rural districts in which fieldwork was 
undertaken.
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2.1. Decentralised structures and processes 
 legal framework
Ghana ’s current system of decentralisation was introduced in 1988 when the Lo-
cal Government Law (PNDC Law 207) established a new local government sys-
tem in which the District Assembly (DA) became the key institution in 110 newly 
designated districts within the country’s ten regions.1 Subsequently the principles 
of decentralisation and popular participation in government were endorsed in the 
1992 Constitution that marked the return to democratic government and in the 
Local Government Act of 1993. Figure 1 illustrates the structure of national and 
local government in Ghana.
 electoral system 
Democratic local elections were introduced under the 1988 reforms, though on a 
non-partisan basis in which candidates stand as individuals, which remains the 
current situation.2 The District Assemblies are composed of 70 per cent elected 
members and 30 per cent presidential appointees. Districts are relatively small 


















Source: National Commission for Civic Education (1998).
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didates elected on a ‘first-past-the-post’ basis. The small size of electoral areas en-
ables relatively close contact between elected representatives and their constitu-
ents, potentially enhancing citizens’ access to channels of political representation. 
Indeed, regular opportunities for such interaction were defined in the 1993 Local 
Government Act , with elected Assembly members required to regularly meet, 
consult and report back to their constituents.3 The elected Assembly members 
play a crucial role in linking communities to the DA, with community needs and 
demands having to be expressed through them. 
 sub-district structures
Two tiers of sub-district structures provide additional mechanisms for political 
representation and participation at highly localised levels. First, there are over 
1,300 Urban, Zonal and Town/Area Councils throughout Ghana , with the given 
name depending on the size and nature of the settlement. In rural areas these are 
called Town and Area Councils. The Councils are intermediary bodies composed 
of between fifteen and twenty members, mainly elected representatives from the 
institutions above and below the Council level, that is Assembly members (from 
the four or five electoral areas in each Council area) and ten Unit Committee 
members (see below), plus five local appointees. Second, there are over 16,000 
Unit Committees (UCs) throughout Ghana, covering settlements of approxi-
mately 1,500 people in urban areas and between 500-1,000 in rural areas. UC 
membership consists of ten elected members and five local appointees. Elector-
ates are small in each UC, at times as few as 250 registered voters, yet respon-
sible for electing ten community representatives. The official claim is that the 
sub-district structures provide formal mechanisms for political participation and 
representation that stretch from the grassroots upwards to the DA, and onwards 
to the national Parliament and President. 
 decision-making
Formally, decisions are taken at full meetings of the District Assembly , called 
the General Assembly , held at least three times a year. The General Assembly 
is convened and chaired by the Presiding Member (PM), elected by Assembly 
members from amongst their number.4 In practice, most of the work of the 
DA is undertaken by the Executive Committee (EXECO ) and its range of sub-
committees. Meeting on a more regular basis, usually monthly, the EXECO 
consists of up to a third of Assembly members and, significantly, is chaired by 
the District Chief Executive (see below). One anomaly is that the Presiding 
Member is barred from membership.5 The EXECO plays a pivotal role, respon-
sible for making recommendations to the General Assembly and for monitoring 
the performance of the executive and administrative functions of the DA. The 
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various sub-committees are also composed of Assembly members and make rec-
ommendations to the EXECO . 6
 district chief executive
A District Chief Executive (DCE) is appointed by the President of Ghana for 
each district, and is undoubtedly the most powerful person in the DA system.7 
He/she (though mainly he) is a political appointee, invariably a local member of 
the governing party, appointed to this full-time, salaried position for a term of 
four years, renewable for a second term.8 The DCE is both the political and ad-
ministrative head of the district, combining political and executive powers. He/
she is an ex-officio member of the Assembly, and arguably the most influential 
Assembly member given his/her role as chair of the EXECO . He/she is head of 
the district administration, made up of a small number of centrally-appointed 
civil servants , headed by the District Co-ordinating Director (DCD) and includ-
ing planning and budget officers. Significantly, the DCD and other officials are 
answerable to the DCE, not the Assembly. Therefore, the DCE has unrivalled 
power in the district, as well as being central government’s representative at dis-
trict level.9 
 powers and functions
A first reading of the legislation does suggest that the powers and functions of 
the DA are extensive. The 1993 Local Government Act confirms the DA as the 
‘highest political authority in the district’ (Article 3 [1]), acting as the planning, 
development, budgeting and rating authority. The broad functions of the DA 
include ‘deliberative, legislative and executive functions’ (Article 10 [2]). It is ‘re-
sponsible for the overall development of the district’ (Article 10 [3]), inclusive of 
a responsibility to ‘co-ordinate, integrate and harmonize’ the activities of all de-
velopment agencies (Article 10 [5]), notably the deconcentrated line departments 
that operate at district level (known in Ghana as ‘decentralised departments’) and 
non-governmental organisations. These broad functions were given prior specifi-
city in the Legislative Instruments that created each District Assembly following 
PNDC Law 207 in 1988, which outlined eighty-six specific functions of DAs . Yet, 
as Ayee (2004: 129) points out, only a few of these functions are actually devolved 
functions where full authority and responsibility rests with the DA.10 The main 
responsibility for the delivery of major public services, such as health, education 
and agricultural extension services, still rests with the line departments located 
in each district. The DAs ’ powers would be substantially increased by placing 
the line departments under their control, as originally stated in PNDC Law 207 
(1988) and reiterated in the Local Government Act of 1993.11 Yet the necessary 
legislation to achieve such reforms, the Local Government Service Act , was only 
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passed in 2003, allegedly due to pressure from international donors, and, as of late 
2007, still awaits implementation. 
 finance 
Th e 1992 Constitution (Article 252 [2]) established the District Assembly Com-
mon Fund (DACF) , with annual allocations ‘not less than 5 per cent of the total 
revenues of Ghana ’.12 DAs also have their own revenue-raising powers, though in-
come generated is limited. Nkrumah (2000: 61) comments that the ‘lucrative tax 
fi elds’ (for example, income tax, sales tax) all belong to the centre, while local gov-
ernment has access only to ‘low yielding taxes such as basic rates and market tolls’. 
In sum, partially democratic structures have been created at local levels, with the 
potential to facilitate local political participation and to enhance local government 
accountability . Of particular note are the representative sub-district structures 
that provide opportunities for the channelling of demands and for inputs into 
policy-making processes from the grassroots upwards. Nevertheless, elements of 
retained central government control are also evident. 
2.2. District profi les
Fieldwork was undertaken in two rural districts in the Brong-Ahafo and Ashanti 
regions of Ghana . To preserve anonymity of sources, these districts have been giv-
en the fi ctional names of Asanama and Bofano respectively. Although not located 
in the poorest regions of Ghana, both districts are characterised by rural poverty 
in terms of low income levels and a lack of access to basic services such as water 
and sanitation, education and health. Agriculture is the main economic activity in 
both districts, cultivating cash crops (mainly cocoa) and food crops (plantain and 
cocoyam). In Asanama, industry is limited to timber processing and small-scale 
agricultural processing, employing 5.9 per cent of the labour force (Asanama DA, 
2003: 9). In Bofano, industrial activities employ 18.4 per cent of the labour force, 
though mainly small-scale cottage industries, such as palm oil processing, brick 
and tile factories, as well as the logging of timber (Bofano DA, 2002: 22).
In Asanama (population 192,000), 24 per cent of the population live below 
the poverty line, with women comprising 60 per cent of those in poverty (As-
anama DA, 2003: 30). Two-thirds of the population do not have potable water, 
while 70 per cent do not have access to household latrines (ibid.: 19). Health fa-
cilities are inadequate for the population, comprising one district hospital, three 
health centres and eight rural clinics. Four doctors were based at the hospital, 
giving a very high patient to doctor ratio of approximately 45,000:1.13 Access to 
primary education is fairly good, with three-quarters (75.1 per cent) of primary 
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age children enrolled in public schools and a further 10.4 per cent in private 
schools (Ghana Edu cation Service, Asanama District, 2004). But enrolment 
rates decrease to 58.8 per cent for junior secondary schools ( JSS) (age 11-14) and 
then drop dramatically to 9.5 per cent for senior secondary schools (SSS) (ibid.). 
Girls’ enrolment is less than that of boys at all levels, with the gap widening as 
the level of education increases. The district adult illiteracy rate was estimated 
at 60 per cent in 2002 (Asanama DA, 2003: 45). Regarding infrastructure , the 
road network is described as ‘poor’, with few tarred roads and many untarred 
roads becoming impassable during the rainy seasons (Asanama District Health 
Directorate, 2004: 3). Electricity supply is limited to 37.2 per cent of households 
(Asanama DA, 2003: 19).
In Bofano (population 148,000), the DA states that ‘one of the most serious so-
cial problems in the district is the relatively high level of poverty ’, characterised by 
low levels of household income, insufficient to meet basic needs in terms of food, 
shelter and clothing, and by the low-level of basic social amenities such as health, 
education , water and sanitation (Bofano DA, 2002: 34). A ‘sizeable number of 
households are malnourished’ due to low incomes and pre-harvest food short-
ages (ibid.: 59). Inadequate water supply and sanitation are again major concerns, 
with 43.3 per cent of households dependent on contaminated water sources from 
streams and ponds (ibid.: 11), while only 0.7 per cent of households have their 
own or shared toilet facilities, with 90 per cent of households reliant on public 
latrines and 9.3 per cent having no access to toilet facilities (ibid.: 12). Health care 
services remain very inadequate. Although the health centre in the district capital 
had recently been upgraded to hospital status, there was only one doctor for the 
entire district of 148,000 people. Also many remoter communities lack access to 
basic health services, and infant and child mortality remain major issues (ibid.: 
56). Educational provision is also a key concern. Enrolment rates in 2004 for 
public and private schools combined were 60 per cent at primary level (equal for 
boys and girls), dropping to 49 per cent for boys and 41 per cent for girls at JSS 
level and 7 per cent (boys) and 4 per cent (girls) at SSS level (Ghana Edu cation 
Service, Bofano District, 2004). Educational infrastructure is described as inad-
equate and in poor condition, with only 40 per cent of schools having adequate 
classrooms and furniture (Bofano DA, 2002: 48). Adult illiteracy is high at 57 per 
cent of the adult population (2000 Census, cited in ibid.: 57). Regarding other 
infrastructure, only 6 per cent of households had electricity (2000 Census, cited 
in ibid.: 11) and the condition of a large number of feeder roads is described as 
‘deplorable’, with farming communities becoming inaccessible during the rainy 
seasons (ibid.: 5).
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3. Impact of Decentralisation on District Poverty Levels 
This section addresses the core question of whether decentralisation has de-
creased poverty levels in rural Ghana , based on empirical data gathered in As-
anama and Bofano . Data was collected in the two districts over a two-month pe-
riod in mid-2004. The aim was to assess the contribution of each DA to poverty 
reduction at district-level.14 Within each district, four communities were chosen 
on the basis of their relative deprivation, with one community selected from the 
four categories of ‘more developed’, ‘less deprived, ‘deprived’ and ‘most deprived’.15 
Three data collection methods were used. First, a household survey was con-
ducted in ten households in each community, providing eighty respondents in 
total.16 Second, focus group discussions with ‘opinion leaders’ were held in the 
eight communities.17 Third, key informant interviews were held at district level.18 
The impact of the District Assembly system on local poverty is assessed in 
terms of access to basic social services and increases in household incomes, in 
other words on the social and economic dimensions of poverty. The emphasis on 
basic services corresponds broadly to the main socio-economic indicator used in 
the cross-national reviews, while the level of household incomes is an important 
economic indicator that appears to have been omitted from the cross-national 
studies. This section proceeds in four parts. First, household income levels are 
examined and whether any increases can be attributed to the DA. Second, local 
people’s perceptions of DA performance are explored. Third, pro-poor objectives 
in DA development plans are contrasted with their implementation. Fourth, the 
level of financial resources available to the DA is considered. 
3.1. Household income levels
From the household questionnaire, respondents’ income levels confi rmed the 
depth of rural poverty , with no demonstrable trend of rising real incomes over the 
previous fi ve years.19 Indeed a slightly higher proportion reported decreases (51.25 
per cent) than increases (48.75 per cent). Th e main reason for increased income 
levels was rising prices for agricultural commodities, especially cocoa, identifi ed by 
60 per cent of those reporting higher incomes. A smaller number of respondents 
noted that the mass spraying of cocoa (undertaken by the Ministry of Food and 
Agriculture) had increased production, while others identifi ed improved trans-
port and storage facilities as enabling higher sales. Th e primary cause of decreases 
in disposable income was perceived as price rises in basic goods, especially food, 
highlighted by 30.6 per cent of respondents, with rises in school fees and medical 
charges identifi ed by a further 19.4 per cent. When asked what action the DA could 
take to improve income levels, two measures were commonly stated: the provision 
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of loans (31.3 per cent of respondents) and the construction and improvement of 
feeder roads (23.8 per cent). What is the record of the two DAs in these areas?
In both districts funds had been used for enhancing employment opportuni-
ties. In Asanama , this mainly took the form of training programmes, such as in 
‘tie and dye’ batik for women. One criticism, however, concerned the non-avail-
ability of loans to establish small enterprises after completion of the training.20 
In Bofano , a Poverty Alleviation Fund had been created to disburse low-interest 
loans to individuals, aiming to raise incomes through increased productivity and 
employment generation. This fund was also subject to criticism, however. First, 
the total amount allocated to the Fund was limited, only 4 per cent in 2004 of the 
district’s annual grant from the DACF. Thus individual loans were small, between 
250,000 and 300,000 Cedis (US$25-30) and perceived as of limited use.21 Second, 
loans were made to individuals and not to the groups and cooperatives formed 
for productive purposes (e.g. cassava growers association, kenti cloth weavers).22 
Third, and most significantly, it was alleged that the Fund had become politi-
cised, with individual loans commonly disbursed to ruling party supporters and 
high non-repayment rates.23
Road construction and improvement, especially of feeder roads, is identifi ed as 
a crucial issue by both DAs , though one where they have limited capacity to act. 
In Asanama , poor roads are stated as a key development problem, ranked second 
overall after the lack of potable water (Asanama DA, 2003: 91), and the rehabilita-
tion of two trunk roads and seven feeder roads is one of thirty-four objectives in the 
District Medium Term Development Plan , though ranked seventeenth. Similarly 
in Bofano , the poor condition of roads is regarded as a key problem of the local 
economy (Bofano DA, 2002: 71), with ambitious plans to rehabilitate thirty-seven 
feeder roads. Yet, the main responsibility for roads lies with central government 
agencies, the Ghana Highways Authority (for trunk roads) and the Department of 
Feeder Roads. Th e DA can select feeder roads for construction and improvement, 
but is dependent on the Department of Feeder Roads for implementation and on 
central government for funding. Only in exceptional circumstances does the DA 
itself undertake road repairs, for example, urgent repairs after rain damage. Th us, 
in their development plans, the DAs have highlighted the need for local road im-
provement, but ultimately their ability to implement such plans is limited.
3.2. Local perceptions of DA performance 
The household questionnaire and focus group discussions revealed mixed per-
ceptions of the District Assembly ’s performance in tackling district poverty , 
positive in some respects, less so in others. Majority views were that the DA had 
contributed positively in the areas of water supply and education , while its con-
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tribution to health services and sanitation (public toilet provision) was perceived 
more negatively. 
A sizeable majority of respondents thought that the DA had improved both 
education services (61.3 per cent) and the potable water supply (62.3 per cent) 
in the last ten years. A larger majority of respondents (78.8 per cent) also felt 
that district infrastructure had improved, though this entailed some overlap, with 
key examples given as school buildings and boreholes, as well as road construc-
tion, electricity supply and market structures. More negatively, only a minority 
of respondents felt that health services and public toilet provision had improved. 
Forty-five per cent of respondents thought that health service improvements had 
been achieved, as against 35 per cent who felt that no real change had occurred 
and 18.8 per cent who thought that provision had deteriorated. Shortcomings 
were most evident in relation to public toilet provision, where only 12.5 per cent 
of respondents suggested that the DA had brought about improvement, while 
45 per cent said no change had occurred and 42.5 per cent that the situation had 
actually got worse. 
These findings from the household survey were generally corroborated by the 
focus group discussions, which highlighted improvements in similar sectors, no-
tably school infrastructure and water supply (boreholes), as well as market fa-
cilities (stalls and sheds) and road rehabilitation. Unmet expectations were also 
evident, with dissatisfaction focusing on the same sectors, notably schools, water 
and markets. Either improvements in these areas had not happened for some 
communities or facilities remained poor. Inadequate public toilet provision was 
again highlighted in a number of focus groups as a key area of need that had not 
been addressed in either district. 
Therefore there is some evidence of a positive endorsement of the District As-
semblies’ contribution to important areas of poverty reduction , especially basic 
service provision. Yet there are two important qualifications. Firstly, the poorest 
communities were less enthusiastic, with the most negative assessment of DA 
performance coming from the more deprived communities. In both districts, the 
focus groups in the ‘most deprived’ communities were most critical of the lack 
of benefits from decentralisation, a perspective shared by the ‘deprived’ category. 
These smaller, poorer and remoter communities felt relatively neglected within 
their districts, with criticisms made that ‘development activities are not reaching 
the hinterland’ and that the DA ‘collects revenue from this area, but puts little 
back into the community’. The second qualification is that perceived improve-
ments often cannot be wholly attributed to decentralisation and the DA system. 
Questionnaire respondents and focus group participants often did not differenti-
ate between levels of government, local and central, or between the roles of differ-
ent government agencies. This was most apparent as regards education and water 
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supply, the two most positively perceived sectors. In education, although the DA 
plays a role in the provision of school infrastructure (buildings and furniture), 
it is the district-level office of the Ghana Edu cation Service that remains the 
key agency. Regarding water supply, although the DA plays an important role in 
the District Water and Sanitation Team (DWST) , including the selection and 
part-financing (5 per cent) of community water projects, the Community Water 
and Sanitation Agency (CWSA) , a donor-funded central government agency, has 
overall responsibility and provides 90 per cent of funding. In many other areas, 
for example, electricity supply, the DA role is subsidiary to that of central govern-
ment departments. 
3.3. District development plans: pro-poor objectives and implementation
Explicit poverty reduction objectives are contained in the District Medium Term 
Development Plans (DMTDP) that each District Assembly is required to draw 
up, usually in five-year cycles.24 For example, the mission statement of Asanama 
DA, proclaimed on the Assembly’s external wall, was to reduce ‘poverty’ and ‘core 
poverty’ levels from 24 per cent and 15.4 per cent respectively to 20 per cent and 7 
per cent, within the period of 2002-04. Such objectives have become widespread 
following the adoption of the Ghana Poverty Reduction S trategy (GPRS ) at na-
tional level, and the requirement by central government that District Assemblies 
structured their DMTDP for 2002-04 according to the five priority themes of 
the GPRS (National Development Planning Commission, 2002: 1). 
The DMTDPs in both districts were oriented at reducing poverty levels and 
providing basic services. The explicit poverty reduction objectives stated in the 
mission statement of Asanama DA have been highlighted. In Bofano , the devel-
opment plan is clearly focused on poverty reduction, both through increasing 
income levels, for instance by enhanced agricultural and industrial production, 
and through basic service provision. Development plans are structured in terms 
of goals, objectives, outputs and activities in each of the GPRS thematic areas. 
Goals of both District Assemblies are similar, producing ‘wish-lists’ that include 
increasing industrial and agricultural production, improving educational stand-
ards, providing basic health care, controlling the spread of HIV/AIDS and re-
ducing population growth (Asanama DA, 2003: 107-08; Bofano DA, 2002: 90-1). 
Specific objectives are then outlined by which to achieve each goal. Some of these 
are within the scope of the DA (‘to construct forty three-unit classrooms’), where-
as others depend on line departments (‘to increase the production of paddy rice 
and maize by 10 per cent’), or central government agencies (‘to extend electricity 
to ten communities’), or are simply wishful thinking (‘reducing the unemploy-
ment rate from 11.5 per cent to 7 per cent’). Therefore the DMTDPs undoubtedly 
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contain pro-poor elements which, if implemented, would contribute to poverty 
alleviation at district level. However, doubts emerge about the DAs ’ abilities to 
implement such plans. 
It is acknowledged in Bofano that previous ‘Development Plans have failed to 
achieve the set goals and objectives as a result of poor implementation’ (Bofano 
DA, 2002: 122), and in Asanama that ‘implementation has always been a prob-
lem’.25 To what extent did the DMTDPs for 2002-04 fare any better? 
In Bofano , an assessment of plan implementation has been possible through 
comparison of the DMTDP (2002-04) with the list of development projects and 
programmes implemented from January 2001 to June 2004. This suggests the fol-
lowing points. First, Bofano DA has focused on small-scale construction projects, 
notably school classrooms and teachers’ accommodation, health centres and nurs-
es’ accommodation, boreholes and toilet facilities. Second, the numbers of such 
projects are considerably less than planned. For example, twenty classroom blocks 
have been built and eight rehabilitated, yet plans were to construct forty and ren-
ovate fourteen. Further, 100 new boreholes were planned in the DMTDP from 
2002 to 2004 (plus a further ten for irrigation purposes), yet only forty-two had 
been completed from January 2001 to June 2004. In all areas, considerable slip-
page from plan to implementation is apparent, often around 50 per cent. Third, 
there are many planned activities in the DMTDP that do not feature in the list of 
implemented projects. These are often non-infrastructural activities, for example, 
family planning and HIV/AIDS awareness training. Additionally, proposed dis-
trict economy projects are absent from the list of projects implemented, notably 
those that focus on developing small-scale industries and agro-processing facili-
ties. Fourth, there is no indication or guarantee that the relevant line department 
has actually implemented sectoral projects in the DMTDP . As observed for road 
projects, the DA has little or no influence on whether such projects are imple-
mented. 
3.4. Financial resources
The impact of District Assemblies on poverty reduction is clearly limited by the 
availability of financial resources. Have these increased? Table 1 indicates that 
there has been an appreciable rise in revenue in both districts over a five-year 
period (1999-2003), mainly attributable to increases in central government trans-
fers from the District Assembly Common Fund (DACF).26 The figures are dis-
torted, however, by the DACF figures for 2003 being inflated by the inclusion 
of a significant shortfall in central government transfers from 2002.27 Internally 
generated revenue (IGR ) has also increased over this period, with Asanama DA 
particularly successful in achieving annual increases in revenue raised from local 
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sources, rising from 0.37 billion Cedis in 1999 to 1.7 billion in 2003. Undoubtedly 
these rises in available financial resources do provide DAs with significantly more 
funds with which to address local poverty issues, given a political will to imple-
ment pro-poor policies. Research raised four other points, however. 
Table 1: District Assembly Revenue
Asanama District Assembly (population: 192,000)






(US $, 2004 
prices)
1999 617,797,466 373,006,186 17,139,847 1,007,943,499 114,539
2000 Figures not 
available
2001 1,096,919,167 618,866,699 – 1,715,785,866 194,976
2002 1,516,593,803 1,402,894,703 – 2,919,488,506 331,760
2003 4,902,310,492 1,696,063,508 – 6,598,374,000 749,815
Source: Asanama District Assembly Annual Trial Balances for years 1999-2003 (2000 not 
available).
Bofano District Assembly (population: 148,000)






(US $, 2004 
prices)
1999 795,830,126 215,630,344 15,912,362 1,027,372,832 116,747
2000 959,951,154 182,142,524 – 1,142,093,678 129,783
2001 1,133,254,790 Not available –
2002 1,463,737,529 645,857,240 – 2,109,594,769 239,727
2003 4,184,654,424 586,336,248 – 4,770,990,672 542,158
Source: Bofano District Assembly Annual Trial Balances for years 1999-2003 (2001 incomplete).
 First, financial accounts indicate that the DA spends a considerable propor-
tion of available resources on itself in both districts, notably on the construction 
and refurbishment of Assembly buildings, including staff accommodation, on 
hardware (such as computers and generators) and on staff training. While mostly 
legitimate, expensive projects such as the construction of an executive guesthouse 
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costing almost a quarter of a billion Cedis are more questionable.28 This suggests 
a degree of elite capture of local resources, in this case an official elite created by 
the District Assembly system itself. 
Second, increasing amounts of ‘internally generated revenue’ (IGR ) may ap-
pear desirable, not only providing additional revenue but also likely to enhance 
demands for local government accountability (Moore, 2007: 56-7). However, it 
is possible that IGR constitutes regressive taxation, given that it is raised mainly 
through fees and taxes on small businesses and on stool land.29 Indeed, one par-
ticularly deprived community specifically complained that the DA collected rev-
enue from them yet they received no benefits in return. Reliance on IGR also po-
tentially increases differentials and inequities between districts, given that poorer 
districts will be able to raise less funds.
Third, DAs have no knowledge of, nor control over, the finances of the line 
departments.30 The so-called decentralised departments are financially autono-
mous from the DA, receiving funding from central government and operating 
according to guidelines from their respective ministries, to whom they are ac-
countable. Additionally, the funds available to the larger line departments, such 
as education , health and agriculture, can be substantial in the district context. 
Indeed it is estimated that 85 per cent of government funds at district level are 
not controlled by the District Assemblies,31 undermining their role as the plan-
ning, development and budgeting authority (Local Government Act 1993, Arti-
cle 3[1]) and their responsibility for poverty alleviation within their geographical 
boundaries.
Fourth, the experience of Bofano DA indicated that District Assemblies are 
often highly dependent on accessing external donor funds for implementation of 
their planned programmes. In their DMTDP , Bofano DA’s financial projections 
included the sum of 14.5 billion Cedis from external donors towards projects 
costing 25.2 billion Cedis, with the other 10.7 billion Cedis coming from the DA’s 
own funds (that is, DACF and internally generated revenue) (Bofano DA, 2002: 
123). External sources included: Village Infrastructure Project (VIP – World 
Bank -funded); Quality Improvement in Primary Schools (QUIPS – USAID-
funded); Highly Indebted Poor Countries debt relief (HIPC managed by central 
government); and the Community Water and Sanitation Agency (CWSA – a 
donor-funded central government agency).
Therefore, in summary, what has been the overall impact of decentralisation 
on poverty levels in rural Ghana ? Evidence from the two districts indicates that 
impact is limited at best with respect to incomes and basic services, with a degree 
of elite capture .
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4. Decentralisation and Local Political Participation 
These relatively negative findings cause us to look back at the processes that de-
centralisation advocates anticipated would lead to more responsive government 
and thus to pro-poor outcomes. What has gone wrong with these processes? 
What shortcomings can be identified? The next two sections address these ques-
tions. This section focuses on levels of political participation , regarded as key 
to greater government responsiveness by decentralisation advocates such as the 
World Bank . In their Attacking Poverty report, for instance, the Bank declared 
that, ‘Widespread political participation is vital to successful decentralisation’ 
(World Bank, 2001: 108). The degree of political participation is also used as 
a measure of the linkage between decentralisation and poverty reduction in 
three recent cross-national studies (Crook and Sverrisson, 2001; Von Braun and 
Grote, 2002; Jütting et al., 2004, 2005). However, increased participation on its 
own does not guarantee greater responsiveness of government.32 This is reliant 
on the intermediate variable of accountability , which is examined in the next 
section. Specifically, government responsiveness depends on whether political 
participation has led to a strengthening of downward accountability of local 
government to elected representatives and their constituents. Decentralisation 
advocates have not ignored issues of accountability, but there is a tendency to 
assume, as noted by Johnson (2003: 8), that ‘democratic participation will yield 
strong mechanisms of accountability’.33 Such an assumption is flawed, of course, 
as Johnson recognizes, and the argument here is that a de-linkage between par-
ticipation and accountability, as manifested in the Ghana case, is a fatal short-
coming in the process that is expected to lead to more responsive and more 
pro-poor local government.34
Decentralisation is commonly seen as a means to increase opportunities for 
political participation and to enhance democracy. Indeed. the Ghanaian Consti-
tution states this explicitly when declaring that:
Th e State shall take appropriate measures to make democracy a reality by 
decentralizing the administrative and fi nancial machinery of government to 
the regions and districts and by aff ording all possible opportunities to the peo-
ple to participate in decision-making (Article 35[6][d], emphasis added).35
In this section, the extent to which opportunities for political participation are 
actually available and utilised at district level are explored in three ways: through 
electoral participation and, between elections , through attendance at community 
meetings and contacting of political representatives.36 
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4.1. Electoral participation 
Electoral participation at district level elections was fairly high, especially at 
Unit Committee level. Voter turnout at DA elections in 1998 and 2002 was good 
though not exceptional.37 It is at grassroots level that the enthusiasm for politi-
cal participation was most impressive in the districts examined, with significant 
numbers of people contesting UC elections. It would not have been surprising 
if many Units were uncontested, given that a minimum of eleven candidates are 
required from electorates of between 250 and 500 registered voters just for a con-
tested election to occur. Much the opposite was found, however, especially in 
Asanama . Here, of the 176 units, 151 were contested in the 2002 elections, leaving 
only twenty-five units (14.2 per cent) where less than eleven candidates stood and 
were therefore elected unopposed. The number of candidates that stood at the 
UC elections is another means of measuring political participation. In this one 
district, there were a total of 2026 candidates in 2002, amounting to one person in 
every forty-five registered voters standing as a candidate.38 This is an exception-
ally high level of local political contestation.39 
4.2. Attendance at meetings
From the household survey, knowledge of the local Assembly member was high, 
with almost all respondents aware of his/her identity.40 With regard to attend-
ance at the community meetings that the Assembly member is mandated to call 
regularly, over a third of respondents in Asanama had attended one or more 
meetings, rising to almost two-thirds in Bofano . Such levels of participation at 
meetings are particularly impressive when taking into consideration the fact that 
meetings had often not been called, as the focus group discussions highlighted. 
Focus groups indicated that community meetings had not been called regularly 
by Assembly members in a number of electoral areas, while attendance had been 
quite impressive where they had been held. In almost two years from the August 
2002 elections until May/June 2004, some meetings had been held in four com-
munities, while no meetings had been organised in the other four.41 Only in two 
villages had regular meetings been held, both in Bofano, in the ‘deprived’ and 
‘most deprived’ settlements, where the beating of the traditional gong-gong sum-
moned villagers to discuss community and district issues. Thus the findings were 
that community meetings with Assembly members had been generally well at-
tended where they had occurred. 
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4.3. Contacting political representatives
When asked whether they had contacted one or more of a range of political, reli-
gious, traditional and community figures concerning individual or community is-
sues, over two-thirds (67.5 per cent) of household questionnaire respondents an-
swered affirmatively. The Assembly member was the most frequently contacted 
in each district, accounting for 26 per cent of instances (29 out of 113 instances), 
followed by the MP (16 per cent of instances), Area Council or Unit Commit-
tee member (14 per cent), District Chief Executive or District Co-ordinating 
Director (12 per cent), religious leaders (12 per cent) and chiefs (11 per cent). This 
indicates a greater propensity to contact political representatives rather than ex-
ecutive members or religious and traditional leaders. 
The focus groups confirmed a keen awareness of the representative role of the 
Assembly member. In response to the question concerning how communities try 
to influence DA decision-making , the Assembly member was correctly identified 
in all discussions as the key means through which to channel community needs 
and demands. For example, the poor condition of the primary school building 
was a major concern in two separate villages, with both communities following 
the correct procedure and urging their Assembly member to take up this issue 
with the respective DA, though with differing outcomes – while new roofing 
sheets were provided in one ‘less deprived’ community in Bofano with good access 
to the district capital, no action was taken in a particularly remote and deprived 
community by Asanama DA, despite ‘promises made by the DCE’. 
Overall, the evidence from the two districts indicates significant levels of po-
litical participation at district and sub-district levels.42 Given the tendency to 
equate participation with empowerment in some cross-national studies (Von 
Braun and Grote, 2002: 73-74; Jütting et al., 2005: 629-30; see footnote 33), this 
could be regarded as an indicator of pro-poor policies. Yet ultimately such local 
political participation is only meaningful if it has the opportunity to influence 
decision-making and resource allocation at local government level. This leads to 
a discussion of accountability . 
5. Decentralisation and Accountability 
This section considers the extent to which district-level government is down-
wardly accountable to its citizens. It does so by examining the mechanisms of 
communication and consultation between citizens and public officials, and as-
sesses their efficacy.43 Despite the assumptions noted by Johnson (2003: 8), there 
is no automatic linkage between increased participation and greater accountabil-
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ity , and indeed this section provides extensive evidence of the de-linkage between 
participation and accountability in the Ghana case. In other words, the account-
ability of local government to its citizens remains low despite reasonably high 
levels of political participation by local people. Downward accountability can be 
sub-divided into two main aspects: the accountability of elected representatives 
to the public (their constituents); and the accountability of the local executive to 
elected representatives. Based on fieldwork data, various shortcomings are high-
lighted that limit both aspects.
5.1. Th e accountability of elected representatives to the public
Although relatively educated, elected Assembly members in Ghana cannot sim-
ply be described as coming from local elite groups. Indeed they were mostly farm-
ers and teachers in the two rural districts examined.44 They are constituency 
representatives, but how well were mechanisms working that should enable con-
stituents both to channel views and demands to the DA through their political 
representatives and to hold them to account for (non-)actions taken? Three prob-
lematic areas are identified here: the representative role of Assembly members, 
the role of the sub-district structures and the representation of women.
 representative role of assembly members
In principle, regular opportunities for constituents to hold their local representa-
tives to account are provided by the obligations of elected Assembly members to 
meet their electorate before each session of the General Assembly and to bring 
constituents’ views and proposals to Assembly meetings. In practice, the discus-
sion above indicated the variability with which meetings had been called. Indeed 
the question concerning the frequency with which the Assembly member called 
community meetings resulted in animated discussion in focus groups (to which 
the Assembly member was always invited and usually present), with explicit criti-
cism at times. For instance, it was stated in one that Assembly members are ‘let-
ting down the people by not meeting with them’. 
Although individual Assembly members were criticised in focus group discus-
sions, issues are clearly wider than individual failings. Assembly members them-
selves raised two broader difficulties. First, one Assembly member stated that 
there was a financial cost involved in organising constituency meetings, yet no 
financial support was forthcoming from the DA. Given that Assembly members 
hold honorary positions and are mainly from non-elite backgrounds, they cannot 
be expected to bear such costs. Second, Assembly members expressed frustra-
tion with their inability to get the DA to respond to community needs. One As-
semblywoman in a ‘deprived’ community stated that she had not been successful 
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in getting DA support for the priority needs of her community, notably road 
improvement and drinking water, and feared this would adversely affect her re-
election chances. Such difficulties raise further concerns regarding the account-
ability of the district executive to the Assembly and the DA’s powers and capacity 
to meet local needs (discussed below).
 unit committees and area councils
The sub-district structures offer, in principle, another important means of chan-
nelling community needs and demands from the grassroots upwards to DA level, 
as well as a further means by which local communities can hold their district level 
representatives to account. Yet major problems were discovered with the func-
tioning of both Unit Committees and Area Councils, severely weakening such 
accountability mechanisms.
The national system of 16,000 UCs was reconstituted at the August 2002 lo-
cal elections . By mid-2004, only nine out of twenty-two UCs remained active in 
the eight communities examined, often dependent on a small number of activists. 
The other thirteen, while existing on paper, had effectively ceased to function.45 
The main reason given for this collapse in focus groups was the absence of any 
funding provided by the DAs , in particular unmet expectations regarding pay-
ment of a ‘sitting (attendance) allowance’, with the role of community representa-
tive described as ‘purely sacrificial’.46 Turning to the Area Councils (ACs ) , the 
picture was similarly discouraging. Focus group discussions indicated that ACs 
were functioning in only two of the eight Areas, one in each district, with very 
limited activity by a few councillors in another two Areas. Again, the other four 
ACs were said to exist on paper, yet had ceased to function.47 Thus, the impor-
tant intermediary role played by Area and Town Councils between grassroots 
communities and district authorities had broken down in most instances. Most 
disheartening was the views expressed in two focus groups, one in each district, 
that the ACs are ‘virtually redundant’ and that they have ‘hardly functioned since 
their establishment ten years ago’. The foremost cause of the collapse of Area and 
Town Councils again appears to be financial, with neglect by both DAs . Not only 
had salaries of AC staff not been paid at times, but also the stated reason for the 
non-convening of meetings in one Area in Bofano was that the DA provided no 
money for transport and sitting allowances.48 In theory, there are two sources 
of finance for Area and Town Councils: a central government earmark of ‘not 
less than 5 per cent ’ of the District Assemblies Common Fund to ‘establish and 
strengthen’ Town and Area Councils; and retention of 50 per cent of revenue col-
lected on behalf of the DA. Yet it appears that such  ‘earmarked’ funds are not be-
ing fully utilised for their intended purpose. In addition, focus group discussions 
indicated that the revenue collection role had either been ‘sidelined’ by the DA, as 
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stated by members of one Town Council, or that the AC had not received their 
due share of taxes collected, as stated by officials in another Area. Such financial 
privation undermines their capacity and their legitimacy. Forget about the pros-
pects of exercising an accountability role, the reality in many instances was of a 
body that scarcely exists. 
 representation of women
Ensuring the equal participation and representation of women in political life 
is a world-wide issue, perceived as a necessary condition if governments are to 
address the needs of, and be accountable to, one half of the population.49 Yet the 
dominance of men in local government in Ghana is described by Ayee (2000a: 
34) as ‘overwhelming’, confirmed by findings here. Of the eight communities stud-
ied, only one was represented by an Assemblywoman. This was fairly typical. In 
Asanama , out of sixty-nine Assembly members, forty-eight elected and twenty-
one appointed, only nine were women, four elected and five appointed. In Bofano , 
out of fifty-eight Assembly members, forty-two elected and sixteen appointed, 
only seven were women, one elected and six appointed. A reason suggested in 
one focus group for the low number of women candidates in DA elections was 
the lack of independent access to the finances required for an election campaign, 
reinforced by the context of non-partisan elections where political party support 
is disallowed. At sub-district level, the picture did not improve. Of those func-
tioning UCs, female membership varied from zero out of fifteen to a maximum 
of three in one instance. The number of women members at Area/Town Council 
level was similarly very low, with female councillors in functioning ACs ranging 
from zero to three out of twenty. This is particularly disappointing given that 
sub-district level representation could serve as a training ground for the partici-
pation of women at DA level (Thomi et al., 2000: 334). 
Despite low numbers of female representatives, have District Assemblies 
nevertheless addressed women’s issues? Under its discretionary powers, Asan-
ama DA had established a Women and Gender Sub-committee, while Bofano 
had not. Although the specific sub-committee enabled more focus on issues 
pertinent to women, difficulties were still encountered. First, the Women and 
Gender Sub-committee faced the same financial constraints common to all 
sub-committees (see below). One consequence was that by mid-2004 the sub-
committee had not yet met that year, with the convenor unwilling to call meet-
ings when members’ travel expenses could not be provided. Second, a feeling 
of marginalisation had been experienced, with the sub-committee’s initiatives 
not receiving support from the EXECO , for example, a proposal for a health 
education campaign on HIV/AIDS . Therefore some neglect of women’s needs 
and demands is apparent in the two districts examined, perhaps unsurprisingly 
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given the lack of female representatives, questioning the accountability of DAs 
to half the population. 
In sum, despite the promising legal framework, it is evident that the account-
ability of elected representatives to local citizens is limited in three ways. First, 
elected Assembly members have generally not been fulfilling their responsibilities 
to hold regular meetings. Second, sub-district structures have collapsed, confirm-
ing the tendency noted by Ayee (2000b: 128) for the DAs themselves to ‘centralise 
within their boundaries’, with little enthusiasm shown for being held accountable 
by their constituent communities. Third, the accountability to women is under-
mined by the lack of women representatives on elected bodies. Overall, the op-
portunities available in theory for local voters to monitor and sanction the actions 
of their elected representatives are very restricted in practice.
5.2. Accountability of the local executive to elected representatives
Th e second aspect of accountability concerns the extent to which the district execu-
tive is accountable to the elected representatives. Two shortcomings are identifi ed 
here, the dominant role of the DCE and the weakness of the sub-committee system. 
Both indicate that the local executive, dominated by the DCE, operates under few 
checks and balances and with limited accountability to the elected representatives.
 role of district chief executive
When visiting District Assemblies in Ghana it is clear that the key individual is 
the DCE, ‘presidential’ in the scope of his/her powers that combine both politi-
cal and executive functions. The question posed here concerns whether there are 
effective constraints on the DCE’s exercise of power. In theory, the capacity of 
the DA to hold the district executive to account should be strengthened by the 
parliamentary-type system, inclusive of the General Assembly and the EXECO 
and its sub-committees, in which the Assembly members play a key role. In prac-
tice, these potential opportunities for influencing and monitoring the executive’s 
actions were not working well.
From interviews with the Presiding Members (PM) of both Assemblies, there 
was little indication that the locally-elected Assembly members were able to con-
strain the powers of the centrally appointed DCE through the General Assembly . 
In Bofano , during the PM’s term office since 2001, the powers of the DCE had 
not been challenged or overturned in any of three important areas.50 First, after 
the DCE’s annual sessional address, the General Assembly deliberates and takes 
decisions on whether to accept or reject each issue raised in the DCE’s address, 
yet nothing had been rejected. Second, in budget discussions, no proposed item 
had been modified or rejected. Third, in making decisions on EXECO recom-
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mendations, all recommendations had been accepted. The presence of a block 
(30 per cent) of appointed Assembly members, generally providing partisan sup-
port to the DCE, can discourage prospective challenges to the DCE from elected 
members, given low prospects of success. Ghana would appear to be an example 
where ‘local executives exercise much more power than the legislature’ and ‘local 
assemblies are often incapacitated in influencing the policy process or in holding 
the executive accountable’ (Olowu and Wunsch 2004: 72). In the case of Ghana, 
such executive power is concentrated in the hands of a political appointee, the 
DCE, rather than in civil servants . This relative failure by Assembly members to 
challenge the power of the DCE raises issues concerning their overall skills and 
suggests the need for training in their roles and responsibilities. Yet the main 
problems are legal and structural in nature, notably the DCE’s powerful position 
as a presidential appointee and as the chief representative of central government 
in the district. 
Further indications of DCEs’ power to pursue their own agenda, relatively 
unencumbered by accountability mechanisms, comes from two sources. One is 
the perception by the two ‘most deprived’ communities of an inequitable distri-
bution of resources within the districts. Focus group discussions suggested that 
resources were ‘skewed towards communities on the main road’ (Bofano ), with a 
‘neglect of the hinterland’ (Asanama ). Additionally, one DCE was criticised for 
favouring projects in his home town. Second, financial accounts indicate consid-
erable outlay by the DA on itself, notably new accommodation for the DCE in 
one district and an executive guest house in the other, diverting scarce funds from 
basic development needs in the districts.51 
One mechanism to increase the downward accountability of the DCE is 
through an elected post, with considerable support for this reform. In the house-
hold survey, 74 per cent of respondents supported an elected DCE, with over-
whelming support for an elected DCE expressed in all but one of the focus 
groups.52 Although desirable from a democratic perspective, an elected DCE is 
insufficient in itself, however. The problem of the concentration of power still 
remains, potentially leading to the ‘strong-mayor’ phenomenon where an elected 
mayor with executive powers dominates the local council (Olowu and Wunsch, 
2004: 78). Therefore institutional reforms would also be required to enhance the 
decision-making powers of the DA and simultaneously reduce those of the chief 
executive, who could focus on an implementation role.
 sub-committees
In principle, the sub-committees play a vital role in ensuring that the Assem-
bly members themselves determine the policies and monitor the actions of the 
district executive. The sub-committees deal with much of the ongoing busi-
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ness of the DA, including those community needs and demands referred to 
them by individual Assembly members, and make recommendations to the 
EXECO . Further, given that heads of the ‘decentralised departments’ attend 
meetings as non-voting technical advisers and that other relevant individuals 
can be co-opted as non-voting members, the sub-committees provide opportu-
nities for the discussion of district-level development issues by a range of key 
personnel. Yet, despite their significance, the condition of the sub-committee 
system was found to be weak in the districts examined, hardly functioning in 
one district. 
In Asanama , the picture was particularly discouraging. Interviews with con-
venors indicated that many sub-committees were meeting infrequently and ir-
regularly. For example, the Social Services sub-committee, responsible for wa-
ter, health and education , had met only once in 2002, twice in 2003 and once by 
mid-2004.53 The poor condition of the sub-committee system was attributed 
by some sub-committee convenors to a lack of financial input from the district 
administration. It was stated that finance was not made available for members’ 
attendance allowances and travel expenses, leading to a reluctance by some 
convenors to call meetings.54 The strong impression in this particular district 
was that the sub-committee structure was not taken sufficiently seriously nor 
funded appropriately by those with power in the district administration, head-
ed by the DCE. The extent of the problem was indicated by one convenor’s 
statement that the ‘sub-committees are dying’, while questioning whether ‘the 
EXECO could be trusted’, given its dominance by the DCE.55 One outcome 
is that the role of Assembly members is diminished and executive power is 
increased, with the accountability of the executive to elected representatives 
adversely affected.56 It has to be asked whether such outcomes are not unwel-
come to a district executive, headed by the DCE, who thus remain relatively 
unaccountable.
In sum, evidence from the two districts has demonstrated that the twofold 
accountability mechanisms have been undermined by a series of shortcomings 
and limitations, with indications of centralising tendencies within the district 
boundaries. A veritable participation -accountability gap has been revealed, with 
the enthusiasm for local political participation not being translated into making 
local government more accountable to its citizens. As Goetz and Gaventa (2001) 
point out, the expression of ‘voice’ does not necessarily mean that it is either heard 
or listened to – it can simply be ignored. In such instances, ‘empowerment ’ has 
certainly not occurred.
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6. Local Shortcomings: National Constraints
Let us review the argument of this chapter so far. In exploring both the socio-
economic and political dimensions of the relationship between decentralisation 
and poverty reduction , two main findings have become evident. First, the impact 
of decentralisation on poverty levels in the districts examined has been limited 
at best. Second, a participation -accountability gap partly accounts for why en-
thusiasm for local political participation has not resulted in more responsive and 
potentially pro-poor local government. A number of local-level shortcomings in 
accountability mechanisms have been highlighted, with local-level reforms re-
quired to strengthen downward accountability, for example, better resourcing of 
sub-district structures and of sub-committees. But the fact that such reforms are 
unlikely, and that instead centralisation is occurring at district level, suggests that 
larger processes are at work and that the shortcomings are symptomatic of wider 
issues. Therefore this section re-directs attention to the national context and 
identifies obstacles to positive outcomes in the form of political, administrative 
and fiscal constraints, ones that are inherent in the structure of decentralisation. 
This analysis is simultaneously compared with that of other analysts of decen-
tralisation and poverty reduction, notably Jütting et al. (2005), who highlight the 
political, administrative and fiscal conditions that facilitate pro-poor decentralisa-
tion. The implications of such differing approaches are then discussed more fully 
in the conclusion.
6.1. Political constraints
Many analysts focus on the importance of political commitment by central gov-
ernment to successful decentralisation ( Jütting et al., 2005: 638; Crook, 2003: 85; 
Vedeld, 2003: 186). Yet decentralisation in Ghana is characterised more by politi-
cal control than by political commitment, with a key mechanism for the mainte-
nance of such control through the presidential powers of appointment. 
The 1992 Constitution retained the system by which the President appoints 
all District Chief Executives, eschewing the option of an elected DCE, and is the 
key means through which central government exerts control at district level.57 
DCEs are upwardly accountable to the appointing authority, not downwardly ac-
countable to the local electorate, and can be used by that authority to implement 
its desired policies at local level. The partisan nature of the appointment system 
is blatant and undisguised. When President Kufuor and his National Patriotic 
Party (NPP) government came to power in January 2001, he terminated the term 
of office of all existing 110 DCEs and appointed new ones allied to the new ruling 
party.58 Additionally, the tremendous power wielded by the DCE in the district 
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has been noted. In such ways, the governing party at national level is able to exert 
considerable control on local politics and development.
The retention in the 1992 Constitution of one-third appointed Assembly 
members was a further impediment to the democratic nature of local govern-
ment. The politics of the appointment system was again highly evident when 
President Kufuor took office in January 2001. All DA appointees had their term 
of office immediately revoked by the President, despite their term formally last-
ing until the next district elections in mid-2002. A new set of appointees were put 
in place, with party loyalists favoured, a blatant travesty of the statement in the 
Constitution that membership of the District Assembly is non-partisan.59 Like 
the DCE, such appointed members owe their allegiance to the President and the 
ruling party nationally, not to the electorate locally. Locally, the appointed mem-
bers ensure a substantial block of supporters for the DCE within the Assembly, 
especially useful in opposition strongholds, and who often undertake influential 
roles, such as Presiding Member and sub-committee chairs. The non-partisan 
nature of the DA system is effectively a myth, but one that serves to conceal 
mechanisms for ongoing central government and ruling party control.
6.2. Administrative constraints
Jütting et al. (2005: 641-42) highlight a clear division of functions between local 
and central government as a necessary administrative condition for success. Yet 
fieldwork evidence here suggests that the nature of those functions and the pow-
ers to implement them are also crucial. The two main administrative constraints 
entail, first, the limited powers and functions of the DA and, second, the lack of 
influence and control over line departments at district level.
Fieldwork in both districts confirmed the partial nature of the District Assem-
bly ’s powers. Although the DA’s roles and responsibilities may appear significant 
on paper (Local Government Act 462, 1993), major service delivery remains in 
the hands of the line departments. For rural communities, the key departments 
are those of health, education and agriculture. Interviews with directors of these 
departments confirmed that their lines of control and accountability are vertical 
to their respective ministries not horizontal to the DA. The DA’s formal roles, as 
outlined in legal provisions, remain illusory, for example, its responsibility to ‘co-
ordinate, integrate and harmonize’ the activities of all development agencies in the 
district. Interviews with directors of the so-called decentralised departments in 
both districts indicated that they operated autonomously of the DA, formulating 
and implementing their own sectoral plans, ones based on national policy guide-
lines and approved by their respective ministries.60 The DA’s role in education 
and health provision is limited and controlled. In education, the DA is respon-
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sible for the provision of school infrastructure , financed from its own budget, 
but with implementation overseen by the district office of the Ghana Edu cation 
Service (GES).61 In health care, the DA can provide small-scale infrastructure 
and is obliged by central government to spend at least 1 per cent of the DACF 
on malaria prevention and 1 per cent on HIV/AIDS , with such funds frequently 
channelled directly to the district office of the Ghana Health Service (GHS) for 
their usage.62 The DA can adopt a more pro-active role in the provision of public 
services through its DMTDP , including co-ordinating activities with the line de-
partments. However, interviews with directors of key departments indicated that 
such co-ordination generally had not happened. Strategic planning in key sectors 
remains in the hands of the deconcentrated line departments.
As discussed above, the powers and functions of the DA would increase sig-
nificantly if and when the 2003 Local Government Service Act (LGSA) is imple-
mented, with current line departments then becoming departments of the Dis-
trict Assembly . Yet significant resistance to the integration of central government 
departments into the DA system is evident, given the delays since 1988 to achiev-
ing such reforms. This reluctance has already led to the opting-out of key depart-
ments – health, education , forestry and probably agriculture – from the LGSA.63 
Explanation for the delays sometimes focuses on the unwillingness of civil serv-
ants to shift to a local government service from a centralised career structure. It is 
clear, however, that the major political blockage entails disinclination by central 
government to lose control over its departments and their activities. 
6.3. Fiscal constraints
Adequate and secure resources for local government, including tax -raising pow-
ers, is perceived as the key financial condition for successful decentralisation 
( Jütting et al., 2005: 642-43). This condition had clearly not been met in the 
districts examined, with financial constraints perceived by a range of informants 
as a key source of the DAs ’ inability to make a significant impact on poverty 
reduction . Although funds from the DACF have recently increased, the Con-
stitutional minimum of ‘five per cent of the total revenues of Ghana ’ remains 
limited and subject to central government ‘earmarks’ over its expenditure, while 
locally-generated revenue in poor districts is insubstantial and possibly regressive 
in nature.64 Recurrent expenditure accounts for the large proportion of district 
funds, with little remaining for capital expenditure on development projects.65 
Such limited fiscal decentralisation has two implications. First, there are severe 
financial constraints on the delivery of public services by DAs and ‘almost guar-
antees that large numbers of the electorate will be disappointed’ (Ayee, 2004: 
135). Second, the financial resources over which the district electorate and their 
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representatives can exert democratic controls are very restricted, while significant 
government expenditure by the line departments remains outside of local demo-
cratic processes. In Ghana, as elsewhere, central government may be more willing 
to decentralise (and offload) responsibilities than to devolve the commensurate 
financial resources.
In sum, the relatively poor performance of DAs in alleviating local poverty is 
not simply due to local-level shortcomings, but more a consequence of national-
level obstacles. Such constraints could be viewed as due to failings to fully imple-
ment decentralisation, for example, the current limitations on DAs ’ actual powers 
and financial capacity. The analysis here, however, suggests that such constraints 
are inherent in the national structure of decentralisation. They reflect not so 
much implementation failure as success in the attempt to maintain central govern-
ment control. The faith in decentralisation retained by most other analysts may 
be inappropriate if the structures in place are precisely intended to fulfil other 
purposes. 
7. Conclusion: Th e Politics of (De)centralisation 
At the outset, this chapter posed the question of whether decentralisation in 
Ghana has led to decreased levels of poverty , and, if not, why not. Findings on 
poverty reduction have been largely negative, with decentralisation having a 
limited and largely insignificant impact on rural poverty in the two districts ex-
amined. Such negative outcomes correspond largely with the overall findings of 
the recent cross-national reviews (see Chapter one, this volume), as well as with 
other country case studies in this volume. However, aspects of the analysis here 
differ from the cross-national studies and from conventional wisdom about de-
centralisation more generally. First, participation is not a sufficient condition for 
pro-poor decentralisation. Second, the reliance on central government ‘political 
commitment’ is misplaced. Third, decentralisation is not a technical exercise, de-
pendent on appropriate ‘design’, but a political one. In conclusion, these three vari-
ations from conventional analysis are discussed, stressing the significance of the 
politics of (de)centralisation .
In accounting for the limited impact on poverty , emphasis was placed on the 
weakness of downward accountability mechanisms, despite the evident enthusi-
asm for local political participation . In short, increased participation and ‘popular 
input’ into decision-making processes had not led to greater empowerment or 
‘popular control’ of government. Participation is often seen as the key to pro-poor 
decentralisation, for example, by the World Bank (2001: 108). The Ghana case has 
demonstrated, however, that participation may be a necessary condition, but it is 
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not a sufficient one for pro-poor decentralisation. There is no automatic associa-
tion between decentralisation, participation and more responsive local govern-
ment, with downward accountability identified as the ‘missing link’. The local and 
especially national politics of decentralisation remain critical.
Although explanations for the relative failure initially focused on local level 
shortcomings, these were regarded as symptomatic of wider issues, with the main 
obstacles to pro-poor decentralisation identified at national level in the form of 
political, administrative and fiscal constraints. Such constraints are often per-
ceived, by both donor agencies and academic writers, as due to failures to fully 
implement decentralisation, with ‘political will’ and ‘political commitment’ re-
quired on the part of central government. Smoke (2003: 12), for instance, notes 
that the existence of political will at central government level has ‘ubiquitous[ly]’ 
been seen as ‘the principal requirement for success’ by decentralisation advocates. 
And, indeed, many of the cross-national reviews stress the significance of central 
government commitment for pro-poor decentralisation, highlighted by Vedeld 
(2003: 186) ‘as an essential precondition’. Yet, it is paradoxical and somewhat naïve 
to place one’s faith in the commitment of central governments to genuinely de-
volve power, especially given the truism that governments rarely give up their 
power voluntarily. The politics of decentralisation are crucial. Central govern-
ments decentralise for a variety of reasons, but invariably to promote their own 
interests and usually inclusive of the retention (and even consolidation) of central 
powers. Motivations can include extending and strengthening their control at lo-
cal level, mobilising support for the ruling party in peripheral areas, off-loading 
responsibilities without relinquishing adequate finance, and enhancing their le-
gitimacy by fostering the appearance of being democratic at the local level. Indeed, 
all such intentions are apparent in the Ghana case to some degree, amply demon-
strating the degree of central government control that can remain in purportedly 
decentralised systems of governance.
Many decentralisation proponents highlight the importance of decentralisa-
tion ‘by design’ rather than ‘by default’, where ‘design’ involves its purposeful im-
plementation by governments while ‘default’ suggests a reluctance to implement, 
often due to donor pressure ( Jütting et al., 2005: 638-9). Yet, in identifying the 
main obstacles to pro-poor decentralisation in Ghana as national-level structural 
constraints, it is evident that these constraints are inherent in the design of decen-
tralisation itself. It is a design that is precisely intended to limit the discretionary 
authority and the capacity of local government and to maintain overall central 
government control. It is clear that decentralisation is not a technical exercise but 
a political one.
The ‘politics of (de)centralisation ’ is pertinent in one final respect. This chapter 
has suggested that the notion of ‘decentralisation from above’ is a paradoxical one, 
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an oxymoron even, given central governments’ various manipulations of decen-
tralisation processes. In such circumstances, decentralisation is unlikely to lead 
to pro-poor outcomes. Prospects for genuine devolution of power, inclusive of 
strengthened linkages between political participation and accountability , may be 
more likely when the momentum for such change comes from below. This could 
occur through mass mobilisation within democratic political parties or through 
pressure from social movements, in both cases motivated by the aspiration to 
enhance popular control over government at all levels. Such struggles, initiated 
by non-state actors, over the nature and type of decentralisation are likely to be 
necessary in order to establish systems of decentralised governance that entrust 
downwardly accountable political representatives with the powers and resources 
to make a difference to local poverty .
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 A further twenty-eight districts were created through the sub-division of larger ones in 
July .
 Somewhat paradoxically, multi-partyism was re-introduced by the  Constitution for 
the presidential and parliamentary elections but not for local elections. District elections 
were held initially in / and subsequently in , ,  and , roughly 
mid-way through the national government cycle.
 Article  of the Local Government Act  states that elected Assembly members are 
required to:
 ‘Meet his [sic] electorate before each meeting of the District Assembly’; ‘Maintain close 
contact with his electoral area, consult his people on issues to be discussed in the District 
Assembly and collate their views, opinions and proposals… and present [these] to the 
District Assembly’; ‘Report to his electorate the general decisions of the District Assem-
bly and its Executive Committee and the actions he has taken to solve problems raised by 
residents in his electoral area’.
 Local Government Act , Article .
 Local Government Act , Article  ().
 There are five statutory sub-committees (finance and administration; development plan-
ning; social services; works; justice and security), plus each DA has the power to create 
others as appropriate.
 Formally the DCE is nominated by the President and approved by at least two-thirds of 
the Assembly members present [Local Government Act , Article  ()]. 
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 Only twelve (. per cent) of the current  DCEs are women (Vieta, : ). Only 
ten (. per cent) of the current DCEs do not come from the district in which they serve 
(Vieta, : ).
 Crook and Manor (: ) describe the DCE’s powers as ‘virtually unassailable’. 
 Ayee (: ) categorises the eighty-six functions into deconcentrated, delegated and 
devolved functions, with only relatively minor services being classified as devolved, for 
instance the maintenance of feeder roads, streets, parks and cemeteries. 
 PNDC Law  () stated that the twenty-two central government departments and 
agencies would be converted into departments of the District Assemblies, while the Local 
Government Act () stated that ‘There shall be established by Act of Parliament a Lo-
cal Government Service’ [Article ()], and that District Assemblies would establish the 
departments listed in schedule one [Article ()]. These included health, education and 
agriculture. 
 The DACF is then allocated between DAs on the basis of a revenue sharing formula ap-
proved annually by Parliament.
 This ratio would have been double were it not for the presence of two Cuban doctors on 
short-term contracts. Average figures for sub-Saharan Africa are given as one doctor for 
every , patients, in contrast to the . doctors for every , people in developed 
countries (NEPAD ).
 The original intent was to construct a baseline survey from existing data of the poverty 
profile in the districts either five or ten years ago. This was not possible, however, as the 
required data did not exist at district level. Although surveys had been undertaken, for 
example, the Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire Survey  and the Demographic 
and Health Survey , data had been aggregated up to regional and national levels and 
was not available at district level.
 Th e two district capitals comprised the ‘more developed’ category, both small towns with 
populations of less than , people. Th e other three categories comprised settlements 
whose deprivation tended to increase as access to trunk roads and size of population de-
creased. In the context of rural Ghana, the term ‘more developed’ is used as a relative concept.
 The household questionnaires were administered by two local enumerators from the eight 
communities, mostly teachers or other professionals. Enumerators undertook a random 
sample of households, stratified to include different geographical zones, and thus income 
groups, within the community. One further requirement was to include at least one and 
preferably two female-headed households in each batch of five questionnaires.
 Focus groups were conducted in the local language, with translation of responses into 
English by two notetakers. The discussions were organised through the Area Council 
secretary, with invitations extended to: the Assembly member (); Area Council repre-
sentative (); Unit Committee representative (); Traditional Authority (Chief, Queen 
Mother or elder) (); religious leaders ( Christian,  Muslim); women’s associations (); 
youth association (); community-based organisation ().
 Thirty-one interviews were conducted with a wide range of individuals involved in the 
District Assembly system, inclusive of Assembly members, central administration of-
ficials, and directors of the line departments. Interviewees included women Assembly 
members in what is a very male-dominated system.
 Almost three-quarters (. per cent) of respondents reported weekly household incomes 
of less than , Cedis (approximately US), with an average household size of . 
persons. One-third (. per cent) of households had weekly incomes of less than , 
Cedis ().
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 Interview with convenor of the Women and Gender Sub-committee, Asanama DA,  June 
.
 Interview with Assemblywomen, Bofano DA,  June .
 Interviews with District Planning Officer,  June , and Assemblywomen,  June 
, Bofano DA.
 Interviews with district officials, June .
 Two DMTDPs have been implemented so far, from - and -. The change 
of governing party at the December  general elections led to a delay and two-year gap 
in the planning process.
 Interview with District Planning Officer, Asanama,  May . He stated that the 
implementation rate of planned projects declined annually in the first MTDP (-), 
from  per cent in the first year to almost  per cent by the final year.
 Figures in Table  are actual amounts, with inflation not taken into account.
 At national level, DACF transfers totalled . billion Cedis for , . billion 
Cedis for , and . billion Cedis for , with the figure for  making up for 
the shortfall in . Averaged out the total transfers for  and  would be . 
billion Cedis per year.
 District accounts also show considerable financial outlay under the headings of entertain-
ment/protocol and the (DCE’s) residency.
 Stool land is customary or community land managed by traditional leaders (chiefs and 
elders) on behalf of the community.
 This was confirmed in interviews both with the directors of line departments and with 
DA officials, notably the District Finance Officers.
 Discussion with official from Decentralisation Secretariat, Ministry of Local Govern-
ment and Rural Development,  April .
 Only Crook and Sverrisson (: ) acknowledge that participation is a ‘somewhat im-
perfect indication of the degree of responsiveness’, one that is also dependent on account-
ability mechanisms.
 In another study, Blair () examined the two concepts of participation and account-
ability relatively independently. Participation was again linked directly to poverty reduc-
tion in a five-stage formula that moved from ‘participation’ to ‘representation’ to ‘empower-
ment’ to ‘benefits for all’ to ‘poverty reduction’ (Blair, : ), but without reference to 
accountability. Somewhat separately, various mechanisms of accountability were identi-
fied, especially those relatively external to decentralised structures and processes, such as 
political parties, civil society and the media. 
 A similar assumption tends to be made concerning the relationship between participation 
and empowerment. While ‘empowerment’ remains an overused and insufficiently defined 
term, participation and empowerment are often placed together as if the one stems from 
the other. For example, Jütting et al. (: -) assess empowerment through consid-
ering levels of ‘participation’ and of ‘local government capacity’, where the qualification on 
empowerment is not so much a disjuncture between participation and empowerment, but 
whether local governments have the capacity (i.e. the power and resources) to implement 
pro-poor policies. Similarly, Von Braun and Grote (: -) refer to ‘participation/
empowerment’ as if they were one and the same. 
 The  Constitution made no substantial changes to the  reforms, while the Local 
Government Act  (Act ) provided detailed regulations on the implementation of 
decentralisation. 
 These three means of assessing levels of political participation are similar to those used by 
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Crook and Manor (: ): voting, election campaigning and contacting or pressurising 
political representatives through individual or group activity.
 In Asanama, all forty-eight electoral areas were contested in both  and  elec-
tions, though with voter turnout decreasing from . per cent in  to . per cent 
in . In Bofano, the comparable figures for voter turnout were slightly higher at . 
per cent in  and . per cent in . Voter turnout in the two selected districts was 
higher than both the regional averages (. per cent in Brong Ahafo and . per cent in 
Ashanti) and the national average (. per cent) at the  District Assembly elections 
(Ayee : ). The decline in voter turnout in the two districts between  and  
reflected national trends, with national average turnout declining from . per cent in 
 to . per cent in  (Ayee, : ).
 Figures for Bofano were not so high. Here, forty-seven out of  Units were contested in 
, down from fifty-seven in . This remains not unimpressive, however, given that 
one candidate was required on average from every forty-one registered voters just for a 
Unit election to take place.
 Other studies do not report so positively about the enthusiasm for UC elections. For 
instance, Ayee and Amponsah (: -) report that only . per cent of respondents 
voted in UC elections in a survey conducted in three districts in August . This could 
be partly due, however, to many elections being uncontested rather than electoral apathy 
towards the UCs. 
 One hundred per cent of respondents in Asanama and . per cent in Bofano.
 These findings are remarkably similar to those of the eight-district survey, where  per 
cent of households said that the Assembly member had never met with constituents 
(Yankson : ).
 These findings confirm a number of other studies where decentralisation has led to in-
creased political participation, as noted by Devas and Grant (: ).
 Blair () also examines various mechanisms of accountability, such as political parties, 
civil society and the media. Rather differently, this study focuses on direct accountability 
mechanisms between citizen and local state, ones that are more integral to structures and 
processes of decentralisation in Ghana.
 Educational qualifications ranged from basic education certificates (indicating schooling 
up to junior secondary school level) to teaching certificates and degrees. As well as farmers 
and teachers, Assembly members came from other public sector occupations (e.g. health 
workers) and the private sector (e.g. cocoa buying companies, sawmills), with traditional 
rulers commonly as appointed members.
 This breakdown was most evident in Asanama, where only four out of thirteen Unit 
Committees remained functional. 
 Ayee and Amponsah (: ) also cite the non-payment of anticipated allowances as a 
key reason for the ‘disenchantment and frustration’ of UC members.
 For example, one Area Council in Bofano had been inaugurated in September  after 
the district-level elections, but had met only once up to June , while another had not 
met for over two years. Of the two Town Councils (in the district capitals), one was not 
functional at all, with the Secretary having ‘stopped working’ due to non-payment of sal-
ary, while the other was described as ‘hardly meeting’. 
 One AC Chair gave this reason as explaining his reluctance to convene meetings.
 See, for instance: Phillips (); Rai (); Ballington and Karam ().
 Interview with Presiding Member, Bofano District Assembly,  June .
 For example, Asanama’s Medium Term Development Plan - indicates substantial ex-
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penditure on the construction and refurbishment of Assembly buildings and an executive 
guest house (costing almost a quarter of a billion Cedis), while district accounts (trial bal-
ances for -) show considerable financial outlay under the headings of (the DCE’s) 
‘residency’ and ‘entertainment/protocol’.
 The exception was one small town from where the current DCE originated.
 Such fi ndings confi rmed those of research undertaken by the Brong-Ahafo District Support 
Project (). Th is found that the sub-committees in Asanama had not held regular meet-
ings over the period June  to April , excepting ‘Finance and Administration’. 
 Interview with sub-committee convenor,  June .
 Interview with sub-committee convenor,  June .
 The picture was somewhat better in Bofano, with more regular meetings held and ex-
penses paid. Interviews with convenors of seven sub-committees indicated that all had 
met at least twice in  and at least once by mid-. Meetings were still not frequent, 
however. 
 In its election manifesto of , the NPP stated an intent to introduce an elected DCE. Yet 
this pledge has not been fulfi lled, with the problem of constitutional reform cited, despite 
the NPP administration under President Kufuor now being in its second term (-).
 Frempong (: ) gives various examples of the closeness of the DCEs to the ruling 
party, for instance, standing later as candidates in parliamentary elections for the party 
that appointed them.
 Frempong (: ) also notes that ‘appointments have gone to reward the party faith-
ful’.
 Interviews with: District Director of the Ghana Education Service, Asanama District,  
June ; District Director of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MOFA), Asanama 
District,  June ; District Director of the Ghana Health Service, Bofano District, 
 June ; District Director of Ghana Education Services, Bofano District,  June 
.
 The district office of the GES inspects and reports on the state of school infrastructure , 
thus guiding the prioritisation of the DA’s building and repair programme. Interview with 
the District Director of the Ghana Education Service, Asanama District,  June .
 Interview with the District Director of the Ghana Health Service, Bofano District,  
June .
 Legislation was passed in the s, notably the Education Service Act and the Health 
Service Act, that contradicted the intentions of a decentralised civil service and kept these 
sectoral services under the control of their respective ministries in Accra (Ayee : 
-).
 The Kufuor administration pledged to raise the constitutional minimum to . per cent, 
but again this has not been implemented.
 Crook and Manor (: ) reported that  per cent of DA funds in Ghana were ex-
pended on recurrent expenditure in .
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5 Th e Impact of Decentralisation on Poverty in 
Tanzania 
Meine Pieter van Dijk
1. Introduction: What to Expect from Decentralisation ?
Decentralisation is an important part of political and administrative reform in 
many countries, including Tanzania . According to Lee and Gilbert (1999), an ac-
tive decentralisation policy is carried out in sixty-three of the seventy-five devel-
oping countries with more than 5 million inhabitants. The expectations of the 
political benefits include a strengthening of the democratisation process leading 
to new initiatives at the local level. Another important expectation is that decen-
tralisation will lead to a reduction in rural-urban disparities through providing 
employment and basic social services at the local level and thus diminish the 
high rate of rural-urban migration. This paper focuses on the extent to which 
decentralisation to both regional and local levels has contributed to the economic 
dynamics of the country in general and how it affects poverty in different regions 
of Tanzania in particular.
More power is now vested at the local level in Tanzania . Decentralisation may 
provide opportunities to local people to take initiatives and to formulate their 
own priorities. They should make their own participatory plans and prepare pro-
grammes, develop economic, social and environmental policies and generate more 
local revenues. Tanzania has a history of both centralisation and decentralisation 
trends. Prior to 1972 all sectoral ministries and the development planning process 
were centralised. In fact local governments were abolished in the early 1970s and 
re-introduced in 1982. However, a programme for enhancing the effectiveness of 
local government was only introduced in 1994. 
This contribution is divided into seven sections. Following this introduction 
and a theoretical section in section two, a brief history of decentralisation in 
Tanzania is provided in section three. In section four, the local government re-
form process is examined, while section five takes a closer look at the responsi-
bilities of the different levels of government, before trying to assess the reality of 
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decentralisation in section six. Here an effort is also made to test the different 
theories of decentralisation, while finally in section seven some conclusions are 
drawn.
2. Th e Th eoretical Framework
Decentralisation policies can provide economic opportunities for local govern-
ments and entrepreneurs (Van Dijk, 2006b). It is perceived as important for cre-
ating the conditions for the diffusion of economic growth at the local level,  focus-
ing on the enabling role of local government (Helmsing, 2000). It is claimed that 
decentralisation can help in three ways:
• It provides local people the opportunity to take various initiatives;
• It generates local taxes, thus making money available for local investment by 
local government. However, too much local tax collection can also work as a 
disincentive for the private sector;
• It allows local governments to develop policies to undertake more develop-
ment activities.
These claims are often not supported by empirical evidence. Many other fac-
tors are at play simultaneously and there is often a difference between how the 
rules of the game have been formulated and how the game is played (for Ghana 
see Laryea-Adjei, 2006). This contribution focuses on the results of decentrali-
sation and in particular on the effects of decentralisation on poverty reduction . 
Besides the expectations mentioned (the evidence is presented in 6.1. and 6.2.), 
three other issues are examined:
• Can decentralisation contribute to poverty alleviation and reduce rural-urban 
disparities (2.1. and 6.3.)?
• What type of decentralisation can be found in Tanzania (2.2. and 6.4.)?
• What is the role of the urban or regional managers in the decentralisation 
process (2.3. and 6.5.)?
2.1. Poverty alleviation through income transfers, service provision or 
employment of opportunities?
Tanzania has undertaken important steps in the field of decentralisation. The 
country has been growing at more than 6 per cent per year during recent years. 
In this chapter we want to analyse what the effects have been on poverty in the 
different regions. The research is part of a larger project (Van Dijk, 2006a). The 
issues addressed in that study were: why did poverty alleviation happen in Dar es 
Salaam and hardly in the rest of the country? What are the transmission mecha-
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nisms distributing the positive effects of economic growth over different cities 
and regions and how does this economic growth affect the poor in other cities 
and rural areas? One of the explanations pursued was that growth was distrib-
uted through decentralisation, which contributed to urban dynamics and affected 
poverty in this way. The consequences for Dar es Salaam and the capitals of the 
Kilimanjaro and Arusha region were analysed in particular, putting Tanzania in 
the context of the globalisation process. Regions do not just depend on the capital 
and neighbouring regions, but also on what happens in neighbouring countries 
and what comes and goes to countries as far away as China . This globalisation 
process affects the competitiveness of its formal and informal sectors, but it can 
be shown that globalisation also provides new opportunities.
Poverty alleviation at the local level is possible in three diff erent ways: income 
transfers, developing services and infrastructure , or creating employment at the 
local level. Th e importance of these instruments will be reviewed in the empirical 
part of the chapter. Th e grants for local governments described in section 6.3 are 
examples of income transfers, as are the remittances analysed in that section. Parts 
of these grants are meant for infrastructure such as roads and water supply and are 
examples of the second way of reaching the poor. We attach a lot of importance to 
the third type of instrument, which can be used by urban and regional managers, 
if given enough autonomy to care for the regional and urban economy. Such eff orts 
to create employment are described in sections 6.2 and 6.3.
2.2. Deconcentration , delegation or devolution , monopoly or pluralism?
We distinguish two main approaches to analysing decentralisation in developing 
countries, which can be combined. In the first place the Type-Function Frame-
work (TFF ) by Cheema and Rondinelli (1983) and secondly the Administrative 
Design Framework (ADF ) developed by Cohen and Peterson (1999).
Cheema and Rondinelli (1983) provide the following definition of decentrali-
sation: ‘The transfer of authority and responsibility for public functions from the 
central government to subordinate or quasi-independent government organisa-
tions or the private sector’. Cheema and Rondinelli (1983) define three forms of 
decentralisation: political (giving the local level more power in decision making), 
fiscal (allowing it to have adequate revenues) and administrative decentralisation 
(redistributing administrative authority), which tend to come in certain combi-
nations. The TFF analyses decentralisation according to forms and types (decon-
centration , delegation and devolution ). By this approach, decentralisation is clas-
sified by forms on the basis of objectives: political, market, fiscal, spatial and 
administrative. The combination of forms results in certain types of decentrali-
sation. The TFF argues that various combinations of the main forms of decen-
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tralisation, political, administrative and fiscal decentralisation, result in different 
types of decentralisation: deconcentration, delegation and devolution.
The ADF identifies ‘states’ that describe how concentrated the roles of govern-
ment still are:
• Institutional Monopoly, or centralisation , where roles are concentrated at the 
spatial centre in an organisation or institution;
• Distributed Institutional Monopoly, or decentralisation to local level govern-
mental institutions or private sector firms and organisations through decon-
centration , devolution , and/or delegation, where roles are distributed spatially 
but remain concentrated in one organisation or institution; 
• Institutional pluralism, or decentralisation through deconcentration , devolu-
tion , and/or delegation, but where roles are shared by two or more organisa-
tions or institutions, which can be at the spatial centre, distributed, or a com-
bination of both.
The ADF suggests that various combinations of roles in service provision result 
in an institutional monopoly, distributed monopoly or pluralism at centralised 
or decentralised levels of governance. A combination of these two frameworks 
provides a conceptual framework for the analysis. It implies that the forms and 
types of decentralisation shape central-local relations. The distribution of roles 
determines whether service provision, for example, is mainly through monopoly 
or plural arrangements (see Figure 1). The resulting institutional arrangements 
influence the performance of local governments in the provision of services. For 
example, where pluralism emerges at the decentralised level of government, it will 
yield better performance than in the case of distributed monopoly (Laryea-Adjei, 
2006). The underlying idea is that decentralised decision-making can contribute 
considerably to improving the provision of urban services. 
Figure 1: Theoretical states of decentralisation and distribution of roles
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The theoretical framework developed by Cheema and Rondinelli (the Type-
Function Framework, or TFF ) is more structure oriented, while the Adminis-
trative Design Framework (ADF ) suggested by Cohen and Peterson (1999) em-
phasises the basic principles of administration (accountability , effectiveness and 
efficiency) and focuses more on the roles of different levels of government.
2.3. Th e autonomy of the urban/regional manager
The new public management theory (or NPM ) is often advocated as an ap-
proach to making public organisations function better. Autonomy and ac-
countability are key concepts of the NPM theory, a theory that is revolution-
ising public management by putting the emphasis on contracts and stressing 
the importance of market orientation and customer orientation. Van Dijk 
(2006b) evaluates decentralisation from an urban manager’s perspective and 
stresses that autonomy means being able to formulate and implement eco-
nomic, social and environmental policies at the local level. On top of that, the 
urban manager needs to be able to generate the financial means necessary to 
implement the strategy developed in cooperation with the major stakeholders. 
It is suggested to check whether the urban or regional managers (functioning 
just below the political and highest administrative level in the regions and 
districts), given their importance in the decentralisation process, can develop 
and implement local economic, social and environmental policies. Finally, the 
question is: do these lower levels of government have access to the necessary 
financial means? Only if he or she has some autonomy with respect to these 
challenges can an urban or regional manager be fully effective at lower levels 
of government.
3. A Short History of Decentralisation in Tanzania 
Decentralisation in Tanzania has a somewhat unusual history. Paradoxically, lo-
cal government was abolished in 1972 by the so-called ‘Decentralisation of Gov-
ernment Administration Act ’, replacing local government with district and urban 
development councils and regional development councils. These bodies were bu-
reaucratic organisations dominated by centrally appointed officials. In 1982, local 
government was re-established in Tanzania through a series of Local Govern-
ment Acts. A policy of decentralisation was subsequently introduced in the 1990s, 
linked to the civil service reform programme, with more power devolved to local 
authorities who became responsible for the provision of many public goods and 
social services.
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Decentralisation was effectively initiated by the Regional Administration Act 
No. 19 of 1997. Through this Act, the government devolved more powers to local 
government authorities (LGAs ) through the reduction of central government 
presence at the regional level and provided resources to strengthen and enable the 
LGAs  to assume full responsibility for socio-economic development. The deci-
sion to delegate powers and decision-making process to LGAs  entailed funda-
mental changes, ones which required central government to establish supportive 
frameworks and programmes. In view of this, the government introduced two 
major reform programmes under its Public Sector Reform Programme: the Re-
gional Administration Restructuring Programme (RARP) and the Local Gov-
ernment Reform Programme (LGRP ), discussed in detail below.
Local governments collect the development levy, land tax and a ‘cess’ (an ad-
ditional turnover tax or levy on the value-added tax of 0.3 per cent), while for 
national government the income, consumption (VAT of 20 per cent) and import 
duties are very important. The Ministry of Finance is responsible for tax reform. 
The tax system has also been made slightly easier by abolishing a number of taxes 
or taking them away from local government and by providing an income transfer 
to local governments instead. Central government also removed the stamp duty, 
but it came back under the income tax.  The value added tax (VAT) is a hot issue 
because business people consider the rate too high. People do not see that it is 
deductible. However, local governments have done a better job in tax collection 
since 1998 (Heymans and Kumar, 2002).
4. Th e Roles of Diff erent Levels of Government
We distinguish between the roles of diff erent institutions and look at their func-
tions and responsibilities before assessing how the system actually functions. Of-
ten there is a discrepancy between the system on paper and how it works in prac-
tice.  Like most countries, Tanzania has the system of trias politica: there is the 
legislature, the judiciary and the executive branch. Central and local governments 
form the executive part. Th e executive part of the central and local governments 
operates at various levels. Th e village level is a corporate body in Tanzania, mean-
ing they can pass by-laws; but the wards, which are just an administrative arrange-
ment, are not. Th ere are two political levels in Tanzania (the elected politicians at 
the national and the local council levels; some of the elected councillors represent 
wards) and three administrative levels (the national bureaucracy, the regional and 
local level bureaucrats). Th e division between a council and a ward is only an ad-
ministrative arrangement. Th e actual relationships between central government 
institutions and local government structures will be discussed in section six.
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4.1. Th e national level
At this level, the president, who is also the commander-in-chief of the armed 
forces, is head of state. The vice president, the prime minister, union ministers 
and ministers, who form the cabinet, support the president. The sector ministries 
are headed by ministers and are mainly responsible for policy formulation, plan-
ning and implementation of sector development plans. As an example, the new 
poverty programme of the government has singled out malaria, tuberculosis and 
HIV/AIDS as priority diseases to fight. In the framework of the Millennium 
Development Goals , maternal and infant mortality will also get some attention. 
However, the health systems in the districts are very important and the challenge 
is how the national level can provide incentives to the local level to implement 
such programmes.
4.2. Th e regional level 
The Regional Commissioner (RC) is the representative of the president at the 
regional level. The Regional Administrative Secretary (RAS), who is the head 
of the Regional Administration Secretariat, supports the RC. Both the RC and 
RAS are central government appointees. The RC oversees law and order and 
good governance.  The Regional Administration Secretariat is very small and has 
just a regulatory function. Its role could be summarized as:
• Interpreting national policies and plan guidelines to the various actors based 
in the region;
• Coordinating the planning and budgeting exercise in Local Government Au-
thorities (LGAs ) within the regions;
• Supporting LGAs to effectively and efficiently discharge their responsibilities 
and improving public service delivery .
One notes the emphasis on law and order and interpreting national policies to 
determine their impact for the local level. However, law and order and good gov-
ernance are important and the RC supports the LGA to discharge its responsi-
bilities. Further discussion of the RAS is provided in section five.
4.3. Th e local level
Tanzania has rural and urban districts. The District Commissioner (DC) is as-
sisted by the District Administrative Secretary (DAS), who heads the district 
administration. Again, both are central government appointees. The DC coordi-
nates and supervises all government functions at the district level, which mainly 
centres on the maintenance of law and order. Before the re-introduction of LGAs , 
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the office of DC was the centre of development activities within the district. 
With the re-establishment of LGAs in 1982 and 1984, the role of the DC’s office 
changed from focusing on development activities to the maintenance of law and 
order.
Each municipality is divided into divisions, which are in turn divided into 
wards. Wards are divided into villages in the case of rural areas and ‘mata’ in the 
case of urban areas. Moreover, villages are divided into hamlets, which are the 
smallest units. The divisions are the lowest organ under central government struc-
ture and are headed by a Division Secretary (DS), another central government 
appointee. One of his/her duties is to assist the DC in ensuring the maintenance 
of law and order in the division. A geographical unit is given the status of city or 
village if they can organise themselves. But becoming a village also means having 
more autonomy. If the region was strong that would defeat the idea of decentrali-
sation. The cities, given their role in development, should be strong. 
The local government is headed by the Minister of State responsible for 
Regional Administration and Local Government under the President’s Office, 
which was created in 2000. The major responsibilities of this President’s Office 
with respect to local government are to:
• Prepare policies on regional development for the regions in general;
• Manage and administer local government affairs at the national level; and 
• Co-ordinate the activities of the Regional Secretariats and Local Government 
Authorities in the country.
There are ninety-eight Rural District Councils (RDCs) and twenty-one Ur-
ban Councils (UCs) in mainland Tanzania (2004). The two types of councils do 
not differ much with respect to functions, organisations and committee struc-
tures. The RDCs operate at three levels: district, ward and village. The general 
public elects the members of District and Village Councils every five years. The 
RDCs are considered as appropriate focal points for planning, implementation, 
evaluation and monitoring of development programmes since local communities 
(and villages) are represented at this level through their elected representatives. 
Also it is at this level where priority needs and constraints on development can 
be identified and solutions be formulated. In addition, sector departments are 
brought together at this level under the chairmanship of the appointed District 
Executive Director, an appointed official who can help to coordinate activities. 
The set-up is part of a planned process where the centre is trying to stimulate 
initiative at the regional level, but at the same time tries to control the process 
from above.
There are about 580 wards in the country (mainland Tanzania ). Ward Devel-
opment Committees (WDCs) , under the chairmanship of a Ward Executive Sec-
retary (WES) assisted by Ward Extension Officers (WEOs), are responsible for 
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scrutinising and consolidating project proposals from villages within their juris-
diction into Ward Development Plans (WDP) before submission to their respec-
tive District/Urban Council. Many of the WDC’s function properly and they are 
often the only decision-making bodies in the rural areas. The local government 
grant system is helping them. They sometimes get directions to undertake certain 
activities. The Tanzanian Guardian (11 July 2005) mentioned for example that 
wards were ‘directed (by the RC) to build secondary schools in Lindi ’. 
There are over 8,000 villages in the country. A village is the lowest level in the 
hierarchical administrative set up of the LGAs . Each village is supposed to have a 
village council, whose responsibilities include the formulation of a socio-econom-
ic plan for the entire village and supervision of its implementation. The village 
plans are submitted to the WDC for scrutiny and consolidation into the WDP.
5. Local Government Reform Programmes
Higher regional growth requires the upgrading of technology, the development 
of human resources and development and reforms at the local government level. 
So far most of the reforms have concentrated on government at the national level. 
The original public reform programme included civil service reform, parastatal 
sector reform and financial and planning system reform. The Civil Service Re-
form Programme included five components: ministerial organisation and effi-
ciency reviews, pay reform, personnel control and management, administrative 
capacity building , retrenchment and redeployment of staff. A sixth component, 
focusing on local government reform was added in the 1994 Action Plan and was 
smaller than the other components. The reform process started by 1996 and over 
ten years later we can try to assess some of its effects.
Implementation of the Regional Administration Restructuring Programme 
(RARP) mentioned above has been completed. The Local Government Reform 
Programme (LGRP starting in 1999) is still being implemented. The Regional 
Administration Secretariats (RASs) are expected to have two major roles, name-
ly an administrative role and a development role. The administrative role of the 
regional secretariat encourages the maintenance of peace and order in the region 
and the administration of the internal operations of the office. The development 
role is the main function of the Regional Administration and focuses on sup-
porting capacity building within LGAs in order to improve service delivery , both 
efficiency and effectiveness. 
Thus, the Regional Administration Secretariat is expected to provide the fol-
lowing services (Van Dijk, 2006a):
• Management support services which focus on areas of local government ad-
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ministration and finance, planning and economic analysis, legal matters, audit-
ing and community development;
• Economic development supports services that focus on production-related 
activities in agriculture, livestock, commerce, industry and natural resource 
sectors;
• Physical planning and engineering services which focus on support to infra-
structure and management activities entailing support for and regulation of 
technical designs, surveys, civil engineering and land development; and
• Social sector support services which focus on development activities in the 
health, education and social welfare sectors in the regions.
Under the LGRP , the Tanzanian Government formulated and endorsed the vi-
sion of the future of the Local Government Authority (LGA) system in 1996. The 
features of the vision, as elaborated in the Local Government Reform Agenda of 
1996-2000, were:
• Largely autonomous institutions, with freedom to make policy and operation-
al decisions consistent with government policies without interference by the 
central government institutions;
• Strong and effective institutions, which possess the resources and authority 
necessary for effective performance of mandated roles and functions;
• Democratically governed, whereby their leaders are chosen through a full 
democratic process;
• Fostering participatory development by facilitating the participation of the 
people in planning and executing their development programmes, similarly 
fostering partnership with civil groups;
• Reflecting local demands and conditions that take into account the demands 
on its service by the local people and the socio-economic environment prevail-
ing in the area; and
• Conducting their activities in a transparent manner and being accountable to 
the people. 
Consequently, the overall goal of the LGRP is to improve the quality of and ac-
cess to public services provided through or facilitated by LGAs . There are several 
components, each of which aim to contribute to the achievement of this goal. The 
objectives of the components include:
• Governance: to establish broad-based community awareness of and participa-
tion in the reform process and to promote principles of democracy, transpar-
ency and accountability . Activities to improve governance are undertaken with 
the Zonal Reform Team of the local government.
• Restructuring of local authorities: to increase the effectiveness of local au-
thorities in delivering quality services in a sustainable manner.
• Finance: to increase the resources available to local authorities and improve 
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the efficiency of their use.
• Human resources development: to increase the accountability and efficiency 
of human resource use at local authority level. 
• Institutional and Legal Framework: to establish the enabling legislation, which 
will support the effective implementation of the reform measures. 
The launch of the LGRP in 1999 was a promising sign that the central gov-
ernment is gradually devolving more power to LGAs and even supplies the nec-
essary finance. The LGRP deals with the transformation of the local govern-
ment system. The purpose is to improve services for the poor. The major areas 
of the programme are education , health, roads, water and human development. 
The programme helps to restructure the organisational structure of local govern-
ments and has a special financial support component for local government, which 
works with grants, not dictated by the centre, but based on priorities planned by 
the people, reflecting their priorities. 
The Local Government Support Project (LGSP ) was created in 2002 to fi-
nance decentralisation. It receives support from the World Bank and other do-
nors.  This financial support entitles donors to sit on the steering committee, 
which meets every six months. They are folding their programmes into budget 
support. The LGSP can give grants. In principle the money is distributed equally, 
on the basis of population, (70 per cent), poverty (20 per cent) and size/area (10 
per cent). For the second half of 2004, 50 per cent of available finance went to the 
councils and 50 per cent to the village level.
The LGRP undertook studies on financing local government (for example, 
Franzsen et al., 2002; Franzsen, 2004). Initially, the programme started with 
twenty-four local governments, trying to enhance their capacity to collect more 
money. Secondly, the programme then discussed how to share grants from the 
central government on a fairer basis. A formula has been developed, based on 
the level of education , health, agricultural and road development and available 
drinking water. The programme wants to make this formula more transparent, 
engender realistic planning and help local governments to determine their own 
priorities. It boils down to a systemic reform and the programme also helps with 
revenue enhancement.
There is also a local government grant system, which can help local govern-
ments financially. The LGSP can provide capital grants and capacity building 
grants. If a city or local government does not qualify at the present time, it may 
receive technical assistance. On top of this money there is also the Tanzanian 
Social Action Fund , which is independent, but can help financially. The LGSP 
can also provide an analysis of the situation and suggest training components to 
deal with the issues that emerge. The project has a website, www.poralg.go.tz, and 
there was a predecessor project, including private sector development in water 
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and electricity. Solid waste is also an activity which the project supported, for 
instance by providing vehicles for emptying pit latrines. The LGSP helped to 
change the formula for grants, with 70 per cent based now on population, 10 per 
cent on area size and the rest on the poverty level.
Besides the LGSP , there is also the Local Government Capital Develop-
ment Grant (LGCDG ) project. Several donors are development partners in the 
project. They participate in the board meetings, which are held on a quarterly 
basis. There is also a local government technical committee and a steering com-
mittee, both meeting quarterly. They help them to make well-informed decisions, 
and the steering committee approved the first release of funds in the first half of 
2005. The grants of the local government urban sector rehabilitation project are 
distributed over the country. 
The LGCDG project remains ongoing, with reviews every three years.  The 
project also supported the development of strategic plans at the local level and 
the citywide plan has beeen published more recently. This was promoted in Dar 
es Salaam under the Sustainable Cities Programme of the UN Habitat Organi-
sation, which started in 1992. These initiatives certainly help to make finance 
available at the local level for development activities. They contribute to spread-
ing development in Tanzania as was shown for the three municipalities of Dar es 
Salaam and in two regions: Arusha and Kilimanjaro (Van Dijk, 2006a).
6. Th e Evidence: What Actually Happens in Tanzania 
Opinions on the effects of decentralisation differ very much. Few people consider 
it a major driver for change, if only because it has been in place for a relatively 
short time. Can decentralisation stimulate local governments to improve their 
development efforts? We will now try to evaluate decentralisation in Tanzania , 
using the criteria formulated above. As mentioned, many benefits are expected 
from decentralisation, in particular greater democratisation and new initiatives 
(6.1), improved management at the local level (6.2) and a reduction of rural-urban 
disparities (6.3). Evidence will be presented on these three points in the following 
three sub-sections.
6.1. Democratisation and new initiatives?
The implementation of the decentralisation strategy in Tanzania after 1997 was 
not totally satisfactory (Steffensen et al., 2004; Mitullah, 2005). Many short-
comings were noted, partly because central government continued to maintain a 
strong presence at regional level. However the process has strengthened the de-
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mocratisation process by introducing mechanisms of accountability and by forc-
ing local governments to compete for funds.
There are advantages and disadvantages to decentralisation. Regions and dis-
tricts need an economic basis to support decentralisation. However, it is always 
preferable to make local officials responsible and accountable through elections . 
The good thing is that the politicians now know they will be held accountable 
for what they have promised. In addition, the new president appointed a large 
number of regional leaders after coming to power in 2006, replacing a large 
number not considered clean or effective.  In August 2006 a meeting of regional 
leaders was held for the second time in Arusha . The president delivered an im-
portant speech and this event shows that the national authorities are taking de-
centralisation more seriously. The president addressed the meeting for two hours 
suggesting a code of conduct, which made it very explicit that a great deal is 
expected from these regional leaders. The Arusha meeting is highly relevant and 
will get a follow-up. His speech and the suggestions made, reproduced in the local 
press, concerning the importance of decentralisation provided political support 
for people active in District and Village Councils.
Other examples of new initiatives are as follows. Since their creation the three 
municipalities in Dar es Salaam have been active in developing economic poli-
cies, for example providing land and infrastructure . Other local governments 
have been able to do something about solid waste collection.  One of the most 
remarkable achievements of Tanzania is the improved accountancy system for 
decentralised projects. One problem was that many of the most qualified people 
were at the central level. However, the Ministry of Finance has now trained 400 
accountants for auditing rural development projects.
6.2. Improved management at the local level?
Some argue that there is not enough infrastructure outside the capital to al-
low economic take-off. Infrastructure delivers inputs to farms, helps to mar-
ket agricultural produce, distributes raw materials and facilitates both domestic 
and international trade. There is a direct link between economic development 
and the growth rate of infrastructure. The rehabilitation of physical infrastruc-
ture, particularly the trunk and regional roads under the Integrated Road Pro-
gramme (IRP) after 1997 significantly improved marketing networks. Recently 
the government has been working on the privatisation of the railroads, which 
will hopefully lead to improved functioning and could also be a big boost for the 
harbour of Dar es Salaam and links with the hinterland. Although initiated by 
the national level, infrastructure is on the top of the list of priorities of the local 
governments.
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A lot of money is spent in Tanzania on improving infrastructure and transport 
(World Bank , 2006). Transport contributes to poverty alleviation by assuring 
cost-effective transport of goods and people. It also links the country to the global 
economy and assists neighbouring landlocked countries to connect to the world. 
The World Bank (2006) provides an overview of the transport infrastructure and 
its management. One can observe more infrastructure being built and improved 
transport to and from rural areas, thus contributing to their development (see 
also Tables 1 and 2).
The Agriculture Sample Census 2002/03 (National Bureau of Statistics 
[NBS], 2006) shows some improvement in assets in the rural areas. The higher 
levels of regional economic growth in recent years are related to decentralisation 
(Table 1). They are the cumulative positive effects of the infrastructure built by 
different levels of government and of the higher levels of expenditure of local 
governments. Together these factors have contributed to higher regional growth 
figures. Regional budgets and tax revenues give an indication of how much is 
spent in different regions (Table 2). However, there is also direct central govern-
ment support to regions, for example by setting up offices in specific regions.
An effect of decentralisation is that more regional initiatives are taking place 
as has been shown by a comparison between Arusha and Kilimanjaro regions 
(Van Dijk, 2006a). Picking two regions in the north led to the conclusion that the 
Arusha region benefits more from decentralisation because it is better managed. 
The region is not only benefitting from tourism and migration into the region, 
but also from agriculture and trade links with Kenya and Uganda . Wheat, coffee 
and flowers (ten Dutch horticulturalists and at least one Frenchman) plus min-
ing can all be mentioned, although the latter concerns mainly some small-scale 
activities. Tourism is an activity which takes place outside Dar es Salaam . The 
continuously increasing number of tourists has had a positive impact on demand 
for rural goods and services.
6.3. Reducing rural-urban disparities?
The Economic Survey 2004 (United Republic of Tanzania [URT], 2005) reports 
on regional inequalities by giving the regional distribution of projects coming 
through the Tanzania Investment Centre . It indicates that Dar es Salaam region 
led with 262 projects, followed by Arusha with seventy-nine projects. Other re-
gions that attracted investors were Kilimanjaro (twenty-one projects); Mwanza 
(twenty); Mtwara (nine); and Shinyanga (eight); Morogoro , Mbeya and Iringa 
regions, registered seven projects each; Pwani , Lindi and Mara five each; Tanga 
region registered four projects; Dodoma , Kigoma and Tabora two projects each; 
and Kagera , Rukwa and Manyara one project each; while Ruvuma and Singida 
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did not get any projects. Some registered projects, however, have branches in 
more than one region. The list shows a strong concentration of projects in just a 
few regions. Table 1 below gives the per capita income figures at current prices for 
the five regions mentioned.
Table 1: Per capita income data for the fi ve regions at current prices
 In thousand T.Sh. per year.
Region 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Arusha 61 74 96 124 149 177 201 227 252 279 304 294 356
Dares-
Salaam
142 171 226 267 311 371 435 492 518 556 589 616 634
Kagera 
region
32 39 50 65 79 95 109 123 140 150 161 225 227
Kigoma 32 41 53 68 82 99 113 127 134 155 126 205 206
Kiliman-
jaro 
40 47 59 74 86 101 117 132 139 153 255 307 376
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2006).
Th e national accounts of Tanzania (NBS, 2006) give the regional per capita 
GDP at current prices from 1992 until 2004 (Table 1). In 1992, the Kagera region 
had the lowest per capita GDP (32,024 TSh.), while in 2004 Kigoma scores lowest 
(206,359 TSh.). More importantly Dar es Salaam ’s per capita income in 1992 was 
four-and-a-half times the per capita income of Kagera, while in 2004 its per capita 
GDP was only three times that of Kigoma, and less than three times that of Kagera, 
suggesting a more equal income distribution and a substantial growth of per capita 
GDP in current prices in the diff erent regions, due to decentralisation and eco-
nomic growth. As we will show in Table 3, remittances from rural to urban and 
from urban to rural areas also contribute to regional and rural development. Th e 
Kilimanjaro region scores relatively well, partially because a decreasing population 
is using the same quantity of resources and receives considerable remittances.
 What more do we know about the financial flows to the local governments? 
How much donor support gets beyond Dar es Salaam ? The LGRP has published 
financial statistics for the period 2000-2004 that give an impression of the im-
portance of grants and own sources of revenue for the Arusha and Dar es Salaam 
regions, which are reproduced in Tables 2a and 2b. Decentralisation has certainly 
contributed to the rapid development of the Arusha region as can be noted from 
the increased revenues from grants and different taxes.
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Table 2a: Grants and own sources of revenue for Arusha 
 In thousand T.Sh. per year.
Arusha 
Category 2001 2002 2003 2004
Education grant 5961112 8362870 9073650 4727457
Health grant 1234230 1127381 1622756 1071726
Road grant 357298 479867 474594 60407
Water grant 103948 96406 144706 125241
Agric. grant 23179 394313 432321 78421
Local adm. grant 516785 632272 611336 583298
Other grants 656517 1332014 1634541 1360326
Basket funds 417212 4427109 1532410 1762506
Compensation 0 0 452970 412704
Total grants 9270281 16852232 15979284 10182088
Development levy 389568 341927 60048 0
Property tax 208392 392318 272161 250970
Other levies 170366 167106 125009 42242
Service levies 196629 150332 316637 274337
Land rent 1848 21464 7833 44717
License fees 701619 655730 752647 269037
Various charges 271670 258517 274624 304158
Other 749375 185220 331633 22881
Total Own Revenue 2689466 2172614 2140593 1158342
Grand Total 11959747 19024846 18119878 11340430
Source: United Republic of Tanzania (2005).
 Tables 2a above and 2b below also show that the most important grants to local 
governments are for education , but the grants can vary substantially over the years. 
Th e total amount of grants is important, however. It reaches between four and 
nine times the own sources of revenues in Arusha , while the total of grants is be-
tween two and one-and-a-half times the own source revenues in Dar es Salaam . 
The total financial resources for the Dar es Salaam region are only two times 
what the Arusha region can spend. The most important own source of revenue 
in Arusha is the development levy (until 2004) and currently different charges, 
while the most important own source of revenue in Dar es Salaam is service levies 
and other levies, with licence fees and permits in second place. Finally, one notes 
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Dar es Salaam 
Category 2001 2002 2003 2004
Education grant 8106223 10508917 12292088 5504412
Health grant 2181286 2585499 2697401 1352899
Road grant 534870 550636 354549 1327925
Water grant 140741 292658 184465 115733
Agric. grant 52692 54365 47324 22848
Local adm. grant 448451 622851 1387778 345800
Other grants 1371969 5155903 2930478 1076065
Basket funds 1231144 1613886 3011175 699367
Compensation 0 0 1333056 1158558
Total grants 14067376 21424716 24238314 11603607
Development levy 2045401 1995142 859328 0
Property tax 1514026 1662982 1583749 1197029
Other levies 525751 567769 499471 155035
Service levies 4044272 4519950 5317695 2804136
Land rent 0 0 0 0
License fees 4014847 4699216 4923033 1339991
Various charges 1038080 1590824 1759498 551417
Other 422931 649800 513118 489136
Total Own Revenue 13605308 15685684 15455892 6536743
Grand Total 27672683 37110399 39694206 18140350
that there are a large number of targeted block grants and that there are many 
different own sources of revenue. Instead of continuing with so many different 
sources of revenue, the system may benefit from more focus, introducing for ex-
ample a single development or property tax .
Urban-rural income transfers take place, although on a limited scale. The ef-
fects on the income distribution between the rural and urban areas can be seen 
in Table 1 and Table 4. The development of infrastructure and services in the re-
gions is also happening, although only on a limited scale, while the government’s 
role in creating employment opportunities is even more limited. The following 
table gives an impression of remittances.
Source: United Republic of Tanzania (2005).
Table 2b: Grants and own sources of revenue for Dar es Salaam 
 In thousand T.Sh. per year.
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Table 3: Remittances as a contribution to total monthly income per household
Source/Location Dar es Salaam Other urban Rural Mainland Tanzania 
Remittances 3,664 3,165 2,719 2,835
As % of total income 3.5 3.2 2.1 2.4
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2002).
The figures are relatively low, but this is partially because information on remit-
tances is difficult to collect (do people remember all the remittances received and 
are they willing to disclose them?), and partially because the household budget 
study only publishes net amounts. The positive effects of decentralisation are 
the result of a combination of improved infrastructure and service delivery and 
some local employment creation due to higher government expenditure and more 
liberal economic policies.
6.4. Deconcentration , delegation or devolution , monopoly or pluralism?
Central government continues to maintain a strong presence at the regional 
level. The process of decentralisation was originally administrative deconcen-
tration to a large extent, where the Regional Administration Secretariat had 
an important role in keeping law and order. At the same time there seems to 
be legal and sectoral centralisation . Cohen and Peterson (1999) draw attention 
to one form of decentralisation, which they call distributed institutional mo-
nopoly. The latter refers to a situation where roles are distributed spatially but 
are still concentrated in one organisation or institution (quadrant III in Figure 
1, or the ‘decentralised monopolist’). OECD (1996) argues that decentralisation 
in Africa in the 1970s meant deconcentration of the national administration 
and strengthening of the regional administration. In countries with a one-party 
government, power had often been centralised and decentralisation was only 
promoted as a reaction to the economic stagnation of the 1980s, after the oil 
and debt crises. However, locally-elected bodies tend to have limited capacity 
and funds and were often unable to carry out the functions transferred to them. 
How much autonomy do urban and regional managers really have? This is the 
topic of section 6.5.
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6.5. Th e autonomy of urban/regional managers
 economic policies
Are local authorities formulating economic policies at the district level? Most 
experts interviewed noted that this is desirable, but not yet the case. Most re-
gional officials do not seem to consider this as their responsibility yet. However, 
there are big differences from region to region as far as the formulation of local 
economic policies and the development of local economic activities is concerned, 
as can be illustrated by the comparison between the Arusha and Kilimanjaro 
regions, where the former promotes economic activities in a more systematic way 
and with more success. However, promoting economic activities is not yet a policy 
at the local level, whereas supplying more facilities/services provision is.
As far as economic policies are concerned, the local governments implement the 
policies formulated at the national level, but also come up with their own ideas, 
such as raising their own taxes or creating boarding schools. How to do this is a lo-
cal decision. It may go as far as deciding what to grow, for example, the choice to go 
for developing horticulture in the Arusha region. In particular local governments in 
Dar es Salaam have initiated some local economic development policies within the 
national development policy , which may provide an example for the regions.
Decentralisation resulted in more competitive municipalities, for example in 
Dar es Salaam . However, also the example of Arusha doing much better than the 
Kilimanjaro region is an illustration of what is possible within the framework 
of decentralisation. It managed for instance to attract a number of international 
organisations, new firms and foreign investors. Finally it can be expected that 
decentralisation will lead to better regional and urban governance if the meetings 
of regional leaders continue.
 social and environmental policies
Do local governments also have the autonomy to formulate social and environ-
mental policies? No: at the moment the local governments implement social and 
environmental legislation, but have no local social and environmental policies. 
However, Tanzania has a tradition of pro-poor rural policies and that may start 
to pay off (Owen and Teal, 2005). Although the local governments mainly imple-
ment national policies, they could pass their own by-laws at the local level. A drop 
in poverty can be seen in Table 4, in particular in Dar es Salaam , but also in the 
other urban areas and even in the rural areas. The data on income distribution 
suggested that it remains skewed but has improved somewhat. The LGSP project 
expenditure compensates to some extent for the existing inequalities by spending 
more in less developed regions.
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Table 4: Poverty reduction between 1991 and 2001
Variable Dar es 
Salaam 




Working age (15-64) 
Younger people 























Average household is 
smaller in Dar 
Largest share 
working age in
Dar es Salaam 
More in 15-44 range
2.4% of household 
budget
Various sources, see Van Dijk (2006a: 9).
 fiscal decentralisation
Do the local governments have enough money to spend on development efforts? 
The Local Government Support Programme makes funds available according to 
local governments’ capacity to absorb money and the quality of their proposals. 
Expenditure is currently 90 per cent of their budgeted funds, so the LGSP has 
never had funding problems. Local government plans are prepared with popular 
participation over a period of three to four months, and then submitted to the 
LGSP . If approved, a memorandum of understanding is drawn up, specifying that 
so much money is committed in this plan period. However, in case of an emer-
gency, the LGSP can also provide assistance. The main instrument is finance and 
hence the LGSP discusses funding at the village level. This avoids confusion if 
there are too many donors active at the local level. 
At the local government level the property tax has a great potential and the 
private sector needs to be sensitised as to how the system works. Borrowing by 
local governments is another option for the future, but of course it commits the 
next generation. Grant funding (section five) generally aims to improve service 
delivery . The impression exists that fiscal pressure at the local level increased 
after the re-introduction of local government in Tanzania , but in fact it has de-
creased recently, mainly because central government has abolished certain local 
taxes and now compensates the local level through financial transfers.
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For decentralisation to succeed it is important that at the local level there is 
adequate capacity to design and implement good tax systems, properly thought 
through and avoiding distortions. The current capacity at the local level is often 
not sufficient in this respect. A lot seems to depend on the people leading the 
decentralisation process and an old and wise man such as the Regional Com-
missioner in Arusha can do a very good job if he works with ambitious civil 
society organisations and private sector representatives in the region. Elsewhere 
a young and ambitious civil servant may help to start things moving, suggesting 
that individual leadership can play an important role in the decentralisation 
process. 
7. Conclusions
We have argued that decentralisation has contributed to local development, be-
cause of the flows of goods, services, capital, ideas and people it has generated. 
One indication is the growing importance of return migration. There is still some 
resistance against the implementation of decentralisation policies at the national 
level. It is the usual fear of national level politicians of their loss of influence if na-
tional ministries are no longer fully in command. The pace of harmonising roles 
between the different levels of government in Tanzania has been slow. Sectoral 
ministries are reluctant to cede authority.
The LGSP has helped to build capacity at the local government level, and 
the positive results of the Local Government Reform Programme deserve more 
attention. By the end of LGSP , after 2008, the programme should have created 
the momentum for ongoing improved performance at local government level. Re-
sponsibility rests now with local government, and their empowerment should 
be one result of this programme. By then this approach should also be main-
streamed. It should be day-to-day government business. 
Decentralisation is the framework for further development at the grassroots 
level and the citizens and politicians should use it as such. A point of critique is 
the rather arbitrary local tax increases. Decentralisation provides the opportuni-
ties; the challenge is now to design mechanisms to get capital and entrepreneurial 
talent to rural areas. For the Tanzanian bureaucracy it is important that the presi-
dent is in favour of small enterprise development and decentralisation. Many 
local level officials still see enterprises only as units to be taxed.
It was hoped that decentralisation would diminish rural-urban differences. 
That could have led to less migration and hence solve the problems of big cities 
like Dar es Salaam . There are, however, no indications, despite a slight improve-
ment in rural-urban income differences and some reduction in poverty , that the 
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number of migrants or their destination has changed over time. However, even 
if migrants are continuing to leave the rural areas, the number coming back or 
moving between the rural and urban areas has also increased, linked to the new 
economic opportunities at the district level. These migrants may bring back 
ideas, skills, education and money, which can all contribute to local economic 
development.
Local governments have received more autonomy in the framework of decen-
tralisation. Local governments can and will do more, although they are not able 
to take up all the responsibilities listed above fully yet, if only because of the 
lack of sufficient local finance. The local government component of the public 
sector reform programme and the local government grant system and increased 
tax collection have provided the local level with more funds. However, firm sup-
port from central government for the local government reforms has sometimes 
been missing. So far decentralisation has never been a hot political item and the 
challenge for local government to take up their own development has rarely been 
emphasised. If the second and third objectives of decentralisation formulated in 
section 3 above (a more equal distribution of development) are to be achieved in 
Tanzania , the first objective (to promote economic activities in the regions) still 
requires greater attention.
 Notes
 Steffensen et al. () focused on the effects on local service delivery and which factors 
constrain the development of a more effective and efficient system of decentralisation.
 Parker () proposes normative criteria for analysing development outcomes of decen-
tralisation, including: (i) effectiveness, that is, providing minimum standards of service 
delivery cost-effectively and targeted towards disadvantaged groups; (ii) responsiveness 
of decentralised institutions to the demands of local communities, at the same time as 
meeting the aims of broader public policy; and (iii) sustainability, as indicated by political 
stability, fiscal adequacy and institutional flexibility.
 A hypothesis, which cannot be tested in this case, is that the approach to decentralisation 
would show that when pluralism emerges at decentralised levels of governance it yields 
better results than in case of distributed monopoly (Laryea-Adjei, ).
 The plans for one local tax have not yet been accepted.
 Functions that can be carried out by lower levels of government are planning, fi scal poli-
cies and revenue collection, budget generation and expenditure management, staffi  ng, pro-
gramme and project implementation, information management and operations and mainte-
nance.
 For Dutch development cooperation, ‘good governance’ is also measured by the efficiency 
of ministries and their ‘administrative capacity’. In the education sector, up to  per cent 
of the financial resources provided could not be traced, according to one evaluation study. 
This does not have to be corruption it can also be due to a lack of ‘administrative capacity’. 
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Enrolment has substantially improved, but the quality of education is still worrying. In 
particular, the quality of education for young girls is very poor.
 For example, the Dutch government is heavily involved in decentralisation and local gov-
ernment reform. Together with other donors, they provide a form of budget aid to local 
governments, which can be used for water projects, for example. 
 Publications explain how the councils are assessed (LGCDGS, ) and provide the 
planning guidelines for village and Mitaa (LGCDGS, ).
 The project is currently working under a plan for -.
 It is quite remarkable that the President has retired or kicked out something like thirty-
one regional commissioners, because they did not do what they were supposed to do. 
Many were not clean and corruption is a key concern.
 Lobo () evaluates the experience of involving the private sector in waste collection in 
Arusha, which is certainly an example of improved management at the local level.
 Besides donor money, local governments can also use the Tanzanian Social Action Fund 
(TASAF).
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6 Decentralisation and the Legacy of Protracted 
Confl ict – Mauritius , Namibia and South Africa 
Christof Hartmann
1. Introduction 
The democratisation processes initiated in the early 1990s in Sub-Saharan Af-
rica brought much hope in a reduction of violent conflict , both at the intra-state 
and the inter-state level. If African governments were to become replaceable via 
the ballot box or amenable to change by peaceful means, there should be a cor-
responding decline in the resort to armed struggle. More than a decade later, 
this hope in such a democratic peace dividend has been shattered, at least with 
regard to the intra-state level. Many processes of political liberalisation and de-
mocratisation were indeed accompanied by a rise in the number of violent inter-
nal conflicts and processes of state collapse. Demands for democracy were clearly 
linked to the massive popular frustrations caused by declining economies and the 
failures of incumbent governments in the 1980s. In many countries political lib-
eralisation resulted from uncivic behaviour and was a symptom of massive inter-
nal social conflict. The violent conflicts that accompanied democratisation often 
indicated the real change taking place in settings unfamiliar with high degrees of 
open political competition and thus lacking peaceful routines of solving conflicts 
over political power. 
Th ese developments seemed to vindicate those representatives of non-demo-
cratic regimes and their intellectual supporters, who had always argued that a mul-
ti-party system is a Western construct unsuited to the culture and ethnic diversity 
of African countries. Much of the serious analysis was also pessimistic, noting 
the legacies of authoritarian systems and other structural obstacles to sustainable 
democratic rule (Snyder, 2000) and the capacity of actors involved in transition 
processes to resort to violence as a bargaining strategy (Klopp and Zuern, 2007). 
Th e coincidence of political liberalisation and the escalation of various confl icts left 
open the question of causality, i.e. whether it was democracy, or a country’s move-
ment towards that goal that led to the eruption of violent confl icts or whether the 
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political reforms were simply a trigger for activating some underlying root causes 
such as authoritarian governance structures, unequal access to socio-economic re-
sources or unresolved contradictions between cultural norms and religions.
A long tradition in political science going back to Lijphart (1977) has always 
argued that it is less the regime type (democracy or non-democracy) but the spe-
cific institutional arrangements of a political system that matter for political sta-
bility and sustainable settlements of violent conflicts (cf. Sartori, 1994; Bunce, 
2000; Reynolds, 2001). In theory, democracy is the only institutional mechanism 
for solving political and ethnic conflicts in a peaceful manner, but this is not true 
for any type of democratic system. A number of basic institutional features were 
identified at the macro-political level considered to be relevant for the manage-
ment of deeply divided societies (for an overview, see Harris and Reilly, 1998). 
Still, this body of literature has an exclusive focus on national institutions, such 
as presidentialism or the parliamentary electoral system, although Lijphart (1999) 
himself identified the decentralisation of political power at the sub-national level 
as conducive for conflict management .  
One of the reasons for the conflictive character of democratisation may thus 
lie in the specific institutional set-up of most African countries. Many conflicts in 
Africa centre on the role of the state in society and emanate principally from its 
structure and organisation. The argument is that some of these conflicts could be 
prevented or mediated by restructuring of the state through federalism , autono-
my or local government institutions. Much of the theoretical literature is mostly 
interested in the conflict -mitigating effects of federalism (Lijphart, 1999; Bran-
cati, 2006). Local politics and local democratisation have, on the contrary, rarely 
been discussed in terms of their institutional effects on conflict management . 
Most African states experiment with some form of sub-national government, but 
decentralisation policies and local government have remained poorly analysed (at 
least with regard to their political effects) in African countries (Olowu and Wun-
sch, 2004) and we do not know much about the real impact of decentralisation 
policies on the interests and strategies of local stakeholders. 
In this chapter we want first to develop a theoretical statement about the likely 
impact of decentralisation on conflict management . We need both a clearer defi-
nition of our concepts and some hypothetical assumptions regarding why and to 
what extent decentralisation should matter for conflict dynamics. The remain-
ing sections of this chapter present empirical case studies from Southern Africa . 
Striking many observers is the fact that three of the most ethnically, racially and 
culturally fragmented African societies, Mauritius , South Africa and Namibia , 
have consolidated their democratic institutions. The social development of these 
three countries has been marked by long histories of protracted and – except 
for Mauritius – also violent conflict among racially defined groups. We will first 
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briefly present the conflictive contexts in these three countries before we deal 
with the role of decentralisation for centre-local conflicts and local-local conflicts 
in each of the three countries.  
2. Clarifying the Concepts of Decentralisation and Confl ict 
Decentralisation entails the transfer of power, responsibilities and finance from 
central government to sub-national levels of government at provincial and/or lo-
cal levels. Different forms of decentralisation are generally distinguished accord-
ing to the degree of autonomy exercised by these sub-national levels in relation 
to central government, i.e. devolution versus deconcentration . This conceptuali-
sation first introduced by Rondinelli et al. (1983) has been criticised by the lit-
erature for oversimplifying the complex and issue-specific discretion exercised 
by sub-national government (Oxhorn 2004) and its administrative focus. The 
political practice of decentralisation policies in Sub-Saharan Africa has tended 
to blur Rondinelli’s basic distinction, because especially throughout the last two 
decades many subnational governments are more than implementing agencies 
and do have some minimal degree of decision-making while at the same time 
lacking guaranteed fiscal transfers or significant own revenue-generating capac-
ity. Given the shift of responsibilities and additional authority to existing lower 
tiers of government without a concomitant shift in resources, a more nuanced and 
issue-specific typology of decentralisation is needed. 
The academic debate is further complicated by the fact that federalism and 
local government are increasingly debated under the single heading of decentrali-
sation as member states in some federations enjoy less de facto power than prov-
inces in some strongly decentralised unitary states (Amoretti and Bermeo 2004; 
Rodden, 2004; Burgess 2005). This is, however, not leading to any cooperation 
between scholars coming from the traditional comparative literature dealing with 
federations and the development-oriented literature on decentralisation which 
hardly deals with federations (for a similar observation, see Schou and Haug, 
2005). Brancati (2006: 654) defines political decentralisation as ‘a system of gov-
ernment in which there is a vertical division of power among multiple levels of 
government that have independent decision-making over at least one issue area. 
(…) Independent decision-making power refers to the fact that these different 
levels of government can legislate on certain matters.’ In discussing the various ef-
fects of decentralisation on conflict she is thus clearly referring to federal systems 
of government. There is no compelling reason to exclude federal systems from 
our conceptualisation of decentralisation. It is indeed a very strong form of devo-
lution , where competencies and resources are constitutionally devolved to local 
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units, and the central government cannot unilaterally revoke decentralised powers, 
unlike in a unitary state where the power to recentralise is vested in the central gov-
ernment. As there are few federal systems in Sub-Saharan Africa (three of them) 
we should, on the other hand, be careful not to restrict our defi nitions in a way that 
excludes the decentralising experiences of many African countries where the inde-
pendent decision-making of sub-national levels remains severely constricted. 
Defi nition of confl ict and confl ict management is even more cumbersome. Th ere 
are diff erent ways to build confl ict typologies. One (and probably the most fre-
quently used) is to distinguish according to the degree of violence involved in con-
fl icts. While social confl ict itself is regarded by most social scientists as unavoidable 
and even desirable, it is the violent escalation of confl ict that needs to be prevented 
or ended or managed. Th e very idea of crisis prevention is to tackle the root causes 
of confl icts while these confl icts are still latent, i.e. violence has not erupted yet. 
Confl icts then pass through diff erent steps or cycles with diff ering degrees of vio-
lent encounters including a post-confl ict phase (OECD, 2001). Since the distinc-
tion between confl ict and post-confl ict situations often cannot be drawn sharply, 
and the term itself erroneously suggests that the underlying confl ict has immedi-
ately come to an end, the term should actually be renamed ‘post-violent confl ict 
phase’. Confl ict management ‘refers to the elimination, neutralisation, or control of 
the means of pursuing either the confl ict or the crises’ (Zartman 1989: 8). 
Another way to make sense of the multiplicity of real-world conflicts is to or-
der them according to the main root cause of conflict . We find competing typolo-
gies in the literature, with most authors distinguishing resource-based conflicts 
(competition for economic power, access to natural resources), conflicts over gov-
ernance and authority (based on competition for political power and participa-
tion in the political process), ideological conflicts (involving different value sys-
tems), and identity conflicts (based on competition between rival ethnic, religious 
or other communal identity groups for both economic and political power and 
social justice, cf. Rupesinghe, 1998). Empirical work with these typologies is often 
hindered by the fact that most conflicts in Southern countries are characterized 
by a combination of these different root causes. 
A third possibility to build a conflict typology, and one increasingly applied 
in ‘conflict management and resolution research’ is to distinguish the individual 
and collective actors involved in conflicts. This idea is based on the premise that 
conflicts are the result of differences in the interests of actors and that the man-
agement or resolution of conflicts consists in reconciling the different interests by 
creating win-win situations for all relevant stakeholders. Lederach’s (1997) Track 
I-III actors are a prominent example of such an approach: different groups of ac-
tors have specific capacities and roles within conflict management independently 
of the precise public good that is contended among the parties to a conflict. 
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Which actor constellations might emerge in conflicts related to decentralisa-
tion? The two main scenarios are the following: 
1. Within a decentralised unit, different groups with contrasting political views 
or structural disparities in economic power or different ethnic or religious af-
filiations may conflict with each other. 
2. Conflicts may exist between one (or several) decentralised units and the cen-
tral government over the extent of political, cultural, financial and economic 
autonomy and authority. 
Mehler (2001) adds another conflict scenario, in which different local govern-
ment units may clash with each other, which is also typical of federal systems 
where the constitution typically provides for some formalised conflict resolution 
mechanism. We will neither consider this scenario in the following nor the role 
of international actors who are sometimes involved in protracted violent conflicts 
(warlords with international connections, arms traders, international humanitar-
ian organisations). Both scenarios are of little empirical relevance in the regional 
area we are concerned with. 
3. Th e Eff ects of Decentralisation on Confl ict Management 
Decentralisation may have many both direct and indirect effects on both conflict 
types identified. Theoretical insight and empirical observation warn us about as-
suming that these effects will always be beneficial for conflict management . In the 
following we will first present the key mitigating effects of decentralisation and 
then proceed with an analysis of the conflict-intensifying potential of decentrali-
sation policies.  
3.1. Confl ict-mitigating eff ects 
 allowing for political inclusion and participation 
One main argument often used to justify decentralisation is that it might allow 
minorities, which are excluded from power at the national level, to be included in 
the political process (Boone, 2003). Wherever conflict is about access to political 
decision-making , this access might not only be achieved via political represen-
tation in national offices such as government or parliament, but also through 
access to political structures at the sub-national level. The existence of a local 
and accountable government which is closer to the people allows for more active 
participation and effective representation of all segments of the population giving 
them a sense of ownership of political institutions. 
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 creating vertical checks and balances 
Decentralisation may mitigate conflict by facilitating the dispersal of power from 
a centralised government structure to the peripheral regions of a country. This 
effect is only likely where there is some meaningful devolution of competencies 
and resources because only under this condition will the control of decentralised 
structures be considered by hitherto marginalised groups as a relevant form of 
inclusion into the political system and as an effective way to hold the central 
government accountable. Decentralisation as a vertical balance of powers will al-
low all groups to air their grievances through some institutionalised channels 
instead of relying on violent means of protest or threatening to form independent 
states. One main example is Mozambique , where the decentralisation programme 
helped motivate the rebels to accept defeat in the first-ever national elections , 
with the implicit promises that power-sharing could take place within new demo-
cratic institutions at the local level (Schou and Haug, 2005). 
 strengthening national integration and legitimacy 
Beyond building additional checks and balances into a political structure, de-
centralisation may create a more stable political equilibrium between the centre 
and periphery. The strengthening of regions can help in reconstructing a sense 
of national unity after violent conflicts by making clear that all regional and lo-
cal stakeholders are taken seriously for the management of conflict . Spreading 
power among a broader array of actors provides them with greater incentives to 
participate and cooperate and incorporate them into the political process. In this 
way, decentralisation can strengthen national integration and the legitimacy of 
national institutions. 
 harmonizing policies and strengthening rule of law 
Decentralisation may formalise and harmonise relationships between national 
governments and sub-national institutions. It may also reassert central control 
over policies that were enacted under a large de facto discretion by local power-
holders and officials. In contrast to the previous argument about creating sub-
national veto –power, this opinion holds that decentralisation may be beneficial 
for conflict management by assuring an effective control of state agencies. It is 
thus not the omnipotent centralising state responsible for conflict which has to 
be tamed by decentralising some of its powers. It is, on the contrary, a weak state 
which may reassert control over the hinterland by creating effective decentralised 
structures and guaranteeing the application of its rules in a more consistent way 
thereby creating a more equal relationship to all of its citizens. 
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 improving service delivery 
Decentralisation can be a tool to extend and improve the delivery of services to lo-
cal populations. It might not only help in maintaining the presence of deconcen-
trated governmental offices throughout the country, but also make this delivery 
more responsive to the actual need and to the administrative capacity in a given 
area. The processes of decentralisation are normally supposed to improve effec-
tive service delivery and tax collection. It is obvious that the successful manage-
ment of conflicts dealing with access and control of natural resources might pri-
marily consist in a ‘good’ and ‘sound’ public policy, and that some of these policies 
might or even should be (planned and) implemented at the local level. Wherever 
the main root of conflict is the scarcity or the uneven distribution of resources 
(access to water), any significant overall improvement of services is likely to miti-
gate conflict. 
3.2. Confl ict-intensifying eff ects 
 empowerment of oppositional actors 
The political inclusion of oppositional actors and their capture of local and re-
gional authorities might also lead to structural stalemate between the governing 
party and these oppositional actors. Especially in post-conflict settings the trust 
of the different actors in the enforcement of new power-sharing rules might not 
be sufficiently strong. The decentralisation of resources and competences might 
become, in these circumstances, a source of continuous conflict over the extent 
of real devolution and the interpretation of the new rules by both the govern-
mental and oppositional actors. Incentives under decentralised structures may 
reward incompatible or uncompromising political platforms (Marshall and Gurr, 
2005). Accountability to local constituents will increase polarisation of the po-
litical process and reward leaders taking ever more ‘patriotic’ positions in defence 
of the region or ethnic group. In some countries the legal rules might enable the 
president to overrule local and regional councils or to appoint district governors 
and mayors from the governing party (see Mehler, 2001, for an illustration from 
Cameroon; and Schelnberger, this volume, for an illustration from Uganda ). 
 local elite capture 
Decentralisation alone does not guarantee that local structures will allow for 
better accountability mechanisms, for more participation by civil society actors 
and for a more responsive policy-making (Bardhan, 2002). Legal provisions may 
provide for the inclusion or exclusion of relevant local stakeholders such as tra-
ditional leaders and ethnic minorities within councils and local administrations. 
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Conflicts might only be shifted from the national to the regional or local level by 
creating new political communities with new minorities that are marginalised by 
the elites controlling the respective regional or local authority. There is thus no 
guarantee that local resource conflicts will be better handled by a local govern-
ment with officials and councillors who represent one or all of the conflict parties, 
or who might lack the technical knowledge to make informed decisions about the 
privatisation of public services. 
 intensifying regional differences 
By allowing for local discretion in decision-making , inequalities in the distribu-
tion of development benefits may increase, thus creating relative deprivation, 
grievance and instability. Some areas might be rich in natural resources, and 
decentralisation will invariably challenge the existing distribution of benefits 
among central and local governments. Decentralisation rules might provide for 
transfer of block grants from central government to sub-national authorities 
with or without exemption rules; there are also significant issues concerning the 
regulated redistribution of funds among different regions and municipalities 
which might rather increase conflicts (Mehler, 2001). The more local govern-
ments are responsible for tax collection and may also have to apply for ear-
marked central government sectoral funds, the more the capacities of local ad-
ministrations will be decisive for the flow of resources and the actual quantity 
and quality of services. 
3.3. Why decentralisation matters for confl ict management 
It is not difficult to see that the same functions of decentralisation might both 
mitigate and intensify conflict . More responsive policy-making at the local level 
and an effective shift of responsibility for tax collection might satisfy some local 
constituencies but lead to grievances in other parts of the country. Inclusion of 
new oppositional groups in the political process will avoid secessionist tenden-
cies but at the same time increase the potential of institutional deadlock between 
different layers of government. 
But which variables then explain whether and in which way decentralisation 
actually works in a given conflict setting? One main hypothesis is that the insti-
tutional design of decentralisation decides the precise impact on conflicts. De-
centralisation is understood as a set of rules that create incentives for actors to 
engage in politics, to pursue sectional or community-wide interests, and/or to 
perceive other local governments as allies or as competitors. 
Local-central institutions affect the distribution of political power and thus 
the likely output of the political system as well as the relative ability of different 
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groups to influence that output. Local and national institutions provide a frame-
work of rules (both written and unwritten) that decide the allocation of human 
and material resources to local government (cf. Ribot, 2003). 
In studying the relationship between decentralisation and conflict we have 
thus to move beyond the analysis of general effects or the assessment of the in-
tensity of decentralisation and to look for the specific rules comprised within de-
centralisation which really matter for conflict management . Many of these legal 
institutions haven’t been designed in order to impact on conflict. Decisions about 
the size of municipalities, to give an example, are motivated primarily by consid-
erations such as economies of scale, enhanced planning and better-qualified staff 
(Keating, 1995). Such decisions may nevertheless have unintended effects on the 
management of social, political and cultural conflicts. 
It is not assumed that institutions will explain all of the effects of decentralisa-
tion on the dynamics of conflict . Institutions do operate within constraints and 
interact both with structurally-given conditions and contingent decisions of indi-
viduals. We will come back to these assumptions in the concluding section.
4. Th e Nature of Confl ict in Mauritius , Namibia and South Africa 
Both Namibia and South Africa have a long history of racial and ethnic struggle, 
the violent phases of which ended at the beginning of the 1990s. While the spe-
cific historical trajectories of racial and social conflict differ between both coun-
tries, they do share a lot of similarities with regard to the main roots of conflict 
and the main actors involved. 
There are various and contrasting readings of South African history and the 
conflicts that have taken place throughout the last two centuries (cf. Friedman, 
1995; Ross, 1999). Apartheid became the apex of white domination over the rest 
of the South African population. Political and social life was regulated according 
to racial criteria, the non-white population was effectively disenfranchised and 
inter-racial social contacts were strictly regulated by the state. White South Afri-
cans did not deny their aspiration of supremacy but interpreted conflict in ethnic 
terms with many different black African, coloured, Asian and white groups. 
While Apartheid in its early phase (1948-1962) was not so different from Eu-
ropean colonial rule taking place in the remaining territories of Sub-Saharan 
Africa , it became an exception starting from the 1960s when both the rest of Af-
rica became independent and Apartheid rule was radicalised with the territorial 
segregation of ‘Grand Apartheid’. At the same time when most Africans got full 
political and civil rights and elected their governments, millions of black South 
Africans were forcefully moved to their ‘homelands’, artificial territories without 
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economic bases which were never recognised by the international community as 
autonomous states. Organised protest against Apartheid grew in the 1960s and 
1970s and became much stronger during the 1980s when both social movements 
within South Africa took the protest to the streets and the armed liberation 
movement African National Congress (ANC) had built up strong regional and 
international support against Apartheid. 
During the negotiations leading to the demise of the Apartheid regime, the 
main conflict was clearly defined in terms of racial categories with the white Na-
tional Party and the ANC as main negotiation partners. Competing African ac-
tors such as the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP ) were effectively marginalized by 
Mandela and the ANC although thousands died in clashes between ANC and 
IFP supporters in the province of KwaZulu-Natal between 1990 and 1994. When 
the new government took over in 1994, Apartheid rule had left a terrific legacy: 
millions of South Africans had been denied a decent life without access to basic 
services such as health and education and the settlement patterns of population 
groups had been thoroughly distorted by Apartheid policies. To overcome this 
legacy a vast social infrastructure had to be reconstructed within a short time-
span. South Africa had become one of the countries with the most unequal dis-
tribution of wealth worldwide, and any government which was failing to deliver 
the most basic needs was going to face increasing social conflicts. 
South African rule over Namibia led to the establishment of a regime very 
similar to the Apartheid system in South Africa (cf. Leys and Saul, 1995). Black 
Namibians were similarly disenfranchised and forcefully moved to so-called 
communal areas with most of the fertile areas reserved for the white commercial 
farmers. Protest again this system mostly came from the armed liberation move-
ment SWAPO fighting against the white Namibian government alongside with 
the Angolan government. In contrast to urbanised South Africa , open rebellion 
within Namibia remained much weaker, and independence was obtained through 
UN -supervised negotiations at the international level. The legacy of Apartheid 
was similar. While the transition left ( just like in South Africa) intact the ba-
sic economic order, political rule was dominated by the former liberation move-
ment. Like in South Africa, the liberation movement was dominated by some 
ethnic groups more than by others, and conflicts over redistribution were thus 
not restricted to a racial conflict between the formerly privileged and the formerly 
marginalised but included struggles among different African ethnic groups for 
inclusion in government and development of their areas. 
Mauritius is included in this comparison although it has never had any apart-
heid rule. It does share with the other cases a religious and racially heterogeneous 
population where access to resources is not evenly distributed (Bowman, 1991). 
On this small Indian Ocean island, a former British colony but previously also 
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under Dutch and French administration, the majority of the population is of 
Indian origin, brought to Mauritius by the British in the second half of the nine-
teenth century to work on the sugar plantations; but around a third is Creole and 
of African descent (brought to Mauritius as slaves), with a minor representa-
tion of Europeans (the so-called general population). Indians are again divided 
along religious lines into Hindus and Muslims, with most of the Africans and 
Europeans being Christians. This mix of races and beliefs is living together on a 
highly urbanised territory in mostly mixed neighbourhoods creating a high prob-
ability of social and political conflict . Upon independence in 1968, the Hindu 
Indians took political power and administrative positions, with the European 
elite maintaining the control of the sugar economy and Muslims mostly active in 
the trade and small business sector. It was the African community that lost out 
in this implicit social contract among the various population groups, and social 
conflict emerged regularly from the grievances of the African-Creole community 
who were disadvantaged with regard to most social indicators. While religious 
differences have not been politicised, conflicts between Indians and Europeans 
concerning their role in politics and business increased with the first-time elec-
tion of a white prime minister in 2004.  
There is no longer any violent conflict in any of these three countries. De-
centralisation is thus less a way out of protracted violent conflict but more a 
long-term strategy to overcome the legacy of armed struggle and to manage the 
conflicts arising out of the heterogeneous composition of the population. Lo-
cal and regional governments in all three countries do reflect this heterogeneous 
composition, with the exception of some rural areas of South Africa and Namibia 
that are dominated by a single ethnic group. It is thus likely that the existing 
political and social conflicts both take place within decentralised units as well as 
between local and central government. 
5. Decentralisation and Central-Local Relations 
In ethnically or racially fragmented societies such as Mauritius , Namibia or South 
Africa , the major conflict -mitigating role of devolution most likely consists of a 
better political representation of national minorities and more effective develop-
mental services in favour of formerly marginalised segments of the population. 
And indeed, one of the motives that might explain the rise of decentralisation 
policies in these three countries is the conscious use of decentralisation as a po-
litical mechanism by ruling groups to placate, neutralise, contain or seek compro-
mise with regional or local elites. Which effects did decentralisation policies in 
these three countries have on centre-local relations? 
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There is no need to make an in-depth analysis of this effect in Mauritius . The 
island is so small that any citizen can take public transport and reach the capital 
city Port Louis within half a day. Local government is basically urban government 
in the five municipalities of the island.1 Municipalities have a slightly different 
ethnic composition than district councils (less Hindu Indians, more Muslims 
and Creoles), but one could hardly see them as strongholds of minority groups. 
It is true that the genuinely non-Indian parties such as the Mouvement Mauric-
ien Militant (MMM) or the Parti Mauricien Xavier Duval (PMXD) emerged in 
the towns of the Plateau Central. The majoritarian electoral system existing in 
Mauritius (plurality in three-member constituencies) has however led to the for-
mation of multi-ethnic party coalitions offering multi-ethnic slates of candidates 
in these constituencies, so that never, even at the local level, has one mono-ethnic 
party obtained full control of a council. 
In Namibia , the previously dominant white population lives scattered over the 
national territory. The interests of this group are addressed via the business com-
munity or via informal channels to the government and ruling party but certainly 
not via the control of some regional or local council. It is different for the non-
Ovambo African ethnic groups (mainly Herero and Damara) who have identi-
fied with opposition parties Democratic Turnhallen Alliance (DTA) and United 
Democratic Front (UDF ) respectively. In contrast to the northern ethnic groups 
that were the backbone of resistance against the white regime and that numeri-
cally account for more than 50 per cent of the population, these ethnic groups see 
themselves as marginalised within the new Namibia.2 While economic and social 
life in the Ovambo municipalities of Oshakati , Ongwediva or Rundu is vibrant 
and new markets, roads and public facilities have been constructed, the regional 
centres of Khorixas (Damara) and Okakarara (Herero) have remained at the pe-
riphery of economic and political life. The disenfranchisement under Apartheid 
rule has given way to marginalisation under SWAPO rule. Both ethnic groups 
perceive decentralisation as a clever trick of the central government which con-
sists in decentralising central government functions without decentralising the 
necessary resources. Municipalities such as Khorixas or Okakarara have thus to 
pay for the bulk supply of electricity and water bill to the state-owned NamWater 
and NamPower companies, yet have to shoulder debts from previous administra-
tions with a municipal administration neither capable of collecting the fees from 
citizens nor willing to enforce a necessary increase in fees to cover the increasing 
costs. 
The growing frustration of non-Ovambo groups has certainly not been trans-
formed into any open defiance or violent rebellion (with the minor exception of 
Caprivi strip), but the current decentralisation programme is certainly neither 
empowering oppositional actors nor creating vertical checks and balances. When 
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regional councils were designed in the early 1990s, communal areas were care-
fully divided among different regions in order to avoid these Apartheid structures 
surviving into the new Namibia (Forrest, 1998). However, this meant in practice 
that both the Herero and the Damara were going to ‘share’ their regional council 
with other ethnic groups, thus depriving them of the possibility to use control of 
regional councils for furthering their group interests. The geographical engineer-
ing of new regional communities confined decentralisation to an administrative 
and developmental function. While hindering local and regional councils from 
opposing the central government, decentralisation was also barred from playing a 
positive function of strengthening national integration and legitimacy in the new 
Namibian state.  
Among our three cases, South Africa is certainly the one where some vertical 
power-sharing is taking place. South Africa ’s provinces were also newly designed 
in the constitutional reform process and the ANC was insisting on a weak federal 
form of government. Provinces have thus got very few own resources (around 5 
per cent of what they spend) and the second chamber of parliament, the National 
Council of Provinces (NCOP) , has few competences and votes on the basis of 
one vote per province so that all questions before the NCOP are decided by a 
majority of five (out of nine) provinces voting in favour of the question under 
consideration. As the ANC has always governed in at least seven provinces, fed-
eralism was a weak weapon for minority groups to defend their interests at the 
national level. The ANC has nevertheless invested a lot of energy to gain control 
of the remaining two provinces, i.e. Western Cape and KwaZulu Natal, and since 
April 2004 is governing in all nine provinces. Parties that mainly represent mi-
nority groups, such as the National Party (NP), Democratic Party (DP) and the 
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP ) , have for some time governed these two provinces, 
although they mostly had to rely on other smaller parties for assuring a ruling 
majority.
In a context of a dominant party system, South African opposition parties rep-
resenting ethnic and racial minorities thus got access to resources, could prepare 
their personnel for assuming high public offices, and present a more convincing 
challenge to the national government by having shown a certain degree of legiti-
macy and support at the local or regional level. The importance of local council 
domination varies, of course, depending on the type of council. The local politics 
of the metropolitan municipalities was of crucial importance to the national gov-
ernment, maybe more than the control of provincial government. 
The successful management of Cape Town by the national opposition Demo-
cratic Alliance (DA) hurt the ruling African National Congress much more than 
the DA presence in the national parliament. When the DA together with a coa-
lition of several small parties won the municipal elections in March 2006 by a 
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very narrow margin and elected Helen Zille as mayor, this caused a major upset 
in national politics. The ANC threatened legal action and advised its provincial 
premier to initiate a constitutional procedure allowing the province to directly 
govern the municipality and thereby annulling the mayoral election. This was not 
going to be, and a disgruntled ANC leadership has accepted Zille’s election. Any 
central government is probably well advised to ‘grant’ the opposition such minor 
successes, thereby integrating it into the political process without risking any loss 
of political dominance. Even a successful term as mayor of Cape Town would not 
make a white lady like Helen Zille a winning candidate for national elections. 
The furious reaction of the ANC was thus more a reflection of their authoritar-
ian style of politics than a clever political strategy. 
6. Decentralisation and Local Confl icts 
To what extent do decentralisation policies impact on conflicts between local 
actors? Before we can assess this question we have to briefly give an overview of 
local government structures in our three countries: 
6.1. Th e structure of local government 
Namibia and South Africa have popular elections for representatives at the local 
and the regional level. In South Africa , municipalities with elected councils exist 
side-by-side with provinces of a quasi-federal status characterised by own parlia-
ments and executives. As outlined above, in the wake of independence, Namibia 
created new multi-ethnic regions bridging the former homelands and former 
exclusively white-controlled commercial areas. The Namibian population thus 
votes both for local councils (municipalities, towns and villages) and regional 
councils. Due to the small size of the Mauritian island, regional government does 
not exist there. 
The socio-economic and demographic disparities between urban areas on the 
one hand, and scattered rural settlements on the other, lead to differences in serv-
ice needs as well as in the availability of resources. Cities and urban settlements 
have thus historically been provided with special arrangements for their govern-
ance. Most African countries have thus two or more classes of local authorities, 
with the urban ones granted more power and responsibility than the rural ones. 
Mauritius follows this model, with the rural authorities being called ‘districts’, and 
the urban ones ‘cities’. There are important differences in the electoral constitu-
tion of these authorities: The rural population elects village councils that in turn 
indirectly elect the district councils and chairmen (Dukhira, 1992). 
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With regard to local government, South Africa applies a relatively uniform 
classification of municipalities following the transformation of local govern-
ment in the late 1990s (see Atkinson, 1998; and Goetz, 1996). Except for the 
seven metropolitan cities and some sparsely populated District Management 
Areas (DMA), there is a single type of municipality governed by a single legal 
document.3 Namibia , on the other hand, holds local elections only in munici-
palities, towns and villages. According to Namibian terminology, municipali-
ties are urban areas that existed before independence in 1989, while the towns 
were created in the former communal areas after independence. The ‘old towns’ 
(municipalities) have thus established traditions of self-government and dispose 
of a more experienced and bigger administrative staff. In the fifteen years since 
independence some of the new towns (for example Rundu or Oshakati) have 
grown much bigger (in terms of population and financial resources) than most 
of the municipalities, but the Namibian government has maintained the origi-
nal distinction so far (cf. Simon, 1996; Toetemeyer, 1999; Piermay and Sohn, 
1999). The rural population is represented exclusively at the regional level (in the 
form of the regional councillor for their constituency). These regional councils, 
in contrast to the district councils of the other SADC countries, are however 
not the exclusive representative institution of rural populations, but a separate 
tier of government and represent both the rural and urban population living in 
that region (for a more extended presentation of local government structures see 
Hartmann, 2004). 
With a similar legacy of apartheid local administration, Namibia and South 
Africa thus opted for contrasting models: While South Africa in 1998-99 strongly 
reduced the number of local authorities by consciously merging predominantly 
white and black areas to build a stronger local government, Namibia kept the 
original system. There is still a marked contrast between the rich and well-admin-
istered municipalities and the newly established towns, although Windhoek or 
Swakopmund have integrated the townships and have been governed by SWAPO 
ever since the first local authority elections in 1992. Still, the differences between 
South Africa and Namibia have less to do with political considerations than the 
socio-geographical context. The predominantly rural setting of Namibia keeps 
ethnic and racial groups much more in distinct and relatively homogenous areas 
than urbanised South Africa. The politics of ethnic conflict management were 
more concerned with the regional than with the local level. Previous homelands 
and communal areas were dismantled and new provinces (in South Africa) and 
regions (in Namibia) designed on the drawing board to foster interethnic contact 
and block separatism. 
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6.2. Th e management of local confl ict 
In most of the southern African countries, elected local government structures 
are entrusted with the control and/or management of resources, including land, 
and the provision of basic services to the communities. At the same time, nearly 
all these countries also have traditional institutions operating at the local level 
(Hlatshwayo, 1995). Both traditional and elected authorities have an interest 
in developing the local community. However, if their functions and duties are 
not harmonised, overlaps between their activities and resulting conflicts can be 
extremely detrimental to the local community. There are either laws in place or 
strong sentiments against allowing traditional leaders to combine traditional 
and competitive political leadership roles. Such prohibitions were generally 
meant to prevent traditional leaders from abusing their positions to gain un-
fair political advantage. Because traditional leaders are, by definition, linked to 
particular ethnic groupings, political cleavages along ethnic lines are likely to 
occur if traditional leaders were given the freedom to engage in party politics. 
But that has not resulted in their exclusion from politics altogether. In South 
Africa , for example, they can be elected by their peers into the reserved posi-
tions or may be nominated to these positions. Alternatively, they can abdicate 
their traditional leadership and compete as ordinary citizens. In Namibia the 
Traditional Authorities Act explicitly states that any traditional leader is pre-
vented from allowing his political opinions or allegiance to influence members 
of his traditional community. There are no traditional authorities on the island 
of Mauritius . 
The problem with traditional authorities is that they are both regarded as 
crucial players when it comes to solving local conflicts and as a source of con-
flict because their role in land administration. Forms of decentralisation that 
devolve competencies and resources only to existing municipalities or district 
capitals (sometimes with long-standing traditions of urban self-government) 
risk depriving the rural populations of any representation at the local level and 
create two de facto classes of citizens, thus creating new conflicts. In northern 
Namibia , traditional leadership remains an important source of authority, of-
ten competing with elected local councils, especially where the jurisdiction of 
chiefs extends into the municipal territory (Friedman, 2005). The balance is 
more mixed in South Africa (Munro, 2001; Williams, 2004). While the po-
liticisation of chiefs may have put to risk their traditional legitimacy, they 
have been unable to hinder or even become the driving forces behind local 
outbreaks of violence between migrant communities, especially in KwaZulu-
Natal . The South African Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework 
Act and Communal Land Rights Act have maintained this ambiguous role for 
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chiefs but confirmed their dominant role in land administration (Ntsebeza, 
2005). 
The three countries analysed share a strong scepticism towards direct election 
of mayors (as practised in Zimbabwe , Uganda and Mozambique )4 and ethnic 
and racial harmony is one major issue. While indirectly-elected mayorships may 
be rotated among the ethnic-racial groups based on informal deals within coun-
cils (as it is the case in the cities of Mauritius , especially Port-Louis, Curepipe 
and in some municipalities of the South African Western Province), a popular 
election has a fixed mandate, and a single directly-elected mayor will necessarily 
always represent a single ethnic or racial group. Different local electoral systems 
were, on the contrary, of less importance for ethnic conflict management . In 
South Africa and Namibia proportional representation systems allowed the par-
ties to present ethnically-mixed slates of candidates to the electorate. Mauritius 
shows how even majoritarian electoral systems may provide for a good solution 
of ethnic conflict management. In each constituency, more than one candidate 
is elected and voters have as many votes as seats to be distributed (for local elec-
tions between three and eight per constituency) which allows parties to field 
candidates from different communities. While voters are free to follow the in-
structions of parties or not, the experience of the last thirty years does show that 
the councils of Mauritian towns are broadly representative of their ethnic and 
racial population notwithstanding the majoritarian electoral system. In this case 
informal rules complement the written electoral rules to produce the socially 
desirable outcome. 
While local government in Mauritius was successful in keeping down con-
flicts among different ethnic groups, it remains to be seen whether Namibia and 
South Africa ’s municipalities can quell the explosive potential of social conflict . 
In these two countries, popular expectations towards distributive policies by lo-
cal authorities run high. The achievements with regard to access to clean water, 
housing, electricity and secondary school enrolment are tremendous both in Na-
mibia and South Africa , and certainly document that decentralisation has not 
stifled the delivery of these basic services. Local government has been given a 
prominent developmental role in the new South African Constitution, and it has 
been equipped with both an adequate institutional set-up and the necessary ca-
pacity-building has been made available. Any observer of the reality of municipal 
politics is, however, able to give more than anecdotal evidence about local elite 
capture , corruption and a growing social unrest directed against the local ANC 
leadership. South African President Thabo Mbeki himself indicated in 2004 that 
‘in the new dispensation, we gave too many powers to local government, which, 
I think, they are often not able to exercise’ (cit. De Visser, 2005: 281). A strong 
form of decentralisation may thus also create new conflicts which in the South 
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African case is less a question of institutional design than a problem of human 
resources, the availability and quality of which are still constrained by the legacy 
of Apartheid education .  
7. Conclusions 
The end of Apartheid created an institutional vacuum with a large window of 
opportunity for conscious institutional design, both at the national and the local 
level. Decentralisation has been used as a main lever for conflict management in 
both countries with a main accent on its developmental role. If local government 
is to have any role in conflict management, it has to have effective powers and 
resources to make a difference in the eyes of concerned populations. This has 
been much more the case in South Africa than in Namibia where decentralisation 
has been effective mainly in uplifting the welfare of some of the previously mar-
ginalised groups while oppositional areas did benefit much less from the same 
policies. 
The analysis has shown that appropriate institutional forms and powers of 
decentralisation are crucial for delivering the assumed theoretical benefits, but 
the broader political and social context, including the legacy of the conflict itself 
and specific party systems, does matter for the effects of any decentralisation 
policy. It would be difficult to argue that the decentralisation policies in the 
three countries did any harm to the process of consolidating fragile democra-
cies. The non-political design of decentralisation hindered local and regional 
authorities from becoming (party) political agents and from increasing a vertical 
balance of power; at the same time, this non-political version of decentralisation 
also saved the countries the trouble of institutional deadlocks and autonomy 
movements. Political stability and national integration is so far guaranteed by 
broad-based dominant parties which control most of regional and local govern-
ment. This also explains why there is little conflict between national and local 
government. 
It remains to be seen which role local government will play when the dominat-
ing position at the national level is threatened. The hope is then that Namibian 
and South African leaders will not choose the path taken by Robert Mugabe, who 
in neighbouring Zimbabwe put municipalities with oppositional governments 
under direct presidential authority, but rather look to a tiny Indian Ocean island 
whose democratic order has survived a number of major government changes 
both at national and local level. 
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 Notes
 There are additionally four district councils and  village councils.
 Interviews with Mayor, Chief Executive Officer and Town Councils of Khorixas and 
Okakarara on  November  and  November .
 In local elections, all citizens living in the metropolitan cities and municipalities elect 
their local councillors while the populations of DMA vote their representatives to Dis-
trict Councils which are then filled up by representatives of the municipalities existing 
within that district.
 The direct election of mayors was a substantial issue in the South African debate but the 
adherents of indirect election (and of party-political control) prevailed, and even in the 
metropolitan cities, such as Johannesburg or Cape Town, the mayor is thus elected from 
among councillors.
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7 Decentralisation and Confl ict in Kibaale , Uganda 
Anna Katharina Schelnberger 
1. Introduction
The contribution of decentralisation policies to economic development, partici-
pation , good governance and democratisation has been the topic of an increasing 
body of research over the last decade (Crook and Manor, 1998). Given Africa ’s 
context of protracted violent conflicts both at the national or regional level and at 
the local level, it is surprising to see how little attention has been accorded to the 
potential role of decentralisation for the management of conflict , especially those 
conflicts related to issues of participation, governance and democratisation. 
Like federalism and autonomy, decentralisation addresses the territorial struc-
ture of a state. Federalism, autonomy and also decentralisation are means of de-
volving power and are considered to be a way of integrating different interests and 
interest groups into a national state while allowing for a degree of independence 
of these groups. The capacity of both federalism and autonomy to contribute to 
the management of conflicts has been studied in much detail (Reilly, 1998). The 
capacity of decentralisation to act as an instrument of conflict management has 
so far received less attention (Mehler, 2001).
The case study of Kibaale district in western Uganda may serve as an exam-
ple for the way actual decentralisation policies both mitigate but also intensify 
different types of conflict . From 1967 to 1986, Uganda was a highly centralised 
state. During the period the country suffered from almost continuous civil war. 
The local government of Uganda today was actually built on Resistance Councils 
(RCs), grassroots institutions conceived as a way of supporting the guerrilla war 
of the National Resistance Army (NRA ) . These RCs were introduced all over 
the country after the NRA had taken power in 1986, and in 1992 Uganda’s official 
decentralisation policy was launched. 
Kibaale District has from its creation in 1991 been an ethnically heterogeneous 
district. After independence, migrants from south-western Uganda settled in the 
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until then sparsely-populated district. This settlement continued over the years, 
so that today about half of the population of Kibaale are settlers. These settlers 
are competing with the original population over the available land, but also over 
political power. In March 2002, Fred Ruremera – a member of the settler com-
munity – was elected as district chairman (head of local government). His elec-
tion was not accepted by the original inhabitants and led to violent conflict .
What has been the role of local government in these conflicts? How has it 
contributed both to their intensification and mitigation? The contribution will 
trace the historical roots of the conflict and describe their development over time 
as well as their interaction with local government structures. It will show that – 
contrary to common expectation – decentralisation and especially the increased 
participation of all groups of the population actually contributed to conflict. 
The next section will provide a theoretical background on the relationship 
between decentralisation and conflict ; the third section gives an overview of the 
types of conflicts in Kibaale district and their dynamics. Two further sections 
discuss the role of local government in the management of these conflicts and 
propose some explanatory factors. A concluding section will discuss some theo-
retical and political lessons to be learnt from the experience of Kibaale district, a 
typical if drastic example of host-migrant conflicts in Uganda .
2. Th e Relationship Between Decentralisation and Confl ict
Decentralisation as a process shifting competencies and resources from the cen-
tral governmental to the sub-national level may contribute to a better manage-
ment of social conflicts but also intensify these same conflicts (Fandrych, 2001: 
93; Mehler, 2001: 287-289; Steinich, 2000). The possible impacts are manifold 
and very much dependent on the specific circumstances. Decentralisation is in 
itself a conflictive process that can open up new arenas of conflict . It is a political 
process impacting on the distribution of political power. In order to be able to 
transfer power and authority to local government units, power and resources nec-
essarily have to be taken away from elites at the national level. Strong opposition 
can be expected from the losers of the decentralisation process (Bächler, 2001: 14; 
Mehler, 2001: 288f.). With regard to the capacity of decentralised units to man-
age existing local conflicts, it is important to note that they can, of course, only 
become active if they are called upon to do so by the population and if they have 
actually been granted authority to intervene and act in these situations (Mehler, 
2001: 292).
Four potential layers of conflict within society can be distinguished to illus-
trate the influence of decentralisation on conflict. Table 1 provides an overview of 
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the expected influences on the different layers of conflict between the individual 
citizen and the community/state, ethnic or other groups within a community or 
region, different regions and regions (and the population of these regions) and 
the central state.
Table 1. Impact of Decentralisation on Confl icts in Diff erent Layers of Society
Layer Contributions to confl ict 
management 
Contributions to confl ict 
intensifi cation
Individual citizen and 
community/state





Improved service delivery 
Defi cits in local democracy 




and squandering lead to 
deteriorating quality of 
service delivery 
Ethnic or other groups within 
a community/region
Local arena to carry out 




Changes in the balance of 
powers, new majorities and 
minorities
Central State loses its 
position as an arbitrator in 
confl icts
Diff erent regions New possibilities for inter-
district cooperation
Demarcation of district 
borders
Need for inter-district 
cooperation
Distribution of resources
Regions (and their 
population) and the central 
state
Demand for autonomy is 
partly fulfi lled







Central state is weakened 
Source: Mehler, 2001.
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As most conflicts in Uganda are conflicts between ethnic groups within a given 
region, the following analysis will concentrate on the effects of decentralisation 
on this type of conflict (for an extended treatment of the other layers see Mehler, 
2001; and Hartmann, this volume). Decentralisation provides different and po-
tentially conflicting groups within a region (such as different ethnic or religious 
groups) with a local arena to carry out their conflicts in a non-violent manner. It 
is easier to organise participation at the local level and thus even minorities can 
be included in the decision-making processes. Decision-making is theoretically 
more inclusive, because it involves all interested parties and provides everybody 
with the possibility to give their views. Local governments offer a forum where 
all citizens, regardless of their ethnic or religious background, can come together 
and negotiate. Members of conflicting groups will be forced to cooperate and 
compromise if they want to achieve something. The result of such cooperation 
will likely be compromise solutions that are acceptable to all. Opponents get a 
chance to get to know each other and prejudices can be reconsidered. Since local 
governments are locally elected, locally legitimated and familiar with the local 
problems, chances are high that mutually acceptable solutions are found. How-
ever, there is also the danger that members of conflicting groups block decision-
making by refusing to cooperate. 
Decentralisation can change the fabric of power between conflicting groups 
in a district. The introduction of local units of government and the way their 
borders are drawn can upset the balance of minorities and majorities. This can 
work both ways: a former minority can suddenly find itself the majority, but a 
former majority may also find itself in the position of the new minority. Minori-
ties and majorities can conflict over access to resources and political power in the 
district.
The indigenous population of an area and immigrants or refugees can carry 
out violent conflicts over the use of resources such as land and water or the adher-
ence to religious customs. Conflict s can also take place between different families 
or clans. Because of the transfer of authority to the local level the national govern-
ment may lose its role as an arbitrator in these cases. Decentralisation also leads 
to an influx of resources. Conflicts can arise over the use of these resources. De-
pending on how they are distributed, disparities between different groups might 
increase. The additional resources can also be used in financing violent conflict 
among groups.
Using these theoretical assumptions as a starting point, this contribution will 
try to empirically assess the impact of local government on conflicts in Uganda 
taking the case of Kibaale District as an example.1
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3. A History of Kibaale District and its Confl icts
Kibaale is a rural district in western Uganda consisting of the three counties Buy-
aga , Bugangaizi and Buyanja . Until 1900, the area was part of the Kingdom of 
Bunyoro-Kitara . Kibaale district was created out of Hoima district in 1991 in or-
der to improve service delivery in the area and because the inhabitants of Kibaale 
had felt neglected by the local ruling elite of Hoima district. The indigenous in-
habitants of the area of Kibaale are the Banyoro , but approximately half of the 
population today are Bakiga , Alur , Banyarwanda , Lugbara , Basoga , Bagisu and 
Baganda .
Two main types of conflicts can be empirically observed: one is concerned with 
the control of political institutions, and the other one is based on land. Land con-
flicts again have several dimensions: for example, land ownership and the settle-
ment of non-Banyoro in Kibaale . All these conflicts are interrelated, with much 
of the political conflict having its roots in settlement issues.
3.1. Confl icts about land
Land conflicts are rooted in what the Banyoro perceive as a dispossession of land 
by other ethnic groups, historically the Baganda chiefs and more recently settlers 
from other parts of Uganda .
3.1.1. land ownership
In 1899, the Omukama (King) Kabalega of Bunyoro-Kitara was defeated by Brit-
ish colonial forces. Under the 1900 Buganda Agreement, the British gave part of 
the territory of Bunyoro-Kitara kingdom to Baganda chiefs who had supported 
their war against Kabalega. Most of those territories, which were subsequently 
called ‘lost counties’, form the present-day Kibaale district. The so called mailo 
land tenure system was introduced and 68 per cent of the land in the ‘lost coun-
ties’ was given to Baganda chiefs, while the rest of the land became ‘crown land’ 
and forest reserves. The mailo titles granted the Baganda chiefs ownership in per-
petuity. Banyoro who had been living on the land continued to live there and 
became mailo tenants (Nsamba-Gayiiya, 2003). 
The Baganda followed a policy of forced assimilation, encouraging Banyoro 
to marry Baganda and speak their language, Luganda, while the Banyoro felt 
subjugated and enslaved by the Baganda whom they considered to be foreign-
ers. As early as 1907, the Banyoro started a campaign to expel Baganda chiefs. 
In 1918 they formed the Mubende Banyoro Committee (MBC ) in order to: ‘(a) 
Fight for return of Omukama Kabalega; (b) Redeem Banyoro land from Buganda 
and British […]; (c) Reinstate socio-cultural aspects of the Banyoro; (d) Resist 
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foreign non-indigenous rule, exploitation and subjugation’ (MBC , 2003:1). Fol-
lowing Uganda ’s independence and a referendum held in 1964, the lost counties 
were returned to the Kingdom of Bunyoro-Kitara . The MBC forcefully drove the 
Baganda chiefs off their land, but these chiefs, now ‘absentee landlords’, kept their 
titles to the land. 
After 1986 the NRM Government under President Museveni took up the is-
sue of land in Kibaale . The question of mailo land in the lost counties was debated 
in the Constituent Assembly , but no steps were taken to change the situation. The 
mailo tenants are paying a nominal ground rent (busuulu) to the landlords. The 
amount is determined by the district land board. Today there is deep animosity 
towards the Baganda ; many Banyoro are of the opinion that the Baganda grabbed 
the land from them and are not the legal owners of it. They believe that they have 
the right to the land their ancestors fought for and on which they were born. The 
national government is undertaking the compensation of Baganda landlords in 
Kibaale through the Uganda  Land Commission. This commission accesses the 
Land Fund to compensate the absentee landlords and then give titles to the oc-
cupants of the land. 
A first indicator for the dynamics of the conflict about land ownership is the 
number of violent confrontations between Banyoro tenants and Baganda land-
lords. Although the Banyoro started expelling Baganda landlords in 1907, violence 
is only reported for the time following the 1964 referendum when the Banyoro 
headed by the MBC chased away the Baganda with spears and machetes. Lobby-
ing activities are a second indicator. The MBC was founded in 1918, but its lob-
bying work ceased after the lost counties had been restored to Bunyoro in 1964. 
The demands of the MBC after its reconstitution in 2001 include the restoration 
of ownership of mailo land. Other forms of lobbying are the demands of the Ban-
yoro for the return of the land at the Constituent Assembly . The amount of mailo 
land serves as a third indicator. By late 2003 eight out of the original 984.3 square 
miles were given back to Banyoro. This represents only 0.8 per cent of the land 
and thus too little to indicate any significant change in land ownership.2 Conflicts 
over land ownership thus reached its greatest intensity far back in the past when 
the Baganda landlords were driven out in 1964. Increased lobbying in the last ten 
years has brought more awareness, but has not led to a change in the intensity of 
the conflict. The conflict remains latent.
3.1.2. settlement of non-banyoro 
Throughout the history of the Bunyoro-Kitara kingdom other tribes have settled 
in the kingdom and become assimilated. Since 1900 there has been increased set-
tlement as the area was depopulated after the lost war. Table 2 shows the different 
phases of settlement since then. 
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Table 2: Phases of Settlement in Kibaale since 1900









‘unoffi  cial’ 
settlementsSettlements as a 
shield from wildlife
Source: Nsamba-Gayiiya, 2003: pp. 7-11, 30.
The first group of settlers were plantation workers from western Uganda , main-
ly Bakiga . They settled in the Kibaale counties of Buyaga and Bugangaizi on 
land given to them by the Baganda landowners. The Banyoro also encouraged 
Bakiga to settle in the so-called ‘elephant corridor’ between the forest and their 
own settlements in order to shield them from vermin and wild animals. Land 
was allocated to the Bakiga by local chiefs against a token payment or sold by 
Banyoro. 
The first official resettlement scheme by the national government (the Kagadi 
Resettlement Scheme) was started in 1973. The settlement involved the national 
government and the Omukama of Bunyoro. Bunyoro district administration con-
sented. Until 1991 several groups of settlers from western Uganda and returnees 
from Tanzania were resettled. Land located within the scheme cannot be sold and 
can be taken away if not used according to the agreed-upon purpose (Nsamba-
Gayiiya, 2003:7).
The second official resettlement scheme by the national government (the Bu-
gangaizi Resettlement Scheme) followed in 1992. It was negotiated by the Mem-
ber of Parliament (MP) for Bugangaizi County and the national government. 
Around 5,000 Bakiga families were resettled on approximately 100 square miles 
in Bugangaizi County. There are no written rules governing the scheme, especial-
ly whether the settlers are allowed to sell their land or settle and buy land outside 
of the gazetted area. In practice settlers are sub-dividing their plots to sell them 
to other immigrants and are also buying land outside of the scheme. An estimated 
75 per cent of the land occupied by the scheme is mailo land (Nsamba-Gayiiya, 
2003:9). Banyoro mailo tenants and Local Council (LC) officials reportedly also 
sold mailo land and land in forest reserves to Bakiga settlers.
In assessing the dynamic of this conflict one may first look at the influx of 
settlers. Since 1900 the number of settlers in Kibaale has constantly increased 
in absolute as well as relative terms and now stands at 50 per cent. The Banyoro 
and the settlers (specifically the Bakiga ) are ascribed very different attitudes 
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and characteristics. The Bakiga are considered to be hard-working and there-
fore tend to be rich by Ugandan standards. The Banyoro are considered to be 
less industrious and seem to have settled with a certain degree of poverty , an 
‘attitude of poverty’. Many Banyoro are jealous of the economic success of the 
settlers. Another difference lies in religion, a source of conflict throughout the 
history of Uganda : most Banyoro are Catholics, while most of the settlers are 
Protestants. 
A second indicator for the dynamic of conflict is the intensity of confronta-
tion between the two groups. Banyoro and settlers have lived together peacefully. 
There was some animosity and jealousy, but open violence first erupted between 
February and May 2002. In early 2002 Fred Ruremera , a Mukiga , was elected as 
District Chairman. The incumbent and loser of the elections , Sebastian Seki-
toleko , a Munyoro , refused to step down from the post as he was not prepared 
to hand over power to a ‘foreigner’. The reconstituted MBC agitated against Fred 
Ruremera as District Chairman. Clashes between Banyoro and the settlers en-
sued, partly geared at chasing the settlers from the land the Banyoro felt was 
theirs. After Fred Ruremera had agreed to step down from office for a compro-
mise chairman the violence stopped.
Violence broke out again after reports in late April 2003 that the District Land 
Board was allocating land to Banyoro that belonged to Bakiga who had previously 
bought it. These clashes were later blamed on the MBC whose members had been 
using radio stations to air messages that incited the violence. Interviews with 
members of the MBC in September 2003 showed that they were still unwilling 
to tolerate the settlers while a prominent member of the settler community men-
tioned that the houses of the Banyoro could also burn.
The dynamics of the conflict about settlement are such that the growing 
number of settlers provided increasing pressure on the indigenous Banyoro . The 
demands of the MBC that all settlers should leave indicated a further increase in 
the intensity. The conflict climaxed during two phases of open violence between 
February and May 2002 and again in May 2003. The situation then calmed down, 
but the conflict remained at a stage of high intensity where it can easily break out 
into open violence again – as seen in new clashes during the national elections of 
March 2006.
3.2. Control of political institutions
After Kibaale had become a district in 1991, settlers were elected as councillors at 
all LC levels and they also served as chairpersons as far up as sub-county level. 
At the parliamentary elections in 1996, a Mukiga was elected as MP for Buy-
aga County. These developments frightened the Banyoro . M. Baguma Isoke , a 
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Munyoro and currently Minister of State for Lands, said in 1996 while he was 
MP for Buyanja County: ‘Bakiga must not take away political leadership from 
Banyoro simply because they have flooded the district in bigger numbers’ (The 
Exposure, December 1996). Intentional exclusion of settlers from political partici-
pation at district level took place under the pre-2002 District Chairman Sebas-
tian Sekitoleko , a Munyoro. 
The subliminal fear many Banyoro had of the growing number of settlers 
was picked up by the MBC which was reconstituted in July 2001. It resolved 
‘[…] that Banyoro should take political control and direction of the key affairs 
in Kibaale district, and the key political/policy posts be left for [the] Banyoro 
to assume, occupy in the motherland’ (MBC , July 2001: 6-10). Joseph Kazairwe , 
the only surviving member of the original MBC , spoke about the meeting on 
Kibaale Kagadi Community Radio and issued threats to the settler community. 
In reaction the settlers formed the ‘Kibaale Settlers/Immigrants Community’ 
which later became known as the ‘Bafuruki Committee ’. It is chaired by Rev. 
Geoffrey Tibenda, a Mukiga . The committee wrote to various national govern-
ment ministries, the Prime Minister and the President calling their attention to 
the problem. 
The creation of the two interest groups, MBC and the Bafuruki Committee , 
indicated an intensification of the conflict . Violence between Banyoro and the 
settlers serves as another indicator. Violent confrontations could be observed af-
ter the election of the Mukiga , Fred Ruremera , as District Chairman in early 
2002. The MBC agitated against Ruremera as a foreigner. The violence stopped 
only after Ruremera agreed to resign in favour of a compromise candidate. This 
so far marks the climax of the conflict. In June 2003 the compromise chairman 
George Namyaka dismissed two secretaries from the District Executive Commit-
tee, both of whom were settlers. This upset the tribal balance, but did not lead to 
violence.
But why did the political participation of settlers in local government and na-
tional parliament not cause a problem before 2002? Firstly, Fred Ruremera was 
elected as District Chairman, the political head of the district. This meant that 
not just a sub-county would be run by a settler, but effectively the entire popula-
tion of Kibaale . Secondly, the creation of Kibaale district in 1991 upset the balance 
between the Banyoro and settlers: the Banyoro lost their majority. The settlers 
now formed a proportionately larger group which was still growing due to contin-
ued settlement. These circumstances partly enabled a non-Munyoro to success-
fully run for the district chairmanship. 
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4. Local Government’s Role in Confl ict Management in Kibaale 
District
4.1. Uganda ’s local council system
Local government is based on the Local Council (LC) System, a hierarchical 
structure of councils and committees stretching from the village (LC I) up to the 
district (LC V) as illustrated in Table 3. Local government is regulated by the Lo-
cal Governments Act 1997.
Table 3: Structure of Local Government in Rural and Urban Areas (simplifi ed)
Rural Areas Urban Areas
LC V District Councils City Councils
LC IV County Councils –
LC III Sub-county/Town Councils City Division Councils
LC II Parish Councils Ward Councils
LC I Village Councils Village Councils
Source: Author’s own sketch based on the Local Governments Act.
The principal unit of local government are the fifty-six districts. The district 
council is the highest political authority in the district. It is presided over by the 
district chairperson as the political head of the district. The district chairperson 
is directly elected and nominates the members of the district executive commit-
tee, the district’s ‘cabinet’. 
The distribution of functions between local and national government is laid 
down in the Second Schedule of the Local Governments Act . Districts have plan-
ning and legislative powers regarding land administration (including that of mailo 
land) and land surveying while the national government is responsible for nation-
al policy regarding land. Of the various boards and commissions at district level, 
two are of importance for this research: the district service commission which 
recruits, appoints and disciplines the public service and the district land board 
which holds public land, may allocate it to landless inhabitants of the district and 
determines the amount of ground rent (busuulu) paid on mailo land.
The president can take over the administration of a district if the district 
council requests so, a state of emergency has been declared or when it has be-
come extremely difficult or impossible for the district government to function. 
He needs the support of two-thirds of all members of the national parliament 
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and can then assume executive powers for ninety days or even longer (Art. 202 
Constitution, Sec. 101 Local Governments Act). District funds come from lo-
cally-generated revenue (about 10 per cent) and direct transfers from the na-
tional government, of which 85 per cent (2001) are conditional grants. The Lo-
cal Governments Act itself uses the term ‘local government’ only for sub-county 
and district councils. Within this article, however, the term shall encompass 
all those political and administrative structures that are part of decentralised 
governance.3
4.2. Impact of local government on confl icts in Kibaale 
4.2.1. conflicts about land 
When Kibaale became a district in 1991, the problem of absentee landlords al-
ready existed. The analysis of conflict dynamics revealed a latent conflict that has 
remained at the same level of intensity since its climax in 1964. Local government 
never attempted to address the issue except by lobbying for compensation of the 
absentee landlords at the national level. This compensation exercise has started, 
but so far not progressed far enough to make any impact. Local government has 
thus not had an impact on the legal question of land ownership. 
The Second Schedule of the Local Governments Act gives the district the re-
sponsibility for land administration, which includes the regulation of settlement. 
Kibaale district has so far failed to pass such a policy. As early as 1996, the then 
Chairman of the District Land Board was ‘embarrassed […] that the district had 
never adopted any guidelines’ on land policy (The Exposure, December 1996). In 
2002, the District Land Board started formulating the ‘Land Acquisition, Use 
and Management Policy’ to address the issue of settlement. The policy intends to 
stop the influx of settlers by taking away their main incentive which is free avail-
able land. All land that is now available should be distributed to those who are 
already in Kibaale. The policy will also provide a procedure for settlement. Since 
the policy is likely to be changed during the deliberations in the District Coun-
cil , it is difficult to judge its potential impact on settlement. It does, however, 
show that local government is now not only aware of the conflict , but also trying 
to address it by providing clear rules for settlement. The previous resettlement 
schemes (Kagadi Resettlement Scheme 1973, Bugangaizi Resettlement Scheme 
1992) had been negotiated without the direct participation of local government. 
Local council officials were excluded from taking part in major decisions such as 
the allocation of plots. After 1992 the settlers, especially Bakiga , were elected into 
the LCs in the area of the scheme. Some are reported to have abused these politi-
cal positions by giving land to other settlers against a token payment irrespective 
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of whether the land is public or mailo land. Where LCs are dominated by settlers, 
illegal allocation of land continues.
The dynamics of the conflict show that the conflict intensified further with 
increasing numbers of settlers. Thus any activity of local government that in-
creased the number of settlers (such as the consent to the settlement schemes 
and the illegal allocation of land by LC officials) or failed to regulate settlement 
(as a settlement policy could have done) constitutes an intensifying impact. The 
allocation of land by the District Land Board in 2003 immediately preceded the 
violent land clashes and may thus have served as a trigger for the escalation of 
the conflict. 
4.2.2. control of political institutions
Political institutions are not only the arena for political representation of all eth-
nic groups within the district; control of these local institutions might also be 
used to influence access to land for group members. For the dynamics of conflict 
it is often not relevant whether such influence is actually occurring: what matters 
is the chance that it might occur. 
Local council elections were held in Kibaale District in early 2002. Thirty-six 
district councillors were elected, a third of them settlers, the others Banyoro . The 
Mukiga (and member of the Bafuruki Committee ) Fred Ruremera was elected 
to District Chairperson with 56 per cent of votes. The MBC Banyoro hardliners 
had only half a year before decided that only Banyoro should be allowed to oc-
cupy political positions in Kibaale. Now MBC members started agitating against 
a non-Munyoro as District Chairman. The incumbent District Chairman, Se-
bastian Sekitoleko , did not hand over power to Fred Ruremera on grounds that 
he was not a Munyoro. Fred Ruremera was accused of having threatened other 
settlers with sanctions in case they did not vote for him. This accusation is re-
jected by more neutral observers, such as the staff of development organisations 
in Kibaale and Kampala . The Bafuruki Committee claims, on the contrary, that 
the national government had asked the people not to vote for Ruremera . Kibaale 
Kagadi Community Radio broadcast a speech of a minister without portfolio 
recruited just before the elections in which he said that the President had advised 
that a non-Munyoro should not stand for the chairmanship. 
In mid-February 2002, accusations broke out into open violence. Houses and 
huts belonging to settlers were burned down, settlers were threatened and physi-
cally attacked. The clashes killed five people. The army and riot police were de-
ployed to Kibaale and roadblocks set up to stop the clashes. The violence stopped 
about May 2002. There were fears that the situation could turn into a genocide 
like the one in neighbouring Rwanda in 1994. This was also reflected by the head-
lines in the press warning of ‘genocide’ and ‘ethnic cleansing’. Local FM radios were 
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reportedly running hate messages, speakers vowing to chase away all ‘foreigners’ 
from the land they had ‘fought for from Buganda ’ (Watson, 2001-2002: 94-96). 
The management of Kibaale Kagadi Community Radio was later instructed by 
President Museveni to stop airing these programmes.
Others warned that the situation was deliberately being exaggerated in the me-
dia in order to make the nation believe that there was a war going on in Kibaale 
(Kibaale District Settlers and Immigrants Community 2002). This was confirmed 
by volunteers from abroad who were working in Kibaale town and Kakindo at the 
time. There was also local talk in Kakindo that politicians had given poor people 
alcohol and money to set houses on fire. The Regional Police Commander, Haji 
Balimwoyo , reported that politicians had ‘been on the forefront though they do 
not want to be seen as being behind it’ (Watson 2001-2002: 96).
The national government responded to the violence in Kibaale by forming 
the ‘Committee of Inquiry into the Political Developments in Kibaale District ’. 
The Committee recommended that Fred Ruremera should resign in favour of a 
neutral candidate. President Museveni visited Kibaale District in April 2002 and 
‘persuaded’ Fred Ruremera to resign: ‘If Ruremera does not stand down volun-
tarily, we use the powers under Article 202 of the Constitution to take over the 
district using the powers of the President supported by two-thirds of Parliament.’ 
(cited in New Vision, 24 April 2002). Both Article 202 of the Constitution of 
the Republic and Uganda and Sec. 101 of the Local Governments Act contain an 
emergency provision that allow the president to take over executive powers in a 
district. These legal provisions will be analysed in more detail below.
Fred Ruremera was officially sworn in as chairman on the day of President Mu-
seveni ’s visit to the district, and agreed to step down in due course to allow for the 
nomination of a compromise candidate. This compromise candidate was George 
Namyaka , a Munyoro and a Protestant whose late wife was a Mukiga and whose 
daughter is also married to a Mukiga. Both the MBC and the Bafuruki Com-
mittee agreed that only ‘their’ candidate George Namyaka should be nominated 
for district chairmanship and asked the national government to take ‘appropriate 
action’ against any other person who would want to register at the nomination. 
With Namyaka being the only candidate nominated he was consequently de-
clared District Chairman of Kibaale district in July 2002. Following a recommen-
dation for power-sharing and representation with all committees at district level 
that the MBC and Bafuruki Committee had agreed upon at a meeting chaired by 
President Museveni in June 2002, George Namyaka appointed seven secretar-
ies to the District Executive Committee representing all three counties; Banyoro 
outnumbered non-Banyoro by just one. George Namyaka was declared chairman 
after the violence had already stopped. The power-sharing policy he applied in 
appointing the District Executive Committee gave the settlers representation and 
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in a way compensated them for the ‘loss’ of the chairmanship. Both the new chair-
man and the power-sharing policy helped to stabilise the situation.
The above analysis points to actors outside of local government which had 
an impact on the conflict . Among the most important of these actors seem to be 
the central government and President Museveni and the two interest groups, the 
MBC and the Bafuruki Committee . Their role will be analysed in more detail in 
the following section.
5. Explaining the Role of Local Government
Local government had an ambivalent role in the events of 2002. The decision to 
create a separate district in 1991 had a powerful impact for the strategies of po-
litical actors and ethnic group leaders. The new district and its political institu-
tions indeed became the relevant arena for conflicts over resources and influence. 
The introduction of local government was apparently more important for conflict 
dynamics than the decisions taken by district councils and administration. But 
which explanatory factors may account for this development? Three such factors 
are examined. Firstly, there are factors that lie within local government itself. 
These are the competencies and resources transferred to local government (the 
legal framework) and the inclusiveness of local government. Secondly, there are 
outside interventions into the working of local government. Lastly, the type of 
conflict will be analysed as an explanatory factor.
5.1. Land ownership
Local government did not have an impact on land ownership. In general, the legal 
framework provides two different ways of addressing land ownership: adjusting 
the amount of ground rent (busuulu) that mailo tenants pay to their landlord and 
compensation of absentee landlords with the aim of giving the land to the mailo 
tenants. 
The District Land Board determines the amount of ground rent (busuulu). 
Sec. 32 (5) of the Land Act sets the maximum amount at 1,000 Ugandan Shillings 
(less than EUR 0.50) per year regardless of the size or location of the land. For 
most cases this is far below the market price and cannot reflect the real value of 
the land. An impact thus cannot be expected.
The District Land Board has powers to ‘acquire by purchase or otherwise 
rights or interests in land’ (Sec. 61 (2) (a) Land Act) and could thus theoretically 
purchase land from the Baganda landlords. But local government does not have 
the financial means to do this: 84 per cent of a district’s income comes from con-
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ditional grants by the national government and unconditional grants are largely 
spent on general management and administration of the district (Francis and 
James, 2004: 330). Thus only locally-generated revenue would be available for the 
purchase of land, and locally-generated revenue in a relatively poor district like 
Kibaale district is low.
5.2. Settlement of non-Banyoro 
Three different ways in which local government contributed to the intensification 
of the settlement conflict must be explained: the consent to the two resettlement 
schemes (which was given under a previous legal framework), abuse of office by 
LC officials and the failure of the District Council to pass a settlement policy.
Since 1997 the Local Governments Act has provided local government with 
a way of dealing with abuse of office. Most cases of abuse of office took place in 
LCs rather than Resistance Councils (RCs). The name was changed from RCs to 
LCs by the Constitution in 1995. Therefore most illegal activities by LC officials 
should fall under the jurisdiction of the Local Governments Act of 1997. The 
Local Governments Act (Sec. 15) allows the removal of district and sub-county 
chairpersons from office on grounds of abuse of office by a resolution supported 
by two-thirds of all council members. This quorum might have been difficult 
to reach in practice. Members of the District Executive Committee can only be 
removed from their positions, but they retain their offices as district councillors. 
(Sec. 21 (a), (d), 22 (1) Local Governments Act). The Local Governments Act 
does not provide for the removal of councillors who are abusing their office. The 
abuse of office by LC officials is thus not effectively addressed under the current 
legal framework. 
Representation of settlers on LCs in the area of the Bugangaizi Resettlement 
Scheme was high enough to dominate the councils. Some settlers actually man-
aged to abuse this dominant position by illegally allocating land to other settlers. 
Information on the decision-making process in these LCs is not available, but it 
is unlikely that illegal allocation of land would be openly debated since allocation 
of land is not the function of the councils but of the District Land Board. The 
dominance of settlers does not automatically mean that Banyoro on these coun-
cils were underrepresented, since the settlers actually are the (dominant) majority 
in the area of the resettlement scheme. But the presence of settlers on LCs did 
make the abuse possible.
Why did the district council fail to pass the settlement policy? The Local Gov-
ernments Act allocates the responsibility for land administration, which includes 
the regulation of settlement to the district council (Second Schedule, Part 1, No. 
5 (viii) Local Governments Act). The District Council only started debating the 
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‘Land Acquisition, Use and Management Policy’ in May 2003. The failure to make 
use of the provision earlier on may stem from lacking willingness to address the 
problem. The Land Board was certainly aware of it, as a statement its chairman 
made in 1996 shows. He was ‘embarrassed […] that the district had never adopted 
any guidelines’ on land policy (The Exposure, December 1996). 
Can the non-representation of settlers in local government explain the failure 
to pass a settlement policy? The indigenous Banyoro had an interest in regulat-
ing the influx of settlers and stopping illegal settlement or any settlement at all. 
The interests of the settlers already present in Kibaale would have been to stay 
there and avoid further illegal settlement or to invite more settlers in order to 
provide them with a place to live, but also to increase their number and thus have 
a stronger standing against the Banyoro. Under the chairmanship of Sebastian 
Sekitoleko (1998-2002), settlers were intentionally excluded from boards and 
commissions. Therefore Banyoro members had the chance to pass a settlement 
policy and the settlers could not have stopped them. Kibaale was certainly a con-
venient place for the national government to resettle people from other parts of 
Uganda . In the case of the Bugangaizi Resettlement Scheme, the Bakiga settled 
in Kibaale had been evicted from Mpokya game reserve, in which the national 
government had a (financial) interest. President Museveni ’s National Resistance 
Movement (NRM ) has most support in the densely populated south-western 
districts. Land pressure in these districts was reduced if some of their inhabitants 
could be resettled somewhere else – and it also ensured their continuing support 
for the NRM Government and President Museveni . In order to keep Kibaale as 
a settlement area, both national government and the President may have exerted 
pressure on politicians in Kibaale district not to pass a settlement policy. 
5.3. Control of political institutions
The design of local government institutions also had an impact on the manage-
ment of the political conflict : A plurality system is used to elect the district chair-
person. The disadvantage of a plurality system is that the candidate who polls 
most (i.e. the plurality of ) votes goes through – although he may not necessarily 
have been elected by the majority of the population. In the case of Fred Rurem-
era , who was elected with an absolute majority (56 per cent), this did not become 
relevant.
Power is concentrated in the position of the chairperson who is the political 
head of the district. Although the District Executive Committee does have its 
competencies, it is the chairperson who nominates the members of this commit-
tee and who is perceived as the district ‘leader’.4 Power-sharing is not possible 
since the highest political post in the district is attributed to one person and not 
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to a group of people. This explains the polarisation around the chairperson, but 
not why it took such a violent form in Kibaale . 
Following his election, Fred Ruremera should have been sworn in and served 
his term as chairman. But what happened instead was that President Museveni 
‘persuaded’ Fred Ruremera to resign by threatening to make use of the emergency 
provision (Sec. 101 of the Local Governments Act and Art. 202 of the Constitu-
tion) to assume executive powers over the district. Fred Ruremera ’s resignation 
was not completely voluntary, but forced upon him as the legal framework put 
him in a deadlock situation. The tense situation in Kibaale met the requirements 
for President Museveni to assume executive powers over the district: the approval 
of two-thirds of the members of parliament. This seemed very likely at the time. 
The second requirement is either a request from the district council to take over, 
a state of emergency in the district or in Uganda in general or a situation ‘where 
it has become extremely difficult or impossible for [the] district government to 
function’. In the last case, parliament and not the district council or any other 
elected body at district level decides whether the district government can still 
function. 
After ninety days the President could have handed back the administration 
of the district to the incumbent district government. But Parliament could also 
have decided that the prevailing circumstances still made it ‘impossible for the 
incumbent district government to assume the administration of the district’ and 
the President could have ordered new elections . In this case, Fred Ruremera still 
would not have been able to stay in office, but would have needed to campaign 
for re-election. Either way, he would not have been able to serve a full term as 
chairman.
The intervention of members of the MBC and the Bafuruki Committee ex-
plains why George Namyaka was the only nominated candidate for the chair-
manship. But it is also a result of the intervention by President Museveni who not 
only recommended that a compromise candidate should be found, but also that 
he should be the only nominated candidate. The power-sharing policy George 
Namyaka applied led to a high presence of settlers (44 per cent) on the District 
Executive Committee. This explains its stabilising impact. The actual decision 
to apply power-sharing on the District Executive Committee goes back to the 
recommendation that was made by President Museveni .
It is questionable whether the specific electoral institutions of local govern-
ment were a crucial factor in intensifying the conflict . The personalisation of 
political power in one single individual who represented only ‘his or her group’ 
on the contrary, certainly had an impact on conflict dynamics. The intervention 
of President Museveni , which was backed by legal and constitutional provisions, 
might have mitigated the violent conflict in the short run. However, it also set a 
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precedent that ethnic mobilisation against ‘outsiders’ is rewarded with a political 
intervention from national government which deprives a democratically-elected 
district chairman of his office thereby also weakening the legitimacy of demo-
cratic procedures within local government.
5.4. Th e type of confl ict as an explanatory factor
Types of conflicts can be grouped together in different categories, for example 
by subject matter. The expectation here is that local government would have the 
greatest impact on conflicts about political power. Conflicts can also be distin-
guished according to the level on which they take place: the national level, the dis-
trict level, concerning both the national and the district level or concerning two 
or more different districts (see above, Section 2). In this case, one would expect 
that local government can best address conflicts taking place at district level, but 
would be progressively less successful for conflicts in which other districts or the 
national level are involved. 
The conflict between Banyoro and Baganda over the ownership of land in 
Kibaale district predates the establishment of local government. By its nature, 
the conflict concerns more than just Kibaale district because the Baganda land-
lords live in other districts. The solution of the conflict by way of compensating 
the Baganda landlords is outside of the financial scope of Kibaale district local 
government. 
The conflict about settlement of non-Banyoro is open to regulation by local 
government. In the case of Kibaale , the failure to pass a settlement policy led to 
a continuing disorganised settlement and an intensification of the conflict. The 
abuse of office by LC officials took place within the district, but effective provi-
sions to address the conflict were missing and local government failed to make 
use of the existing provisions. Local government had thus some impact on the 
conflict settlement.
By its nature, the closest to local government is the conflict over control of lo-
cal political institutions, the arenas in and through which struggles for political 
power are carried out. On the one hand, this offers the chance to guide the con-
flict in such a way that it becomes less intense. On the other hand, conflicts taking 
place within the structure of local government have the potential to destabilise lo-
cal government itself. All this could be observed in Kibaale District. The election 
of Fred Ruremera destabilised local government ; his resignation, the compromise 
chairman George Namyaka and especially the power-sharing policy applied de-
fused the tension. 
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6. Conclusion 
This contribution set out to analyse and explain the impact of local government 
on conflicts by a combination of factors internal to local government, such as the 
legal framework and the inclusiveness of local governments, as well as outside 
interventions and the type of conflict .
In the context of Kibaale , three different conflicts were identified upon which 
the impact of local government had to be analysed. Roughly 70 per cent of land 
in Kibaale is ‘mailo land’ that belongs to Baganda landowners. Because this land 
used to belong to Banyoro prior to the 1900 Buganda Agreement, Banyoro still 
consider the land as their property. The second type of conflict is concerned with 
the settlement of non-Banyoro in Kibaale. The election of these settlers to local 
government offices in Kibaale led to the third conflict about the control of politi-
cal institutions.
Local government had no impact on questions of land ownership. This is ex-
plained by the legal framework that does not permit local government to address 
the conflict , and also by the type of conflict itself as it takes place largely outside 
the scope of local government.
With regard to the settlement of non-Banyoro an intensifying impact was 
observed: local government consented to the two official resettlement schemes 
which led to an increased influx of settlers; settlers within local government 
abused their positions to illegally allocate land to other settlers; and lastly the 
District Council failed to make use of its statutory right to regulate settlement. 
The legal framework in place at the time of the consent largely explains the con-
sent to the resettlement schemes. The abuse of office was made possible by the 
presence of settlers in local councils (a sign of the inclusiveness of local govern-
ment) and perpetuated by the legal framework that did not allow local govern-
ment to effectively address abuse of office. The failure of the District Council 
to pass a settlement policy can tentatively be explained by the interest of the 
national government in Kibaale as a settlement area. That interest may have led 
to an intervention at the district level. At a broader level, one could argue that 
decentralisation did actually move conflicts about land to a newly-created district 
which was not well equipped in terms of legal competencies and resources to deal 
with this complicated issue.
The political conflict was, in a way, the direct result of national decentralisa-
tion policies. These policies did effectively increase the political and administra-
tive importance of the district leadership as it was the district land board which 
was going to discuss and decide the land allocation and compensation scheme. In 
creating a new district with a demographic majority of settlers, conflicts about 
the ethnic control of political institutions could easily have been predicted. It is 
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a combination of objective (changing) population ratios and new institutional 
constraints (in the form of local government) which largely explain the conflict 
dynamics. In these new contexts, the mobilisation of the MBC around the issue 
of Munyoro rights was the crucial variable in triggering off the violent escalation. 
The Local Governments Act and the Constitution then provided for a procedur-
ally correct way to ‘depose’ the unwanted District Chairman 
The analysis has shown that the ability of local government to address and 
manage conflicts does indeed depend on a number of critical factors. Whether 
local government has any impact at all depends on the type of conflict (whether 
the conflict is open to regulation by local government or not). The type of impact 
(whether local government intensifies or mitigates conflict) depends on factors 
such as the legal framework, the potential for outside interventions into local 
government and the inclusiveness of local government. 
In its first chapter, this contribution proposed that decentralisation would 
contribute to the management of conflicts between different ethnic groups in 
a district by providing a local arena in which conflicts are carried out in a non-
violent fashion. It further proposed that at the local level it should be easier to 
organise participation of all relevant stakeholders. In the case of Kibaale , these 
assumptions failed: conflicts were carried out in a violent manner after the elec-
tions in 2002. The introduction of inclusive political participation and competi-
tive elections to district chairman led actually to an escalation of latent conflicts 
among population groups over the access to land. While political participation at 
the lower levels of local government (i.e. village and county level) remained peace-
ful, it was the district level where interest groups mobilised along ethnic differ-
ences. The most conflict -sensitive element in Ugandan decentralisation policies 
proved to be the demarcation of district borders. The proportion of settlers in the 
total population rose dramatically after Kibaale was split from Hoima district in 
1991. Kibaale and its history as ‘lost county’ may represent a special case (which 
favoured the sentiment of political marginalisation and thus Munyoro ethnic 
identity). It is, however, not difficult to draw a more general lesson: devolution 
indeed creates new political communities and institutions with new political ma-
jorities and losers that may resort to violence to defend their interests.
 Notes
 Th e author collected data in Kibaale District, Uganda between August and November .
 Author’s interview with M. Baguma Isoke, Minister of State (Lands),  September , 
Kampala.
 For a more extended treatment of the Local Government System see Francis and James, 
, and Wunsch and Ottemoeller, .
 Sec.  (), () Local Governments Act.
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8 Decentralisation as a Stabilising Factor in 
Rwanda 
Peter van Tilburg
‘A country does not have to be deemed fi t for democracy; rather, it has to 
become fi t through democracy’ (Amartya Sen, 1999).
1. Introduction
There has been a dramatic change in violent conflicts in the world from tradi-
tional inter-state conflicts to intra-state conflicts. From the 1990s onwards, almost 
all major conflicts around the world are taking place within states. These con-
flicts are in most cases caused by two powerful elements, which usually operate 
in combination: strong identity (based on race, religion, culture, language) and 
imbalanced distribution of economic, social and political resources. The result 
has been an immense growth of civilian casualties in conflicts, increasing from 5 
per cent of all war victims during World War I to 80 per cent during the 1990s 
(Harris and Reilly, 2003).
How does it happen that people who have lived together peacefully, even 
coming from the same family, are suddenly standing up against one another? 
One explanation comes from an author referring to Serbia : ‘ There is a psycho-
logical mechanism that makes it possible for large numbers of basically normal 
citizens to engage in collective crimes or to accept them without protest. It is 
based on strong links between members of the group. (...) The primary driving 
force leading to genocide is not the pathology of individuals, organising and 
committing the genocide, but the pathology of the ideas guiding them’ (Anzu-
lovic, 1999).
In this respect, the question is whether there is a mechanism that would allow 
governments to keep these conflicts under control. In cases where conflicts have 
come to a halt, it appears that there are several possible pitfalls that can occur in 
the post-conflict period. Government can become overburdened by humanitar-
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ian projects during the relief phase, armed rebel movements can become part of 
local governments after a peace deal, a change of regime may enforce a break with 
the past, and the decentralisation process may be lagging after national elections 
(Musch, 2005: 8). 
There are many examples in the world of ways in which democratic po-
litical competition has exacerbated underlying social tensions. On the other 
hand, however, in the light of distrust among ethnic groups and the shattered 
social cohesion in traditional communities, democracy, and particularly decen-
tralisation, giving the same rights to everyone at local level, has also been seen 
as a possible solution in the aftermath of conflicts. In this context the concept 
of democratic decentralisation should be introduced, pooling decentralisation 
with good governance. This encompasses at least two key relationships: the 
reciprocal relationship between the central government and local governments , 
and the relationship between the local government and the local population 
(Barnett et al, 1997). But still, does democratic decentralisation bridge the past 
with the future? Decentralisation and participation can at least give people the 
feeling that they are going to manage their own affairs and control their own 
future.
The present article intends to elucidate the assessment that in Rwanda de-
centralisation and the resulting participation of the local population in plan-
ning their own future is supporting social cohesion and the drive towards 
stability . Data have been mainly collected in one of the provinces (the south-
western province of Cyangugu ) in the frame of an evaluation of a decentralisa-
tion and good governance programme, supported by the Dutch government. 
Cyangugu has been heavily hit by the genocide, particularly during the period 
of ‘scorched earth’ practices in 1994, when Hutu were fleeing to the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DR Congo , at that time Zaire ), destroying everything in 
their way.
The history of many African countries is characterised by conflict , largely 
within their boundaries. While conflicts between states may tend, in some coun-
tries, to mobilise national unity and strengthen social cohesion, violent conflicts 
within the state mostly weaken its social framework. Most of these conflicts are 
known as having caused lots of bloodshed, migration and economic disorder. Of-
ten the international community enforces a temporary ceasefire and peace upon 
these governments. But then the question comes up: how can peace and stabil-
ity be maintained? The basic perception here is that a minimum condition for 
stability is that the government formally supports it. However, efforts to develop 
a free and non-violent society can only be really successful when the population 
as a whole is involved, independent of ethnic background, race or gender. There 
should be respect for the rights of every citizen. 
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It is difficult to define the concept of stability , as it could be suggested that 
stability is achieved as soon as there is no conflict . This is not the case, though the 
absence of conflict is doubtlessly a precondition for stability. On the other hand, 
conflict itself is not necessarily problematic, as it can be a constructive means of 
social change in those situations where the status quo is unfair or illegitimate. 
The question raised in this article is: when can we call a post-conflict situation 
stable and how could decentralisation be an instrument to manage conflicts and 
maintain stability? 
Within this contribution our main concern is political stability , which is de-
fined in general terms as a situation when an enduring, legitimate political order 
has been secured. This is reached through a consensus on justice by all conflicting 
groupings: in the first place based on the notion of distributive justice, being a 
form of fairness; and secondly based on legitimacy. Such consensus is needed to 
produce a just and stable government, and to achieve political stability (Young, 
2000). One way to strengthen an enduring and legitimate political order is to 
involve citizens through decentralised, local governments . Such involvement at 
local level is best guaranteed when decentralisation takes the form of devolution , 
i.e. the transfer of competencies from central government to autonomous units of 
local governance with a statutory or constitutional basis for power. 
In the nexus between decentralisation and stability there are two basic ele-
ments that require attention: ownership and accountability . Ownership refers to 
the situation in which local citizens can manage and decide on their own future. 
But when only selected groups are in the position to control the future, this may 
be a source of conflict again. Therefore, a system of accountability is required. 
In the formal sense it is taken care of by a system called ‘checks and balances’, 
referring to a structural division of competencies within government between 
the executive, legislative and judiciary powers. Accountability relates to a con-
trolling structure, whereby government is directly or indirectly monitored and 
restrained by an active and a concerned citizenry, covering all groupings in so-
ciety. Both concepts are inter-related with political participation : the more local 
citizens (whether or not representing ethnic or other groups) participate in the 
political process, the stronger the feeling of ownership and the more the system 
of accountability becomes manifest. 
One of the key principles of such democratic practice is to empower civil society 
and to give it capacities for direct participation in governance. But then those local 
institutions that are allowed to do this ‘checking’ should be invested with the nec-
essary resources, power and authority. Th ese inputs are necessary to carry out the 
required duties, and to raise non-governmental institutions to a level above suspi-
cion and to make them fully accountable towards the citizens. In order to achieve 
this, conditions should be created, such as proper education and health services, 
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through which people are enabled to participate. Participation of citizens in the 
peace-building process is important for its success. Th e more the local population 
contributes to eff orts to rebuild civil society and create stable institutions, the more 
it will own the process and the higher it will value the outcome of a peaceful and 
successful long-lasting settlement (Gizelis and Kosek, 2005; World Bank , 2003). 
Or, as is postulated elsewhere, citizens with a poor quality of life, and who are given 
little or no decision-making power are much more likely to re-participate in rebel 
organisations than those with higher living standards and the ability to participate 
in the political process (Walter, 2004; see also Jütting et al., 2005). 
Another relevant concept used to analyse confl ict situations and stability is social 
capital. Social capital is defi ned in general terms as the internal social and cultural 
coherence of society, norms and values that govern interactions among people and 
the institutions in which they are embedded (Colletta and Cullen, 2002). Violent 
confl icts within a state divide the population, undermine interpersonal and com-
munal groups’ trust, and destroy norms and values that underlie cooperation and 
collective action for the common good. On the other hand, restoration of social cap-
ital will support bonds within communities, build bridges between communities, 
and link state and community levels. In other words, social capital will strengthen 
society’s cohesiveness. However, there is a danger that social capital is being built 
up within groups, particularly ethnic groups, and would again become a threat to 
stability. In other words, social capital can be considered a two-edged sword.
Studies on social capital distinguish vertical social capital (cohesion between 
levelled groups) and horizontal social capital (cohesion crossing the hierarchy) 
(Woolcock and Narayan, 1999; Colletta and Cullen, 2002). And the conclusion 
is that the more horizontal social capital is linked with vertical social capital, the 
more likely society is capable of managing conflicts. In other words, social cohe-
sion between groups at the same level, as well as at different levels, form essential 
components in the prevention of civil wars. In institutional terms, we can say 
that vertical social capital is sustained through a system institutionally linking 
the different levels of society, and horizontal social capital at local level through a 
structure guaranteeing equal rights of all groups and mutual respect among these 
groups. Both can be satisfied through decentralisation, being an instrument for 
managing conflicting interests in a non-violent way through electoral systems, 
power-sharing, institutional set-up, political rights, the rule of law , mechanisms 
for representation, and participation of civil society (Large and Sisk, 2006; Har-
ris and Reilly, 2003). This may guarantee a system of accountability and a strong 
feeling of ownership. 
In other words, if decentralisation stimulates ownership among all ethnic or 
socio-cultural groups at the local level, and allows a system of accountability to be 
developed, it may support the growth of social capital. This means that to make 
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decentralisation sustainable it has to be supported at national and local levels. At 
the national level, support is reflected in government policies, political infrastruc-
ture , and government strategies for participation , equality, and accountability. At 
the local level this is reflected in the number of financial and human resources, 
the amount of revenue that is generated, the capacity of management in participa-
tory planning, and its accountability and transparency. 
Social capital, the feeling of ownership and accountability have a dimming 
effect on conflicts, whereby decentralisation is restraining decision-makers from 
using violence (Bohara, Mitchell and Nepal, 2006). What is required from gov-
ernments? One could say that the quality of governance can be judged by the level 
that they are able to satisfy at least four criteria: accountability, participation , pre-
dictability and transparency (Bratton, 2004; Kudva, 2006). Accountability refers 
to the answerability of public officials concerning their behaviour; participation 
relates to the involvement of citizens in the development process as the benefici-
aries of this process; predictability concerns a fair and consistent application of 
laws and the implementation of government policies; and transparency refers to 
the availability of information to the general public and the clarity about govern-
ment rules, regulations and decisions. 
In addition, the political process should allow a fair share of resources, in-
come and opportunities among all social groups. That would mean that, in order 
to prevent underlying conflicts reviving again, a long-term human development 
approach is required, through a sustained programme of not only setting up po-
litical institutions that can administer social conflicts but also socio-economic 
development , improving the well-being of all members of society (Oosterhout, 
2002; Robinson, 2003).
Based on what is said above and on experiences with decentralisation in many 
African and Asian countries, we can say that, in order to achieve financial decen-
tralisation and participative governance, at least five conditions are to be met:
1. Introduction and implementation of appropriate legal reforms, including the 
legalisation of local institutions and their decision-making power;
2. Institutionalisation of a financial resource base at the local level, through rev-
enue generation and tax collection;
3. Initial assistance to local governments in institution and capacity building by 
central government , either or not supported by donor organisations;
4. Standardisation of local government’s accountability , transparency and re-
sponsiveness; and
5. Enhancement of the role and performance of local interest groups in participa-
tion .
In the next chapters these parameters are being looked at in Rwanda ’s context.
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2. Genocide in Rwanda 
The massacre that took place in Rwanda in 1994 has, in terms of magnitude and 
speed, hardly any comparison in history: 800,000 people were killed during less 
than three months. The level of hatred between the Hutu and Tutsi that caused 
this genocide did not exist in pre-colonial times, when both coexisted harmoni-
ously. Identification with an ethnic group was loose, and was based on whether 
one belonged to the cultivators or pastoralists respectively. But during the Bel-
gian colonial period the Rwandese were forced to make a choice between these 
two ethnic identities. The result was that during the colonial period the ethnic 
dimension of society and its political system became institutionalised. And thus, 
after independence in 1962, governments were considered either Tutsi or Hutu, 
marginalising the other ethnic group. 
Following the overthrow of the Tutsi government by the Hutu in 1961, the 
Tutsi faced increasing repression. The combination of an increasing economic 
and political malaise under president Habyarimana fuelled the existing ethnic 
hatred. Many Tutsi were forced to seek for refuge abroad. But in 1990 the Tutsi 
rebel force, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF ) led by Paul Kagame invaded the 
northern part of the country. As a response the Rwandan security forces armed ci-
vilians, particularly the Interahamwe. This consisted initially of a group of young 
men that at the eve of the genocide were attached to the youth wing of the ruling 
MRND party (Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement ). 
But they increasingly showed up at political meetings, dressed up bizarrely in 
combat fatigues covered with red, green and black coloured cloths in the colours 
of the Rwandan flag, and carrying machetes and carved replicas of Kalashnikovs. 
They were later even being trained by the ruling MRND, and participation was 
stimulated by the propaganda spread by the Radio et Télévision Libre des Mille 
Collines .
Notwithstanding this hatred, on 4 August 1993 a peace agreement was signed 
in Arusha between the RPF and the Government of Rwanda in order to end the 
civil war and to start a peace process that would result in the establishment of 
democracy and human rights in the country. To keep an eye on the compliance 
of the treaty and in the light of continued killings and rising tension between the 
two ethnic groups, the United Nations (UN ) sent out a peacekeeping mission to 
Rwanda. This United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was 
conducted under Chapter VI of the UN Charter and was considered as classic 
peacekeeping, having only a very limited mandate. This mandate turned out to be 
heartrendingly insufficient to force both groups to maintain the Arusha accords 
and to prevent the genocide. The force commander in charge, General Roméo 
Dallaire , got caught up in the civil war and could do nothing but watch the kill-
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ings continuing. His frustrating experiences he laid down in a book, which shows 
the shameless indecisiveness and powerlessness of the international community 
(Dallaire , 2003).
The extraordinary eruption of violence had not been foreseen, and the limited 
mandate of the UNAMIR became clear mid-January 1994. Then there was suf-
ficient proof that there had been a conspiracy to destroy the Arusha  Peace Agree-
ment by any means necessary. When on 6 April an airplane coming back from 
Tanzania crashed, killing the Rwandese President Habyarimana , the President 
of Burundi Ntaryamira , and the Chief of Staff of the Rwandan Army Nsabi-
mana, there was no limit any more to the aggression. The Belgian UN troop-
ers were blamed for taking down the airplane, and shortly thereafter ten Belgian 
soldiers were killed. During the few months to follow, more than 800,000 people 
were killed, indiscriminate of age, level of education or sex, about two million 
were forced to flee from the country, and another one million were internally 
displaced. 
After the RPF forces overtook Kigali in July 1994, it was the Hutu militias 
who had to flee to neighbouring countries, destroying everything on their way. 
During these days many Hutu were killed in revenge, though the number does 
not match the number of Tutsi killed. Only two years later, about one million 
Hutu returned from neighbouring countries DR Congo , Burundi , Tanzania and 
Uganda , many among them being perpetrators. It is in this historical context that 
the process of democratisation in Rwanda had to take place. 
Officially, the RPF headed a multiparty government, but in practice non-RPF 
cabinet ministers only retained their positions by the grace of the ruling party. 
From October 1999 to March 2000 there was a major shake-up in government as 
the RPF leadership engineered the departure of the Parliamentary Speaker, the 
Prime Minister, three other cabinet ministers, and finally President Pasteur Biz-
imungu . In April 2000, President Bizimungu resigned and Vice-President Paul 
Kagame became the first Tutsi president of the nation. It was Kagame ’s rebel 
force that seized Rwanda ’s capital and put an end to the genocide in 1994.
The new government of President Paul Kagame aimed from the beginning 
at reconciliation, poverty alleviation and democratisation . In the frame of the 
reconciliation process, one of the first contributions of development assistance 
has been the restoration of the capacity of domestic courts to handle the about 
125,000 suspects crowded into 160 jails. One way has been the establishment of 
the so-called Gacaca , which is based on a traditional community-based conflict 
resolution mechanism to expedite the genocide trials. Under the system, local 
people with integrity in the community are made responsible for trying suspects 
in villages where they committed their crimes. And as suspects meet their vic-
tims, these trials are also intended to facilitate reconciliation at the grassroots 
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level (Khadiagala, 2004). This system of Gacaca, though supporting the process 
of reconciliation, did not necessarily contribute to development.
In the meantime a new constitution was drafted with a strong focus on na-
tional reconciliation, and on eradication of ethnic, regional and other forms of 
group distinctiveness. Reconciliation is important as it forms the process through 
which a society moves from a divided past to a shared future (Bloomfield, Barnes 
and Huyse, 2003). The constitution stipulates that no party can hold more than 
50 per cent of the positions in the cabinet, even with an absolute majority in par-
liament. The new constitution was adopted by referendum in May 2003 with a 93 
per cent majority of the electorate. Notwithstanding all these efforts the contin-
ued external security threats, including the insurgencies of 1996-1997 and 2001, 
remain a serious impediment to recovery.
3. Decentralisation in Rwanda 
When the two parts of Ruanda-Urundi became independent in July 1962, there 
was pressure from the UN to federalise as a single nation, but both opted to go 
separately. Ruanda, in which ethnic violence continued during 1960 and 1961, be-
came a republic, and its name was changed to Rwanda . Historically, Rwandese so-
ciety already had several social institutions, which are still supporting the imple-
mentation of popular participation in the countryside: Umuganda , the tradition 
of working on community projects; Ubudehe , the tradition of mutual assistance; 
Gacaca , the tradition of communal resolution of disputes; and Umusanzu , the 
tradition to support the needy and contribute to the achievement of a common 
goal (Government of Rwanda, 2002 [1]). 
The first presidential election in Rwanda was won by Grégoire Kayibanda , 
the leader of the interim provisional government. The name of his party, the Parti 
du Mouvement de l’Emancipation du Peuple Hutu (Party for Hutu Emancipa-
tion), indicated the standpoint of the government policy. In 1973 Kayibanda was 
removed from power through a coup and a Major General, Juvénal Habyarimana, 
replaced him. Habyarimana remained in power for twenty-one years until 1994, 
running a conventional self-serving military dictatorship. But his Hutu ethnic 
policy created an increasing problem on Rwanda’s frontiers. Over the borders 
there was a vast number of mainly Tutsi refugees, who, as time passed, became 
increasingly unwelcome in their host countries and efforts to send them home 
were frustrated. This all led to the atrocities that followed. 
This all implies that between 1962 and 1994 no decentralisation has taken place 
in Rwanda . However, less than five years after the genocide and RPF ’s military 
victory, the present government of Rwanda started taking up the process of de-
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centralisation seriously. The government aimed at implementing the programme 
of the October 1993 Arusha agreement, which foresaw a government of national 
unity. It has set up decentralised institutions and powers, with the declared aim 
of maintaining stability by destroying the political machinery that facilitated the 
genocide (Human Rights Watch, 2006). Its efficiency in doing so and the lack 
of much political opposition may have supported this development (Kayizzi-
Mugerwa, 2000).
In today’s Rwanda , besides national government, there are four levels of gov-
ernance: provincial, district, sector and cell (village) level. In March 1999 the first 
election of councillors and local representatives at cell and sector level took place. 
But only in 2001 were elections held at the level where devolution takes place, 
the district. These were followed by parliamentary elections in 2003. During 
the 2001 elections, an RPF -controlled National Electoral Commission super-
vised the process. It appeared that local and international observers registered 
very few electoral malpractices, though the elections were far from satisfactory. 
Nevertheless, the participation rate was 90 per cent (International Crisis Group, 
2001). A year later fresh elections took place for the executive committees at cell 
and sector level. 
At national level, in 2001 the Ministry of Local Government and Social Af-
fairs (MINALOC) was established to implement the decentralisation policy in 
the country. The purpose was to ensure political, economic, social, administrative 
and technical empowerment of the local population in order to fight poverty by 
participating in planning and management of their own development. Within 
the Ministry a special Decentralisation Management Unit (DMU) was set up to 
guide the decentralisation process. In a policy document of MINALOC several 
objectives have been listed, basically focusing on stimulating local people to par-
ticipate, making the political process more transparent, improving the planning 
process, and setting up a proper monitoring system. In order to achieve the overall 
objective to maintain stability , the government has formulated five official objec-
tives of the decentralisation policy (Government of Rwanda , 2002 [2]): 
1. Strengthening the coordination and harmonisation of all stakeholders and 
players in the implementation of the decentralisation policy;
2. Building and strengthening the capacity of central government ministries and 
local governments for the implementation of the policy;
3. Increasing and expanding the revenue base and generation capacity of com-
munities, and strengthening financial management and accounting capacity in 
local governments;
4. Effectively operationalising a common development fund to support develop-
ment projects in governments; and 
5. Effectively decentralising service delivery to the local governments.
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Decentralisation in Rwanda is implemented as devolution at the level of the 
district. In addition there are other administrative layers: the province between 
central government and districts, and sectors and cells below the districts.1 May-
ors who are directly elected by the local population serve as political heads at dis-
trict level, while the top official at province level (prefect) is nominated by central 
government . Devolution can be considered as the process of delegating the power 
to district councils, the Community Development Committees (CDCs) and the 
women’s associations. The district councils are the political institutions at local 
level where decision-making takes place. The CDCs are the local developmental 
institutions, explicitly set up for communities at local level to participate. 
Districts are entitled to collect certain taxes, like property tax , licence tax, and 
rental tax. In addition they can impose taxes to be decided by the council, such 
as advertisement taxes and market taxes. Government is stating that presently 
nation-wide ten times more tax is already being collected than during the time 
that tax was collected centrally. The collection of taxes may even improve when 
sanctions are to be imposed on defaulters. 
In the meantime, the Government of Rwanda has embarked on a comprehen-
sive Public Sector Reform and Capacity Building Programme under supervision 
of the Ministry of Public Services, Skills Development, Vocational Training and 
Labour. The project is based on the vision that good governance requires an effec-
tive and efficient functioning of the civil service at all levels and all departments to 
ensure transparent and accountable management of public services.
The government has phased the implementation of decentralisation in the 
country into three periods. A first period of three years, from 2001 to 2003, was 
considered as a period during which decentralisation had to be institutionalised. 
During that period three key institutions were established: the Common De-
velopment Fund (CDF) for funding development projects in the districts; the 
Decentralisation Support Units in most of the ministries and provinces, as well 
as some private organisations and NGOs whose interest are at district level; and 
the Rwandese Association of Local Government Authorities (RALGA ) , formally 
inaugurated in May 2004.
A second period of five years, from 2004 to 2008, is intended to be used as a 
period to entrench and deeply root not only the decentralised institutions, but 
also to put into effect comprehensive administrative reforms that involve numer-
ous stakeholders. This is worked out in the National Five-Year Decentralisation 
Implementation Programme (DIP) (Government of Rwanda , 2003). Recently the 
DMU at MINALOC has been transformed into the National Decentralisation 
Implementation Secretariat (NDIS) . This transformation signifies the emphasis 
the Government of Rwanda is putting on having moved from the preparation 
phase of decentralisation to the implementing phase. Finally, a third phase of 
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seven years is foreseen (2009-2015) as a consolidation phase, and to refine ap-
proaches, methodologies, tools, etc.
The government has produced a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) , 
which indicated in 2002 that 5 per cent of domestic revenue would be transferred 
to the development fund for poverty reduction , though up to the present the ac-
tual amount has been less than a quarter of what was promised. Moreover, it says 
that central government will ensure that the districts have enough resources to 
carry out the functions assigned to them, put in place simple systems to facilitate 
the flow of funds and management information, and provide the districts with 
guidance and support for capacity building (Government of Rwanda , 2002 [1]). 
One of Rwanda ’s key objectives, as formulated in a long-term social and eco-
nomic vision, is good political and economic governance (Government of Rwan-
da, 2000). Good governance is considered as essential to successful development 
and is therefore related to the other key objectives: rural economic transforma-
tion, development of services and manufacturing, human resource development , 
development and promotion of the private sector, regional and international eco-
nomic integration, and poverty reduction . 
But any institutional development can only become successful when stake-
holders are able to understand the meaning of democratic institutions and are 
able to participate in political and economic processes. In this respect education 
is of utmost relevance. The importance of primary education has been recognised 
and a World Bank study indicates that, despite the untold havoc caused by the 
genocide, the education system in the country has recovered remarkably well, 
at least quantitatively (World Bank, 2004). The education sector has been sup-
ported by several donor organisations. 
4. Decentralisation as a Stabilising Factor in Rwanda 
The recent history of Rwanda has been extremely violent. During the country’s re-
covery, many people, local as well as foreign, have asked themselves how genocide 
could possibly have happened. Particularly as intellectuals have been involved, 
accepting anti-civilised, retrograde values, and even having been instigators of 
the worst of crimes little more than a decade ago. Nevertheless, during the past 
ten years the country has become relatively composed as social capital has slowly 
been built up. But the situation in Rwanda could still not be called completely 
stable, as the government is accused of still being involved in war activities in the 
DRC, resulting in, among other things, external security threats.
As has been stated above, social capital is a double-edged sword, bridging as 
well as splitting, social groups in society. In 1994, due to the de-linking of vertical 
 Peter van Tilburg
social capital (the network between the central Hutu government and the local 
Hutu population) and horizontal social capital (the social cohesion between eth-
nic groups), and at the same time a concentration of social cohesion within these 
ethnic groups, the killings became almost a matter of course for many Hutu. Oth-
ers have analysed it as having become even a duty, commissioned by the media 
and sanctioned by the government (Colletta and Cullen, 2002). Presently we can 
see that, because of the earlier ethnic clashes, the feeling of group cohesiveness is 
still strong. The present government, however, is no longer talking about Hutu 
or Tutsi , but only about Rwandese. It is stimulating social institutions that cut 
across traditional cohesive groups forming new links that cross ethnic lines. These 
institutions can provide the basis for mediation, management and the resolution 
of conflicts. Decentralisation and participation have been promoted along with 
initiatives to improve social cohesion between ethnic groups within Rwanda .
A number of reasons have been given to explain why decentralisation is still 
being practised to a limited extent in Africa and why it has such a poor track 
record. Central governments have not been able to set up the required basic insti-
tutional infrastructure with adequate power attached; have insufficient capacity 
and finances; have been confronted with a strong ‘resistance to change’ that ex-
ists for powerful actors; and/or have hardly any experience with engaging local 
communities in effective, bottom-up planning. The result has been that instead 
of listening to the poor for decision-making at local levels, there are cases where 
decentralised local governments just copy the environment that previously oc-
curred at central level. 
Rwanda appears to deviate from this picture. The government has explicitly 
stated that it aimed at a political order that is legitimate and stable. Backed by 
appropriate laws, it has implemented decentralisation through devolution at the 
level of the district. At this level local participation is being guaranteed through 
local bodies (district councils and Community Development Committees ) whose 
members, including the mayor who holds the chair of the council, are directly 
elected by the local population. Moreover, districts are entitled to collect certain 
taxes, though this has still not yet been effectuated to its fullest extent. All this 
has resulted in a situation that citizens became involved in the performance of 
local public duties, particularly through the district councils and CDCs , widen-
ing the basis of political participation. In discussions with local citizens, it was 
made clear that these grassroots approaches have increased the feeling of owner-
ship and strengthened accountability . Being intended as problem-oriented, these 
measures have formed elements in developing vertical and horizontal social capi-
tal in the country.
However, though Rwanda has seriously embarked upon this decentralised ap-
proach, the situation in the country is complex. The impact of the genocide on 
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the social structure of society as well as the psychology of the citizens is still 
tremendous. Many survivors are heavily traumatised, countless children are or-
phaned (nearly 40 per cent of the children up to the age of eight in 1994 have 
lost at least one parent, which makes it one of the highest orphanhood rates in 
the world), and many women have borne children from their rapists. One-third 
of the families in the country are headed by widows, unmarried women who are 
often still very young, or wives from genocide-suspected prisoners, with an aver-
age number of seven young dependents. Even at present, two-thirds of all the 
basic productive labour force in the country is still female. These psychological, 
and often also physical, scars cannot easily be wiped out. Though government is 
no longer making a distinction between Hutu and Tutsi , presently the majority of 
the population is said to be Tutsi, like the President, as a large part of the Hutu 
are still hiding in surrounding countries.
Moreover, the agriculture-based economy of the country was completely de-
stroyed, with an output reduction of 42 per cent, forcing the greater part of the 
population to live in extreme poverty . The GDP was reduced by 50 per cent and so 
was per capita income. Due to the shortage of land and the difficulty for women 
to inherit land, many young girls who have suddenly found themselves heads of 
families do not have any economic security and protection. A study undertaken 
on the relationship between the role of women and war in Rwanda has found out 
that these girls live in a permanent climate of insecurity and are vulnerable to at-
tempts at intimidation and sexual assault (Gervais, 2004). 
However, through their women’s associations at district and lower levels, many 
women have gained access to means of production that have allowed them to im-
prove their living conditions, for a large share even getting beyond the subsistence 
stage. Within these associations democratic rules are usually applied and women 
learn how to vote for their leaders in an indiscriminate way. Th ese platforms allow 
the members to exercise their rights within the community. Th ese women’s asso-
ciations have become very important democratic institutions within local society. 
And one other success of Rwanda is that presently women take 49 per cent of the 
seats in the national parliament, being the highest percentage in the world!
Another important institution that the government has established is the 
Common Development Fund (CDF) . The fund, initially set up independent from 
government, has the task to generate finances for development purposes. Local 
district governments form the target group and can apply for support by the fund 
for development projects. These district development projects are supposed to 
be prepared by the CDCs . The government is stating that it will accommodate 
the fund with 5 per cent of the national GDP, and several donors are also passing 
funds for programmes and projects through the CDF. This has resulted in some 
modest economic development at local level.
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Th e majority of the rural population, however, is still very poor. Due to poverty 
in several parts of Rwanda , local governments are still trying to fi nd out how to 
deliver basic human needs, such as water, schooling, and garbage collection. Th e 
government, being aware of this, initiated its Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper in 
2002, indicating a long-term and sustainable economic development (Government 
of Rwanda, 2002 [1]). However, in practice it has not yet done much about its im-
plementation. Th e international donor community has stressed that expenditure 
on the military should be reduced in favour of the social sector. Th e touchstone 
for Rwanda is whether it is able to off set the diff erent budgetary demands against 
security and democratisation . Moreover, it has the challenge to build up a sustain-
able middle class and at the same time to strive for limited inequality.
The doctrine that central government in Rwanda is propagating is adorned 
with concepts such as accountability , transparency and responsiveness. Devolu-
tion in Rwanda has increasingly become entrenched through a bargaining process 
among the stakeholders concerning the designation of tasks and powers. Initially 
the bargaining power of the municipalities was still limited. Municipalities still 
had to find ways as to how to merge common interests and how to set up interest 
groups as offset against central government. The establishment of the Rwandese 
Association of Local Government Authorities (RALGA ) has improved the bar-
gaining position of the districts.
RALGA ’s mission statement is to strive for and to build on already-instigated 
developments towards an efficient, effective, transparent and accountable local 
government system in Rwanda . This demands that local authorities in the coun-
try will become places free from injustice, corruption , nepotism, segregation, sec-
tarianism and any other malpractice that may hamper good governance and deter 
the decentralisation process that the country and its government have adopted 
as a vehicle for service delivery and a tool to alleviate poverty . In realising this, 
the Association has been given three mandates: representation of the districts as 
its members, lobbying for the districts with central government and abroad, and 
building capacity in support of local government and civil society .
As stated above, decentralisation has been implemented at district level 
through setting up democratic institutions. By doing so, the basis for establishing 
sufficient social capital to manage conflicts has been laid. However, management 
capacity, particularly in participatory planning, is still low and financial and hu-
man resources are still restricted. But local governments, in order to improve 
their management capacity and financial base, are supported by foreign donor 
organisation, whether or not via RALGA . 
In Rwanda , before the genocide, there had not been any experience in local 
government, nor in citizen’s participation , except for traditional power structures. 
Therefore, capacity building in Rwanda is considered a top priority and it is also 
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strongly supported by the international community. This concerns not only ca-
pacity for local administrators and council members, but also for civil society . The 
planning process in Rwanda is supposed to be built up as much as possible based 
on local participation and bottom-up planning. The government strategy for 
participation is aiming at a vibrant civil society, whereby many different interest 
groups are taking part in local decision-making . This strengthening of the self-
help capacity of local government at district level forms the engine for establish-
ing economic recovery, and for guaranteeing a stable and peaceful situation. This 
has been recognised by donors (like the UN , European Commission , World Bank 
and many governments) by concentrating their support on these interventions.
It could be concluded that in Rwanda the decentralisation process has fulfi lled 
the conditions that are indicated above. Th e necessary legal reform has been imple-
mented, formalising local authorities. Moreover, local government has been enabled 
to enhance tax revenues, and is supported in replenishing its lacking capacity. Sup-
ported by the international donor community, capacity building has been taken up 
by institutions at district level, but also at provincial and national level, including 
RALGA . Th e government has even initiated a reform of the public sector. Moreo-
ver, government has articulated its intention to standardise local government’s ac-
countability , transparency and responsiveness, but this is still in process and re-
quires more time. Part of the problem is that each of the twelve provinces is being 
supported by a diff erent donor, each following its own approach. Th is means that 
donor coordination that should be taken up by central government, is not taking 
place eff ectively, which does not necessarily indicate a lack of national ownership of 
the process, but rather a lack of political will and administrative capabilities. 
Finally, civil society and participatory institutions have been supported and 
their roles enhanced. This has initiated a bottom-up planning approach, particu-
larly through the CDCs . It has consequently increased the sense of ownership 
among all groups at local level, and strengthened a system of local accountability . 
On the other hand, it could be stated that the ethnic balance in the country is still 
very unstable, as the majority of the villagers are Tutsi . Hutu who escaped to bor-
dering countries are slowly returning. Reconciliation, being one of the credos of 
government, has been institutionalised through the system of Gacaca . It is, how-
ever, difficult to foresee whether the present institutional and social structure and 
the stock of social capital that has been built up is sufficiently sustainable to resist 
the increasing number of returning Hutu in the communities in the near future. 
It is not only a question of delivering sufficient services to improve the living con-
ditions of all groups, but also of setting up a system to allow Hutu refugees to get 
a ‘feeling of ownership’ as well. On the other hand, government cannot explicitly 
develop a pro-active strategy in dealing with the returning Hutu, as the official 
government policy does not make a distinction between Hutu and Tutsi.
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5. Conclusion
Post-genocide Rwanda had an acute need for political reform, aiming at justice 
and a new sense of national identity and social cohesion. An open debate at local 
level has started that is based on a collective responsibility for development needs. 
The aim is that such a mentality should replace the culture of passive obedience, 
which left people open to political and sectarian manipulation. Decentralisation 
has become instrumental in achieving a feeling of ownership at local level. It in-
creases the probability of economic development and at the same time enhances 
the aspiration of cohesion. 
Based on these developments in Rwanda , we can conclude that the process of 
decentralisation and the accompanying attempts towards good governance have 
contributed to a more legitimate political order, i.e. a more stable political con-
text than before 1994. However, the process is not yet irreversible. The intense 
participation of the local population in its own development, including in the 
process of reconciliation, has certainly had a stabilising effect, as it developed 
social cohesion (or social capital) and has reduced the chances of returning to 
political turmoil. However, as participation of civil society is not fully accom-
plished in the country, and consequently the feeling of ownership is not strong 
enough, stability cannot yet be guaranteed. That would mean that a full assess-
ment of the performance of the local government system in delivering economic 
and political stability has to wait until the end of its comprehensive implementa-
tion period in 2008.
In general it could be concluded that Rwanda has seriously embarked upon 
the road to decentralisation and local democracy as has been laid down in policy 
documents and multi-annual plans. Several required conditions have by and large 
been fulfilled: relevant legal reforms have been put through; revenue generation 
has been approved by the districts; institutional and capacity building activities 
have been embarked upon and been supported by the donor community; ac-
countability , transparency and responsiveness have been stimulated at local level 
(also with support from RALGA ); and local civil society has slowly become es-
tablished, particularity the women’s associations. And in terms of reconciliation, 
government has stimulated a system of transitional jurisdiction by means of 
Gacaca .
The question still stands what the chances are that these results will sustain. 
The major constraints in the country are still distressing poverty and disturbing 
lack of capacity at all levels. And, moreover, the establishment of a stable social 
infrastructure , consolidated by horizontal and vertical cohesion, crossing all eth-
nic groups, may still take a long time to be realised. And last but not least, as in so 
many African countries, much depends on individuals. It is hard to foresee what 
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will happen when the present president, who is of Tutsi origin, is replaced. All 
these factors make the political situation in Rwanda still unsteady. But notwith-
standing these restraints, one could generalise by saying that in Rwanda, where 
the government has explicitly implemented devolution as a means for political 
stability , decentralisation has contributed to improved service provision, to pov-
erty reduction , and indirectly to political stability. 
 Note
 Local government is implemented in  districts (fourteen of which are municipalities), 
located in a total of twelve provinces, and covering , sectors and , cells.
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9 Conclusion: Decentralisation – No Shortcut to 
Development and Peace
Christof Hartmann and Gordon Crawford
Proponents of decentralisation anticipate many positive outcomes, inclusive of 
benefits in terms of poverty reduction and conflict management . The case studies 
in this book have subjected these claims to empirical investigation in the context 
of Sub-Saharan Africa . What are the overall findings from the country stud-
ies? This concluding chapter outlines the findings in three main sections. First, 
the extent to which decentralisation has contributed to poverty reduction is dis-
cussed, inclusive of consideration of key constraints. Second, the impact of de-
centralisation on conflict management is summarised, highlighting both direct 
and indirect effects. Finally, the prospects for decentralisation in Sub-Saharan 
Africa are examined, both as a policy agenda and as a research topic.
1. Decentralisation and Poverty Reduction 
In comparing the four country case studies, one immediate observation is that 
they have utilised different methodological approaches to explore the impact of 
decentralisation on poverty levels. Steiner considers a number of challenges that 
constrain the implementation of decentralisation reforms in practice, ones which 
diminish the prospects for pro-poor outcomes, and then examines the extent to 
which such challenges have been evident in Uganda . Chinsinga takes a similar 
tack in highlighting the extensive implementation problems in Malawi , described 
as ‘inconsistent, ad hoc and disjointed‘, while focusing more narrowly on the ‘stra-
tegic political calculations’ that underpin such problems. Crawford undertakes 
an empirical assessment of the impact of decentralisation on poverty levels in 
two rural districts in Ghana , examining access to basic services and household 
income levels. Van Dijk takes a broader sweep in assessing the overall contribu-
tion of decentralisation to local development, with more reliance on quantitative 
indicators such as financial flows and income distribution. Such variations in 
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methodological approach are a strength of this study, we hope, enabling the link-
age between decentralisation and poverty reduction to be explored in a variety of 
ways. Therefore, what are the overall findings? 
1.1. Has decentralisation led to poverty reduction ? 
The findings are largely negative in three of the four country case studies (Ugan-
da , Malawi and Ghana ), and only in Tanzania are outcomes perceived more posi-
tively. The lack of a positive impact is most evident in Malawi where Chinsinga 
concludes that decentralisation reforms have had ‘no discernible impact on pov-
erty reduction ’ since their introduction a decade ago. In Ghana, the evidence leads 
Crawford to conclude that decentralisation has had a limited and fairly insignifi-
cant impact on rural poverty levels. Uganda has been praised for the scale and 
scope of its devolution initiative, yet Steiner finds that implementation short-
comings have restricted the expected impact on poverty. A more positive scenario 
is portrayed in Tanzania, however, where Van Dijk argues that decentralisation 
has contributed to local development and poverty reduction through generating 
increased flows of goods, services, capital, ideas and people.
1.2. What accounts for the various outcomes? 
Taking the more positive case of Tanzania first, Van Dijk identifies three main 
instruments that have been responsible for poverty alleviation at the local level: 
income transfers; provision of services and infrastructure ; and employment crea-
tion. These three aspects tend to be interconnected and mutually reinforcing. The 
key enabling factor appears to be the increased finance made available to local 
governments from the Local Government Support Programme, funded by the 
World Bank and other international donors. This has provided local governments 
with grants for local infrastructural development and service provision, especially 
in the areas of roads and water supply, which in turn has created economic op-
portunities for local entrepreneurs and employment for local people. Although 
rural-urban migration has not reduced as much as hoped, the number of people 
returning to the rural areas has increased, linked to the enhancement of economic 
opportunities at the district level. A virtuous cycle is completed by the increased 
opportunities for local taxation, in turn allowing local authorities to undertake 
more development activities. While most welcome, such positive outcomes would 
seem to be highly dependent on the availability of external funds, in the context 
of a donor-driven decentralisation process. The negative side of donor-driven 
processes is not examined here in Tanzania, but are clearly highlighted in the 
Malawi case, notably the lack of central government commitment. 
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In both Uganda and Malawi , the lack of a positive impact on poverty levels is 
explained mainly by the difficulties encountered in fully implementing decentral-
isation reforms. Steiner makes this point most explicitly with regard to Uganda. 
She notes that ‘decentralisation is a highly complex reform process’ which requires 
comprehensive changes in political, administrative and fiscal structures, and out-
lines a series of implementation ‘challenges’ that constitute significant constraints 
on achieving poverty alleviation. Such challenges relate to both the demand and 
supply side of decentralisation, examining the participation of the poor in making 
their needs known on the one hand, and the responsiveness and accountability 
of local politicians and officials on the other. The presence of such constraints 
on what Steiner terms the ‘proper implementation’ of decentralisation in Uganda 
largely accounts for why decentralisation has not had a significant impact on pov-
erty levels in the short-term. But this does not lead her to question decentralisa-
tion per se, or its anticipated benefits in the longer run. She concludes by clearly 
stating that ‘it is not decentralisation in itself that is disappointing or deficient 
but the implementation of the same’. In her view, decentralisation’s ‘potential for 
poverty reduction is not (yet) fully tapped’ in Uganda, with the implication that 
fuller implementation of decentralisation reforms should realise pro-poor ben-
efits in the longer term. 
A similar view is expressed by Chinsinga in relation to Malawi , despite the 
very bleak picture of decentralisation reforms there. He also concludes by empha-
sising decentralisation’s ‘potential to lead to political participation and poverty 
reduction , but such outcomes depend very much on how it is implemented’. Yet 
the gap in Malawi between potential and actuality is vast. Of the four country 
case studies, the failures of decentralisation are most evident in Malawi and the 
obstacles to possible pro-poor outcomes are the most substantial. The dangers 
of a donor-driven process that does not have local support are also apparent. 
Despite the adoption of a decentralisation policy by the Government of Malawi 
since 1998, strategic political calculations by both national and local elites have 
undermined implementation. Chinsinga’s analysis highlights both resistance 
from national political actors, unwilling to accept a loss of power and author-
ity, and power struggles between local elites for capture of limited local govern-
ment resources. The outcome is a barely functioning local government system, at 
least not in democratic terms, with the prospects of pro-poor policies remaining 
very remote. At the time of writing, local elections had been repeatedly delayed 
since the expiry of the inaugural term of office of district assembly councillors in 
2005, with a presidential declaration having handed all powers at district level to 
the central government-appointed district commissioners. Indications are that 
local government elections are unlikely before 2009. For Chinsinga, it is a huge 
paradox that decentralisation reforms have almost completely stalled, given that 
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several poverty reduction initiatives in the past decade have championed decen-
tralisation as their overriding implementation strategy.
Democratic decentralisation is also incomplete in Ghana , with various demo-
cratic deficits noted by Crawford, although political structures are considerably 
more established there than in Malawi . A ‘participation -accountability ’ gap partly 
accounts for why decentralisation has had a limited and largely insignificant ef-
fect on local poverty , with local enthusiasm for participation in decentralised 
structures not resulting in more responsive and accountable local government . 
Yet, Crawford strikes a note of greater caution. Rather than retaining faith in 
decentralisation’s potential to deliver pro-poor outcomes, he questions the likeli-
hood of a positive linkage between decentralisation and poverty reduction for 
three main reasons. First, enhancing local political participation is not a suffi-
cient condition for pro-poor decentralisation, with attention also required to 
strengthen downward accountability mechanisms. Second, as the case of Malawi 
also demonstrates, reliance on central government’s ‘political will’ to implement 
‘decentralisation from above’ is misplaced – central governments do not willingly 
give up power and authority and indeed often manipulate decentralisation poli-
cies to their own advantage. Third, implementation is not a technical exercise 
but a political one, with the achievement of genuine devolution likely to depend 
on pressure from below. An element of Chinsinga’s analysis is similarly chasten-
ing. While acknowledging that decentralisation reforms can in principle create 
new political spaces for the marginalised and disadvantaged, he notes that such 
‘invited spaces’ can degenerate into a prerogative of the state, one that can be 
‘strategically limited, controlled and even closed altogether’, as the Malawian case 
seems to suggest.
1.3. What have been the key constraints?
It is recalled that nine implementation issues were outlined in the introduction 
to this book (pages 14-16), noted by various authors as having the potential to ad-
versely affect the realisation of the anticipated benefits of decentralisation. This 
section returns to each of these nine issues and undertakes a comparative analysis 
of their presence in the four poverty -oriented country case studies. What indica-
tions are there of these various challenges acting as constraints on decentralisa-
tion’s impact on poverty reduction ?1
First, a strong legal framework exists in the cases of Uganda , Ghana and Ma-
lawi , with decentralisation provisions included in the national constitution and in 
local government acts. These legal provisions all contain the objective of devolu-
tion , with Uganda being regarded as one of the most radical devolution initiatives 
worldwide. Yet in reality decentralisation has been a mixture of devolution and 
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deconcentration in all cases, with central government line ministries continuing 
to play a key role in local affairs. This is particularly so in both Ghana and Ma-
lawi, and also relatively so in Uganda. Thus it is clear that a strong legal frame-
work may be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for successful devolution. 
Similarly, strong legal backing will enhance but not guarantee the prospects of 
decentralisation leading to poverty reduction .
Second, a clear division of responsibilities between local and central govern-
ment is evident in Uganda , at least on paper, given the comprehensive and precise 
manner that these are outlined in the Local Government Act . Yet even here a gap 
between theory and practice remains, with Steiner noting that line ministries 
have de facto retained substantial power over local policy-making . Elsewhere the 
division of responsibilities is less clear and the discretionary authority of local 
government is limited. In Ghana , responsibilities are very blurred in practice be-
tween the District Assemblies and deconcentrated line departments, with DAs 
having few devolved functions where full authority and responsibility rests with 
them. In Malawi , central government resistance to decentralisation means that 
functions still remain in the hands of line ministries. The division of tasks, func-
tions and responsibilities between line ministries and the district assemblies were 
to be outlined in sector devolution plans. Yet, severe delays meant that the tenure 
of the elected assemblies had expired by the time this process was completed in 
2005, with fresh elections not yet held. In Tanzania , it is also noted that there 
is a discrepancy between the system on paper of functions and responsibilities 
between different levels of institutions and how it works in practice. As noted 
earlier, Jütting et al. (2005: 641-42) highlight a clear division of functions between 
local and central government as a necessary condition for successful decentralisa-
tion and poverty reduction , yet this has not been satisfactorily realised in any of 
the country case studies examined here.
Third, with regard to human and financial resources, findings are generally 
of inadequate and insufficient levels, with adverse implications for the capacity 
of local governments to perform their assigned functions and for the prospects 
of poverty reduction . Focusing here on financial resources, local governments in 
all four studies depended on central government transfers supplemented by their 
own revenue collection, with additional funds at times available from donor de-
centralisation support programmes. One noticeable difference was in the propor-
tion of central government income transferred to local level, with Uganda ’s ambi-
tious devolution programme resulting in 30 per cent of the Ugandan government 
budget being transferred to local government, whereas only 5 per cent of total 
government revenue is required by law to be transferred to local government in 
both Ghana and Malawi . Local revenue generation was low and problematic in 
all cases for a variety of reasons, ranging from the poverty of the local communi-
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ties and the regressive nature of local taxation to a lack of administrative capacity. 
Local tax collection was described by Steiner as the ‘principle problem’ in Uganda, 
with the need to ‘design and implement a good [local] tax system’ also noted by 
Van Dijk in Tanzania . Only in the case of Tanzania was the adequacy of overall 
available funds not commented on negatively. Here it was reported that decen-
tralisation had led to an increased flow of financial resources to local areas, with 
positive spin-offs for the local economy and local development. Elsewhere the 
inadequacy of funds for poverty reduction purposes was highlighted, including in 
Uganda where the larger transfers of funds from central government still remained 
insufficient to cover the more extensive range of functions and duties assigned to 
local government . Financial problems were the most extreme in Malawi, where 
the financial base of local government was described by Chinsinga as ‘very weak 
and fragile’. This was attributed mainly to central government’s failure to transfer 
the legal minimum of 5 per cent of total revenue, only managing between 2 and 3 
per cent per annum since 2000. In Ghana, the 5 per cent constitutional minimum 
had been provided, albeit irregularly and often delayed, and central government 
transfers had increased in absolute terms, yet DAs suffered from significant fi-
nancial constraints. A further issue raised in two country cases concerned the 
provision of conditional grants by central government, undermining the discre-
tionary authority of local governments. In Ghana, central government earmarks 
on expenditure amounted to 41 per cent of the District Assemblies Common 
Fund (DACF) . In Uganda, Steiner noted that the provision of conditional grants 
meant that central government ultimately decides how money is spent, contrary 
to the emphasis on the ‘informational advantage’ of local government within de-
centralisation discourse. Finally it was observed that local governments remain 
dependent in many instances on donor funds to implement development activi-
ties, also questioning the extent to which decision-making processes are locally-
driven. In one district in Ghana, if the activities in the five-year development plan 
were to be implemented, then almost 60 per cent of total funds would need to be 
raised from external donor sources. In Tanzania, the contribution of the multi-
donor Local Government Support Programme (LGSP ) was noted positively, yet 
donors’ financial input also gave them membership of the LGSP ’s Steering Com-
mittee and the ability to influence policy direction. The financial constraints af-
fecting local governments in all country cases have clear implications for their 
ability to tackle local poverty, even assuming the local political will to do so. It 
is evident that central governments are more willing to relinquish functions and 
responsibilities than they are to provide the commensurate resources to tackle 
these. 
Fourth, the relative weakness of legislative bodies and of locally-elected coun-
cillors was noted in Uganda , Malawi and Ghana . Different aspects of this issue 
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were explored in the country studies. At one level, it was felt that local councillors 
were often not fully aware of their powers, duties and responsibilities due to in-
adequate training and a low level of education , as discussed in the case of Uganda. 
Different education levels were also seen as a significant cause of the conflicts 
between local councillors and civil servants in Uganda, with some reluctance by 
the latter to be guided by and accountable to the former, given their higher edu-
cational qualifications. At another level, a more political interpretation of the 
relative weakness of elected representatives was explored in Malawi and Ghana. 
The situation of elected councillors was particularly dire in Malawi, with the cur-
rent collapse of the District Assemblies as deliberative organs. Following their 
election in November 2000, it is reported by Chinsinga that most councillors 
became ‘either dormant or resigned’, with the terms of conditions for councillors 
not meeting expectations. The weakness of the local councillors was also evi-
dent in the various power struggles waged with other district-level stakeholders, 
namely local MPs, traditional chiefs and district secretariats. Subsequently, new 
local elections have been repeatedly postponed, not likely now until 2009, with 
delays driven by political calculations, as Chinsinga explains, with the President’s 
party reckoning that the longer the delay, the better it will suit them. In Ghana, a 
similar, if less extreme, process of marginalisation of elected representatives has 
occurred, one in which the specific intent of local executive bodies to constrain 
their activities is more evident. The politicised and centrally-directed nature 
of this process is particularly clear given that the District Chief Executives, in 
whose hands power is concentrated, are not civil servants but ruling party politi-
cal  appointees. The problems encountered by elected representatives, especially 
in Malawi and Ghana, question the degree of democratic decentralisation and 
raise issues of democratic deficits. Such deficits clearly have an adverse impact on 
the prospects for poverty reduction , given the potentially positive role that could 
be played by elected representatives on behalf of their poor constituents.
Fifth, the anticipated increase in local political participation , on which many of 
the expected benefits of decentralisation is based, inclusive of poverty reduction , 
was found to be limited in practice in most cases. Steiner’s findings in Uganda 
were of a restricted level of popular participation. She reports that ‘local officials 
generally do not provide sufficient space for citizens to get involved in decision-
making , and citizens often prove to be ignorant about the opportunities offered 
by decentralisation’, concluding that more time is needed for a participatory polit-
ical culture to evolve. Again, the failures in Malawi were of a greater degree, with 
Chinsinga stating that decentralisation reforms have not promoted meaningful 
political participation at local level, largely due to the non-functioning of sub-
district participatory structures. The picture in Ghana was somewhat different. 
Crawford’s findings were that local people had often taken advantage of available 
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opportunities for political participation, both electoral and non-electoral, though 
he also noted the collapse of sub-district structures. In Tanzania , the encour-
agement of popular participation in the planning and implementation of local 
development programmes was noted by Van Dijk as an important goal of local 
government reform, but with little indication as to whether such a goal has been 
achieved. Limitations on popular participation clearly affect the ability of the 
poor majority to state their claims either directly to local authorities or indirectly 
through their elected representatives.
Sixth, more accountable government is claimed as one of the benefits of decen-
tralisation and also regarded as crucial to successful decentralisation and poverty 
reduction , yet it had not been achieved to any significant degree in any of the case 
studies. In Uganda , Steiner found that two key lines of accountability were both 
lacking, with low levels of accountability of civil servants to elected councillors 
and of local councillors to the population. In Malawi , the failure to establish and 
strengthen local democratic structures and processes, notably the role of elected 
representatives and of participatory sub-district structures, meant for Chinsinga 
that decentralisation had ‘not fostered any form of downward accountability’. In 
both of these cases, the lack of accountability was attributed to limited participa-
tion , rightly noted by Steiner as ‘a precondition for accountability’. Yet partici-
pation may be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for enhancing the ac-
countability of local government. Findings in Ghana emphasised the de-linkage 
between participation and accountability, with reasonably high levels of political 
participation by local people not resulting in increased downward accountabil-
ity. Various shortcomings were highlighted in the two related lines of account-
ability – the accountability of the local executive to elected representatives, and 
that of elected representatives to the public. Such local shortcomings included, 
for example, the weakness and neglect of the sub-committee system of the dis-
trict assembly and of sub-district structures. These weaknesses in representative 
and participatory structures were contrasted with the considerable powers of the 
unelected District Chief Executive, whose unofficial role is to strengthen local 
support for the national ruling party, and who remains upwardly accountable 
to the president, not downwardly accountable to local citizens. Additionally, in 
Ghana, accountability to half of the population was compromised by the lack of 
representation of women in all aspects of the district assembly system, a situation 
doubtless replicated in other countries where there is no quota system for women 
representatives. To its credit, Uganda has guaranteed representation to women, 
as well as other disadvantaged groups, through reserved seats in local councils. 
In all countries, increasing the potential impact of decentralisation on poverty 
reduction is dependent on strengthening those accountability mechanisms that 
are an integral part of the structures and processes of democratic decentralisa-
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tion. Yet this is difficult to achieve in cases like that of Ghana where ostensible 
decentralisation is replete with mechanisms of central control.
Seventh, it was noted earlier that ‘political will’ or ‘political commitment’ at 
central government level has ubiquitously been seen as the key requirement for 
successful decentralisation, including by analysts of the linkage between decen-
tralisation and poverty reduction . The case studies here have reaffirmed, however, 
that such political will cannot be taken for granted, even where relatively strong 
legal frameworks exist. The lack of central government political will, and its dam-
aging impact, was most evident in Malawi . The prevalence of what Chinsinga 
terms ‘power politics’ at both political and bureaucratic levels has drastically af-
fected the prospects of implementation of decentralisation policy reforms. At the 
political level, the commitment to decentralisation has waned since its introduc-
tion over a decade ago, with implementation decisions driven by self-interested 
calculations, for instance, the perpetual delays in holding local elections . At the 
bureaucratic level, the resistance of line ministries to decentralisation has intensi-
fied and solidified over the past decade, encouraged by the lack of political will at 
governmental level. The Malawi example in particular demonstrates the limita-
tions of donor-driven decentralisation which national elites may be unwillingly 
forced to accept, while remaining able to effectively block, a point made strongly 
by Chinsinga in his concluding remarks. An absence of political commitment to 
the devolution of power was also evident in Ghana . Here Crawford indicates how 
the design of decentralisation reforms is also underpinned by strategic political 
considerations, notably the maintenance of local political control by the national 
ruling party. Key mechanisms include the presidential powers of appointment, 
especially the nomination of the all-powerful District Chief Executive. Bureau-
cratic resistance was also evident given that the integration of decentralised line 
departments into the District Assembly system has been delayed for almost two 
decades. In his conclusion, Crawford makes the point forcibly that it is naïve to 
place one’s faith in top-down decentralisation, given the unlikely commitment of 
central governments to relinquish their own power. Even in the case of Uganda , 
regarded as one of the most radical and far-reaching devolution initiatives world-
wide, Steiner notes that the initial five-tier system of Resistance Councils was 
established by the National Resistance Movement, under President Museveni , as 
a means to consolidate its political power following its military victory in 1986. 
Her historical overview also indicates the initial opposition of central govern-
ment ministries who baulked at the loss of control over resources. In Van Dijk’s 
more upbeat presentation of decentralisation in Tanzania , he remarks nonethe-
less on the ‘resistance against the implementation of decentralisation policies at 
national level’, with national politicians fearful of their loss of influence and sec-
toral ministries reluctant to cede authority.
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Eighth, local elite capture is a commonly cited problem of decentralisation. 
Clearly the opportunities for pro-poor decentralisation exist in inverse proportion 
to the degree of elite capture. Th is phenomenon is explored most directly here in 
the Uganda case. Although not an easy one to investigate, a strength of Steiner’s 
approach is her interlinkage of elite capture with issues of corruption , patronage 
and clientelism , and with accountability levels. Not only does she outline the dis-
tinguishing characteristics of each concept, but also clearly indicates their relation-
ship to elite capture, with low accountability increasing the scope for corruption, 
patronage and clientelism, which in turn increases the likelihood of elite capture. 
Th e data examined by Steiner indicated irregularities in local tendering and re-
cruitment processes, suggesting the prevalence of elite capture and of low levels of 
local government accountability, with adverse consequences for pro-poor service 
delivery . In Malawi , Chinsinga states more emphatically that decentralisation re-
forms have ‘fallen prey to elite capture’. Fractions of the local elite have engaged 
in power struggles over control of local governance frameworks and associated 
resources, however limited. Local councillors, despite their greater democratic le-
gitimacy, have had diffi  culty in asserting themselves against local MPs, chiefs and 
the district administration. Th eir demise since 2005, and the failure of central 
government to hold new elections , suggests that elites at both national and local 
levels, including traditional authorities, have succeeded in marginalising the role 
of locally-elected representatives and in steering local resources towards them-
selves. Chinsinga also notes the perverse linkage between a lack of participation 
and downward accountability on the one hand, and the degree of elite capture on 
the other. In Ghana , analysis of district assembly expenditure patterns indicates a 
degree of elite capture, with a considerable proportion of resources being expend-
ed by the district administration on itself. In this instance, a new local elite, com-
prised of the DCE and senior Assembly offi  cials, has been created by the district 
assembly system itself. In all cases, the presence of diff erent forms of elite capture 
has clear negative implications for the poor and for poverty reduction .
Finally, the case studies all demonstrate significant democratic deficits and no 
country case could be said to exemplify democratic decentralisation. Uganda is 
generally regarded as the most far-reaching example of devolution in Africa , yet 
even here there are considerable restrictions on democratic processes, notably 
those concerning participation and accountability . Malawi ’s decentralisation ef-
forts are described by Chinsinga as ‘deconcentration with nominal democratic 
decentralisation’, with abundant evidence of the failure to establish and maintain 
democratic structures and processes. The rhetoric in the Ghanaian constitution 
of ‘making democracy a reality’ through decentralising government has not been 
matched by the practice, which remains a mixture of deconcentration and politi-
cal decentralisation. How can this lack of local democracy be interpreted? Could 
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it be mainly a question of time, as Steiner tentatively suggests from her study of 
Uganda, with the implementation of complex decentralisation reforms being a 
longer-term process? Or do we also need to look more closely at the motivations 
of those national governments tasked with implementation? This may suggest 
that devolution of power is not seriously on the agenda of such actors. Decen-
tralisation may be largely a donor-driven process, enforced upon but resisted by 
poor country governments, as the case of Malawi has demonstrated, or one that 
is implemented by central government actors in a manner that is intended to 
maintain and consolidate centralised control while enhancing the appearance of 
democratic legitimacy, as the case of Ghana has suggested.
1.4. Concluding remarks on decentralisation and poverty reduction 
Th e poverty section of this book posed a straightforward question concerning the 
impact of decentralisation on poverty reduction . Predictably, the answer has been 
more complex. Overall fi ndings were negative in three out of four cases, with only 
Tanzania perceived more positively. Explanations for the relative failure of decen-
tralisation to deliver poverty reduction have varied somewhat amongst authors. 
In Uganda and Malawi , the emphasis is on the lack of implementation. In other 
words, it is not decentralisation that has failed but rather a failure to implement 
it fully. Th e implications are that full implementation will likely result in poverty 
reduction in the longer-run, with faith thus retained in the policy of decentrali-
sation and its potential benefi ts. A similar explanation could also be applied in 
Ghana , where a commonly-heard statement is that ‘decentralisation is incomplete’, 
and therefore it may seem premature and somewhat harsh to make negative judge-
ments about the outcomes of a process that remains only partly complete. 
However, the Ghana case in particular has indicated that implementation con-
straints are not merely technical in nature, and the motivations of key actors have 
been questioned. In this respect, the politics of decentralisation became a recurring 
theme, especially in the Ghana and Malawi cases. The overall argument is that 
national governments implement decentralisation for a variety of reasons, includ-
ing attempts to extend and strengthen their control at local level, but invariably 
to promote their own interests. Additionally, governments may undertake decen-
tralisation reforms at the behest of international donors, but often with a degree 
of reluctance and resistance. This suggests an inherent paradox or contradiction 
in expectations of top-down decentralisation, reliant on central government ac-
tors for implementation. The Ghana case indicated how the design and imple-
mentation of decentralisation was intended to strengthen and consolidate ruling 
party control over local districts, notably through the presidential appointment 
of local party activists to the all-powerful position of District Chief Executive. 
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The Malawi example illustrated the dual problem of donor-driven decentralisa-
tion reforms becoming imbued with the strategic political calculations of Ma-
lawian political actors at both central and local government levels. By extension, 
this emphasis on the politics of decentralisation can also suggest that where de-
centralisation has led more successfully to poverty reduction , its implementation 
has likely coincided with the central government’s or ruling party’s interests, for 
example, an ideological focus on pro-poor policies or decentralisation as a means 
to undermine local elite opposition to national government reforms.2
Focusing attention on the politics of decentralisation has simultaneously high-
lighted the significance of local democracy and of democratic decentralisation. 
On the one hand, the democratic deficits identified in the case studies account 
for many of the shortcomings in poverty reduction outcomes. On the other hand, 
a strengthening of local democratic structures and processes can potentially en-
hance the prospects for poverty reduction. In examining the range of challenges 
to the implementation of decentralisation, the most significant constraints per-
tained to issues of democracy and indicated the presence of major democratic 
deficits. Analysts of decentralisation have frequently stressed the importance 
of local participation to successful decentralisation, tending to assume that in-
creased participation will lead fairly automatically to enhanced accountability 
of local government . Findings here, however, have placed a particular emphasis 
on the significance of the downward accountability of government, while noting 
that participation may be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for greater 
accountability. Thus the strengthening of accountability mechanisms becomes 
a key means by which popular input into local decision-making processes can be 
translated into greater popular control of local government, not only enhancing lo-
cal democracy but also increasing the opportunities for policy-making that ben-
efits the poor majority. The decisive shift in orientation is from expectations of 
achieving poverty reduction through top-down decentralisation to an emphasis 
on building local democracy and generating social change in favour of the poor 
through bottom-up processes and political struggles from below.
2. Decentralisation and Confl ict Management
The chapters in this book have also enquired into the contribution of decentrali-
sation to the management or resolution of conflict . While economic and social 
development (and in a more-or-less explicit way the alleviation of poverty too) 
is one of the main rationales behind decentralisation across the continent, this is 
much less the case for confl ict management . Not one single government among the 
fi ve cases analysed here (not even South Africa ) openly recognised confl ict man-
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agement as an offi  cial objective behind decentralisation. Drawing conclusions thus 
entails less an evaluation of offi  cial government policy and more an assessment of 
the success of hidden agendas, all in all a more diffi  cult exercise. It also consists of 
an analysis of the intended or unintended eff ects of various governmental policies 
and actions on the confl ict dynamics in the countries concerned. 
2.1. Decentralisation and confl ict types
One of the obvious reasons why conflict management has gained less prominence 
as an outcome of decentralisation policies is the uncertainty surrounding the un-
derstanding and occurrence of conflict. While rarely stated, most people equate 
conflict with violence. But if we restrict the analysis to predominantly national 
violent conflicts then we are left with relatively few cases. In some of the protracted 
violent conflicts on the continent, decentralisation has indeed been a crucial ele-
ment within a formalised post-conflict settlement. This is the case, for instance, 
in South Africa , Mozambique , Sudan and Mali . While the South African Apart-
heid regime certainly did not belong to the typical centralist-authoritarian Sub-
Saharan African regime type, a strong form of decentralisation was still a major 
element of the transitional constitution that paved the way for peaceful elections 
and the handover of political power to the African National Congress (ANC) 
in 1994. Hartmann shows in his chapter that decentralisation of power and re-
sources was a kind of exit strategy for the outgoing white elites, not so much in 
the sense of keeping or creating a white homeland, but in building vertical ac-
countability and a balance of power in a system of government with limited hori-
zontal accountability. Although the white parties (and some black allies such as 
the Inkatha Freedom Party) had struggled for a full-blown federal constitution, 
the ANC had opted for a strong central government, and thus decentralisation 
was the only possible constitutional compromise.  
There are many more African cases where decentralisation is part of a bigger 
package of institutional reforms and policies in countries that are recovering from 
extended periods of violent conflict and civil strife. In his chapter on Rwanda , 
Van Tilburg addresses the question of decentralisation for political, economic 
and social stability , i.e. the role of decentralisation in addressing latent conflict 
at national level. Decentralisation is seen as a broader strategy, among others, in 
creating a stable political dispensation in a ‘post-conflict’ setting, thus allowing 
for economic growth and the building of social capital and trust among the dif-
ferent segments of the population. In the Namibian case, as shown by Hartmann, 
decentralisation is seen as a necessary instrument to tackle the inequalities pro-
duced by a long history of racial segregation by providing for a more efficient dis-
tribution of services and by creating new and strong municipalities from racially 
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mixed neighbourhoods. Even the ANC government in South Africa clearly and 
strongly subscribes to such a vision of decentralisation in the sense of an institu-
tional strategy aimed at overcoming the legacies of Apartheid rule.  
Schelnberger’s contribution on Uganda , on the contrary, is concerned with vio-
lent and latent conflicts at the local level. It makes clear that decentralisation is not 
necessarily an institutional strategy for solving conflicts between national conflict 
parties or between a central government and an ethnic opposition. If decentrali-
sation is bringing government closer to the people, democratic local government 
is – theoretically – providing for an arena for solving local conflicts. The example 
of Kibaale district from Uganda reveals that the problem starts from defining 
what the appropriate ‘arena’ is. The drawing of local boundaries and the inclusion 
and exclusion of groups within local government may actually increase politi-
cal and social conflicts. In other words, an established local government with an 
identifiable local political community may represent an arena for solving conflicts 
within this community. Decentralisation , on the contrary, is typically the process 
of creating ex nihilo local government structures or of modifying existing ones, 
and these processes of institutional change create winners and losers and produce 
struggles over membership (rights) in these new local communities which may 
strongly reduce the problem-solving capacity of these decentralised structures.  
Students of African politics may identify many other instances of local re-
source conflicts with a similarly ambiguous role of decentralisation policies. The 
limited number of case studies collected in this book certainly does not allow for 
generalisation, but these few remarks clearly show that in analysing the relation-
ship between decentralisation and conflict it is important to clearly define and 
differentiate which conflicts, violent or latent, local or national, are influenced by 
decentralisation.
2.2. Decentralisation as a direct strategy of confl ict management 
The chapters give few indications that decentralisation was a direct strategy in 
tackling the various conflicts. Uganda is the case which comes nearest to such 
a strategy, although this aspect is not the main research object of Schelnberger 
in her analysis of decentralisation in Kibaale district. Decentralisation did serve 
the ruling government in Kampala in defusing the ethno-regional challenge from 
Buganda and other former kingdoms at the time of the Constitutional Assembly 
in the early 1990s. It was much less successful in ending the challenge from the 
northern groups, privileged by Museveni ’s predecessors Amin and Obote, which 
are at least tacitly still supporting the rebellion of the Lord’s Resistance Army. 
Uganda also clearly shows how much the precise format of decentralisation 
does matter. By steadily increasing the number of districts, President Museveni 
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was able to fragment any ethno-regional opposition to his regime, whether origi-
nating from the north or from Buganda . Yet, while securing his political survival 
at the national level and maintaining his reputation of having pacified Uganda 
after years of turmoil, the strategy of decentralisation had the disadvantage of 
increasing localised resource conflicts. The creation of new districts mostly hap-
pened on the basis of ethnic criteria thereby ethnicising political identities and 
wrongly suggesting that each ethnic group could have their ‘own’ district. In con-
texts of strong migration, such a decentralisation policy automatically leads to 
conflicts between autochthonous and immigrant groups over citizenship rights 
in these newly-created districts. The successful management of a national con-
flict might thus come at a price, i.e. the creation of new localised conflicts. Other 
states such as Mozambique or Mali have opted for a less radical strategy and kept 
a more limited number of provinces/districts.
The other cases covered in this book are rather atypical of ethno-racial con-
flict in Sub-Saharan Africa insofar as political conflict is mainly not a competi-
tion among equal contenders with territorially separate settlement areas. Conflict 
among different ethnic groups, each mainly living in a different region of the 
country and competing for scarce state resources, has indeed occurred in most 
Sub-Saharan African countries, such as Uganda . While presidents and army of-
ficers have certainly privileged some ethnic groups over others, this has still re-
mained a horizontal competition which can be addressed through a territorial 
strategy, i.e. by granting autonomy or decision rights to the government of a ter-
ritorially defined area. As these regions, districts or provinces are dominated by 
specific ethnic groups, this policy will automatically benefit these ethnic groups 
(or their leaders). For example, the ethnic groups inhabiting the Casamance re-
gion in southern Senegal would certainly consider the granting of more extended 
autonomy rights to the provincial government of Casamance as a significant in-
strument of conflict management .
South Africa , Namibia , but also Rwanda (and to a lesser extent Mauritius ) 
are, on the contrary, typical cases of ethnically-ranked societies, i.e. societies 
where ethnic identity corresponds with social status or political rights. In these 
countries one ethnic, religious or racial group had succeeded in dominating the 
state apparatus in order to serve their own group interests, and to consolidate 
this dominance through either formalised institutions or strong informal norms.3 
This was the case of the white settlers in Namibia and South Africa and of the 
Tutsi minority in Rwanda (helped by the German and later Belgian colonial au-
thorities). In these countries ethnic affiliation did not correspond with settlement 
patterns, so that the various groups lived side-by-side in mixed neighbourhoods, 
thereby increasing the likelihood of violent conflict . The main root cause of con-
flict is not the demand for political autonomy, but the quest for full citizenship 
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and the ending of social, cultural, economic and political marginalisation (which 
under a democratic constitution equals the end of ethnic domination).  
It thus becomes clear why decentralisation is of limited relevance in such a 
context. The granting of more political competencies or resources to devolved 
units of government alone does not address the grievances of conflict parties. 
Given the specific legacies of Apartheid rule or genocide in Rwanda , territorial 
autonomy could hardly be the direct answer to ethno-racial conflict in Rwanda, 
South Africa or Namibia . 
2.3. Decentralisation as an indirect strategy of confl ict management 
In the introduction to this book we identified several indirect conflict -mitigating 
or conflict-intensifying effects of decentralisation on conflict. Drawing on the 
material from our case studies, we will see to what extent these effects could be 
identified in Rwanda , Uganda , South Africa , Namibia and Mauritius .
The first conflict -mitigating effect consisted in the political inclusion of new 
groups. In other words, decentralisation is supposed to increase the representa-
tive character of the political system, especially in heterogeneous societies with 
territorially-concentrated minorities. Yet, there is little evidence of this process 
occurring in the five countries, although it has already been pointed out that 
these countries have relatively few territorially-concentrated minorities. Decen-
tralisation did not achieve this effect in Uganda or Rwanda , for instance, where 
some segments of the population remain outside the formal institutions. Ad-
ditionally, the successful inclusion of various previously marginalised groups in 
South Africa or Namibia has not been a product of decentralisation policies, 
but of the broader transformation process in both countries. The symbolic value 
of the control of municipalities for formerly marginalised or oppressed groups 
should not be downplayed, however, even if these administrations are lacking the 
resources to make a difference in the lives of their populations.  
It was also argued that decentralisation can foster political stability and national 
unity through granting greater autonomy to confl icting groups, who are forced to en-
ter into a formal bargaining process with the government. Th is seems to have partly 
happened in South Africa and Namibia where oppositional parties chose to partici-
pate in local government. Although there was little risk that these groups were go-
ing to re-engage in violent rebellion against the government, the pure fact of formal 
participation and involvement in local institutions has exposed them to regular and 
offi  cial contacts with governmental actors at local, regional, and national level. 
The case studies also provide little evidence of stronger state penetration of lo-
cal areas through decentralisation. Decentralisation might indeed have extended 
administrative services to rural regions in Namibia , South Africa or Uganda that 
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were poorly served before, but the limited empirical evidence from our cases sug-
gests that increased legitimacy for the central state is rather achieved through 
elite consensus and not via a more solid support by populations that still feel 
marginalised, or in some cases indeed remain economically marginalised despite 
official decentralisation policies (Uganda, Namibia).
What about the conflict -intensifying indirect effects of decentralisation? There 
is little evidence from our case studies that decentralisation has fuelled violent 
conflict at the national level, either by strengthening disloyal political forces or by 
exacerbating regional differences in socio-economic development . Schelnberger’s 
case study does demonstrate, however, that a specific design of decentralisation 
might increase the likelihood of violent conflict at the local level. There is a lot of 
scepticism, especially in the Uganda and Southern Africa chapters, about whether 
local governments are sufficiently well prepared to handle conflict among differ-
ent communities under their jurisdiction. Control of the local government often 
becomes one of the main sources of conflict, i.e. this ‘trophy’ is a cause of conflict 
not a way to solve it. Even in less politicised circumstances, administrators are 
often inexperienced, new legal norms are difficult to handle, and in many African 
countries there are additional problems of how to accommodate traditional lead-
ers within local government structures. 
There is also little evidence for the assumption that a stronger degree of devo-
lution might be more beneficial for conflict management , either because a more 
accountable, better-serviced citizenry might be able to sort out whatever differ-
ences they have in peaceful ways, or be able to overcome the legacies of a violent 
past. Unfortunately, democracy, especially if narrowly conceived as majority rule, 
is not always a viable strategy for managing conflicts between different communi-
ties within a local government area. With the notable exception of South Africa 
and Namibia , political decentralisation in most African countries has re-intro-
duced first-past-the-post electoral systems thereby creating few incentives for 
coalition-building and inter-ethnic accommodation.  
Although the small number of contributions collected in this volume do not 
allow us to draw further conclusions on the role of decentralisation for conflict 
management , they certainly warn us against too much optimism. Decentralisa-
tion is always a complex set of political interventions with many intended and un-
intended effects. Only empirical analysis can tell us whether these effects actually 
occur and how their results vary or not in the different decentralised units across 
a country. Not every type of decentralisation is beneficial for the management of 
the various conflicts that may exist at national or local level. It needs both strong 
political commitment and clever institutional engineering to anticipate negative 
effects and to hinder conflict parties from capturing the decentralisation project 
for their own narrow interests.  
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2.4. Poverty Reduction = Confl ict Management? 
If socio-economic grievances are thought to be the main root cause of conflict 
then decentralisation as poverty alleviation might represent a viable strategy of 
conflict management . All chapters show that the main aims of decentralisation 
are related to better service delivery and indeed to an improvement in the socio-
economic conditions of the population in the rural areas. The crucial point which 
was highlighted above in the comparative analysis of the poverty-related chapters, 
is, however, that these effects can materialise only under the condition that de-
centralisation is effectively implemented. A misconceived or half-hearted imple-
mentation may lead to more frustration than a straightforward centralist policy, 
and, in turn, may not only fail to uplift the social and economic situation of the 
population, but also may escalate conflicts, especially where specific population 
groups are more adversely affected by poverty than others. 
The main focus of the conflict chapters is not on the actual implementation 
of service delivery , though Van Tilburg is quite optimistic concerning the actual 
role of socio-economic improvements for the reconciliation process and the re-
construction of social stability in Rwanda . It could also be argued on the basis of 
Hartmann’s chapter that the broad socio-economic improvement in South Africa 
has reconciled many black South Africans to a political and socio-economic set-
tlement of the Apartheid conflict which remained below their historical aspi-
rations. It is, however, not clear to what extent these improvements are indeed 
related to the actual process of decentralisation. For example, the South African 
municipalities have a prominent role in service delivery, but most of the resources 
are still collected at the national level. 
Developmental actors will keep their faith in the conflict -mitigating role of 
poverty reduction programmes, especially with regard to local resource con-
flicts. Our analysis warns against too much optimism, however: even where 
these programmes effectively reduce poverty and thus socio-economic griev-
ances, there is no guarantee that this will also reduce the likelihood of violent 
conflict. 
3. Th e Future of Decentralisation in Sub-Saharan Africa 
We pointed out in the introduction to this book that decentralisation remains 
a popular concept in African politics, with most governments adopting at least 
some parts of its legal instruments and policies. Democratic reforms gave a new 
stimulus to many of these processes, shifting the emphasis from economic and 
administrative efficiency towards political accountability of administrators and 
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the introduction of elected councils at various levels of government. As return-
ing to a more centralised form of government is hardly on the agenda in Sub-
Saharan Africa , decentralisation is likely to remain as a ‘normal’ feature of Afri-
can politics. The various contributions to this book have identified a number of 
constraints, some of which apply to policy implementation in general and some 
of which are more specific to decentralisation, for instance, local elite capture 
and the lack of political will by national elites to seriously consider any loss of 
direct control over resources. 
The analyses collected in this book give a rather sober assessment of what 
decentralisation in its current form can achieve in terms of poverty alleviation 
and conflict management . While none of the contributors entirely questions 
the general wisdom of decentralisation, some highlight conceptual weaknesses 
while others stress problems of implementation. The fight against poverty and 
the peaceful management of the various regional, national, and local conflicts are 
indeed Herculean tasks that no single policy instrument can achieve. We should 
therefore not expect decentralisation to deliver something that larger interven-
tions (both national and international), with more resources and political com-
mitment, have failed to do. 
Decentralisation is also a thorny research topic. The content of the concept it-
self is contested and it is difficult even to achieve agreement among policy-makers 
and researchers about what should be researched and analysed. Not only are na-
tional processes of decentralisation thus difficult to assess, but it becomes even 
more cumbersome as we move down to the regional and local level, given that the 
actual practice and outcomes of decentralisation can vary significantly within a 
single country. The comparison of decentralisation policies is thus a methodo-
logically demanding endeavour, at least if one wants to move beyond the analysis 
of policy papers and towards the real effects on the ground.
There is a growing trend to assess decentralisation only in its aggregate effects 
at the national level, independently of whether one is interested in its effects on 
poverty or conflict . Without denying the analytical value of this growing body 
of research, this book has brought together a number of original analyses that 
present mostly qualitative data collected by country specialists on the ground. 
It is thus reflective of both the manifold research methods of our contribu-
tors and of the different realities in various Sub-Saharan countries. It is hoped 
that the contributions herein have succeeded in enhancing our understanding 
of the interactions between decentralisation reforms and the complex realities 
of African societies, most notably in the areas of poverty reduction and conflict 
management .
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 Notes
 This section further develops Susan Steiner’s line of argument that she applies specifically 
to Uganda, though with an expanded list of potential constraints. 
 This argument corresponds largely with that put forward by Crook (: ) to explain 
the apparently exceptional case of West Bengal, with successful poverty reduction under-
stood as due to the state government’s ‘ideological commitment to anti-poverty policies’. 
In this instance the ruling Left Front government has implemented decentralisation as a 
means to challenge local elite resistance to mass-based policies and to mobilise an elec-
toral alliance in favour of such policies.
 The idea of ranked and unranked societies is further explored in Donald L. Horowitz, 
, ‘Three Dimensions of Ethnic Politics’, World Politics, Vol.  No. , pp. -.
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